University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

March 2018

The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding's
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: A Path Toward
Epistemic Progress
Dahlia Guzman
University of South Florida, dahlia.guzman@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Guzman, Dahlia, "The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: A Path Toward Epistemic
Progress" (2018). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7626

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: A Path
Toward Epistemic Progress

by

Dahlia Guzman

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Alex Levine, Ph.D.
Stephen Turner, Ph.D.
Joanne Waugh, Ph.D.
Wei Zhang, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
February 22, 2018

Keywords: Quine, feminist philosophy of science, feminist epistemology, critical theory

Copyright © 2018, Dahlia Guzman

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation is a culmination of sorts, but I believe it is more aptly described as
another harvest for me. I’ve learned so much. Heartfelt thanks to Dr. Alex Levine for his good
humor, hard work, and patience. Without his guidance, I’d be way out in the weeds! I thank my
professors and colleagues from UTPA and Kent State University for preparing me so well. I
thank my wonderful family and friends who encouraged me and supported me throughout this
crazy and exhilarating process, and forgave my absence from so much. I especially thank my
USF colleagues who, over the past six years, mentored me, tutored me, fed me, bought me
beers, propped me up, made me laugh, and kept me going. You all know who you are; I’m
lucky to know you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter One: Modern and Quinean Naturalized Epistemologies ..................................................16
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................16
Modern Epistemology and Science: Shared Histories .......................................................18
Internalism vs. Externalism ...........................................................................................................23
Foundationalism vs. Coherentism ..................................................................................................35
Quine's Naturalized Epistemology.................................................................................................41
Chapter Two: Feminist Epistemologies .........................................................................................54
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................54
The Emancipatory Promise ............................................................................................................60
Critical Feminist Responses to Quine ............................................................................................68
Chapter Three: Standpoint Epistemologies ...................................................................................88
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................88
Standpoint Theories .......................................................................................................................93
Feminist Standpoint Epistemologies..............................................................................................97
Ideologies and Critical Theory.....................................................................................................103
Strong Objectivity ............................................................................................................116
FSE's Controversy and Productivity ................................................................................124
FSE's Naturalistic Epistemology .....................................................................................129
Chapter Four: Naturalisms ...........................................................................................................134
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................134
Naturalism in a Broad Context ........................................................................................138
Harding's Critical View of Naturalism ............................................................................146
Standpoint as a Resource for Epistemology ....................................................................151
References ....................................................................................................................................156

i

ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint
theory in the philosophy of science, and its application to epistemology. Strategic naturalism
stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject
to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no
clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition
as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why
Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in
epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a
social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader
network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would
invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic
difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing
but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject.
Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized
Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern
epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that
epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that
the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and

ii

cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in
epistemology, science, and philosophy of science.
Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist
responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The
justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques
provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment
with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of
science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns.
Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more
naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific
practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on
epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared
histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource
for a more naturalistic epistemology.
The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate
FSE insights and make use of FSE’s controversiality in continued efforts to naturalize
epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness
and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and
reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of
knowing subjects we are would foster epistemic progress.
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INTRODUCTION
Epistemology’s search for a definitive set of principles by which to justify knowledge
claims is a search for an “unmovable” Archimedean point. As a normative discipline,
epistemology, understood more broadly, is charged with a variety of issues that include the
creation, the evaluation and dissemination of knowledge; ascertaining the necessary and
sufficient conditions of knowledge, its sources, and its limits; defining concepts of justification,
and the criteria by which to judge them sound. The attempt to find a definitive set of epistemic
principles also determines what progress looks like for epistemology. In the introduction to his
anthology, Epistemology Futures (2006), Stephen Hetherington asserts that, in fact,
epistemology’s “telos is either to be, or to generate, epistemological progress”; and as long as
epistemology continues, “it can have no more general a goal than that of making progress.”1 He
acknowledges that occasions of epistemological progress may not be recognizable. They cannot
be predicted or guaranteed to have occurred, in part, because progress is difficult to define.

What are its distinguishing marks? Are there special kinds of evidence we should
have if we are to support claims of [epistemological achievement]? How good
must the evidence be? … On what grounds should we assess an idea as
constituting epistemological progress? What would make our assessment true? 2

1

Stephen Hetherington. “Introduction: Epistemological Progress.” Epistemology Futures. Stephen Hetherington,
Editor. Clarendon Press. 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central.
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usf/detail.action?docID=422899. pp.1.
2
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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Hetherington makes room for the possibility that new epistemic standards might be needed in
order to correctly understand the points of progress in the discipline. Indeed, this is one of the
underlying assumptions of naturalistic, embodied, social, and standpoint epistemologies: new
epistemic standards are needed. Hetherington’s anthology offers candidates for new epistemic
standards. Naturalized epistemology is one of these candidates, although it is not new.
Naturalized, embodied, social, and standpoint epistemologies respond to different parts
of the project of epistemology even as they agree on its importance. In their distinctive ways,
each is a critical response to the standard view that such a singular point of view for justifying
knowledge is valuable or possible. What I am driven to understand in this dissertation is why
certain naturalistic approaches have not been considered candidates for epistemic progress. Since
the 1970s and 80s, feminist standpoint epistemologies have offered strong critiques of definitive
elements of epistemology including its central normative task, its general approach, and the
knowledge it has produced. Hetherington suggests that “possibly, within epistemology … maybe
more should be in flux [and] even some well-entrenched projects need to be re-evaluated.” 3 I
agree. I enter this discussion of re-evaluating epistemology’s project by discussing the
continuity between Quine’s move to push epistemology forward, and the continued push by
feminist scholars. Finally, I offer an exposition and a defense of the theoretical approach of
Sandra Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Theory (FSE). Sandra Harding's work is in the philosophy
of science, but she has been a prolific analyst of the implications of her theoretical stance in
disciplines outside of philosophy of science. Harding asserts that the goals and tasks set by and
for philosophers of science have never been static. Similarly, criticism of her work and her
engagement with those criticisms impels feminist philosophers of science to search for ways to
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Ibid., p. 7, emphasis added.
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better understand the relationship between humans and the world. I argue that this search can be
extended to epistemology more generally. For this reason, throughout this dissertation, I will talk
about Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Theory and the naturalistic epistemology it entails as
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology (FSE). If Harding is correct in her assessment that
epistemology and science are two parts of the same project, then they should be in dialogue with
each other, without any attempt to give priority to either.
Facilitating this kind of naturalistic inquiry should be a task epistemology adds to its
repertoire. Epistemology that is naturalistic in the manner Harding prescribes most certainly
retains its normative aspect. However, it does so by trading in its epistemic absolutes for guiding
principles, such as those put forth by Harding, which are based on actual practices, informed by
the goal or purpose of the inquiry, and supported by empirical data and the tools and methods of
a specific discipline. Guiding principles aid in the formulation of questions about and the study
of subject matter that is new, approached from a new perspective, or motivated by a new goal or
circumstances, with the view that the ideal of objective knowledge—in the Archimedean sense—
or absolute truth is one that will never be attained. 4 The feminist engagement with the issue of
values in philosophy of science provides what I will argue is a strong impetus toward an
improved naturalistic interpretation of the epistemic relationship between humans and the world.
One claim I make is that traditional epistemology has made little substantive progress in
our understanding of knowledge, and especially in our understanding of the kinds of knowing
subjects we are. While it’s fair to concede that some move towards naturalizing has been made,
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Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief.” In Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential
Readings & Interpretive Essays, Second Edition. John J. Stuhr, Editor. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000.
pp.68-69. Peirce argues that reason and experience are essential for knowledge. Importantly, experience that is
reexamined and re-verified becomes a guiding principle-- something we already know that is used to find out what
we do not know.

3

the naturalizing has not been satisfactory. The naturalized epistemology formulated by Quine
offers some valuable changes but ultimately fails to aid in the progress of epistemology. Further,
I claim that feminist critiques are the best place to find the resources for epistemic progress, and
more specifically, the naturalism fostered by Harding is the most viable of the feminist critiques
and would invigorate the projects of epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and
respect for epistemic difference that would expand our working assumptions about human
experience and its influence on rationality. Some valuable insights and methods yielded by
Harding's naturalistic approach have been incorporated in the philosophy of sciences as well as
by the sciences themselves and have been theoretically productive as well. This productivity
supports a claim that the naturalism at work in FSE is a viable path toward epistemological
progress, especially since general epistemology has remained resistant to feminist insights.
In light of these ideas about the relation between epistemological progress and naturalism,
W.V.O. Quine’s analysis is important. Quine determined epistemological progress to have
stalled because of the failures and limitations of received epistemology, and offered an
alternative: a naturalized epistemology that was an acceptable candidate even to those
epistemologists who rejected all or part of his account and critique of epistemology. My
discussion of Quine serves as a starting point for talking about the applications of naturalism to
epistemic concerns. As I discuss in ensuing chapters, relatively few post-Quinean Anglophone
philosophers would deny their commitment to some form of naturalism. These forms of
naturalism, however, maintain a broad set of commitments concerning accounts of beliefs, and
the nature of human subjects, and their rationality, among other things. Feminist scholars would
contend these commitments preclude acknowledgment of epistemic difference that have
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important implications for those aforementioned concepts. On the one hand, that Harding is a
naturalist is not all that controversial. On the other hand, Harding’s brand of naturalism is
distinctive in its embrace of epistemic difference that I have named ‘strategic naturalism,” which
requires recognition and inclusion of alternative methods of knowing, that necessitate periodic
self-reflection, and re-visiting definitions, concepts, methods, and theoretical models.
For Harding, naturalism begins with understanding two things: 1) the actual scientific
practices and theoretical models being used and 2) the social and cultural values and forces that
have shaped these practices, and how they’ve constituted the objects of study. Social and cultural
values do not necessarily lead to bad science, but to science that is more sensitive or responsive
to those groups in society who are marginalized. This approach is how her kind of naturalism
and the version of objectivity she utilizes contribute to emancipatory values. It is pluralistic in
its orientation, and given its emancipatory goals, it is motivated to measure epistemic progress in
terms of how accessible it is to marginalized standpoints as well as to how the knowledge
produced might improve the lives of marginalized groups.
What Harding argues for is recognition that, beyond the fact that epistemic labor in its
scientific and non-scientific forms is a social activity, epistemic labor is situated in and
reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. This approach has
several implications. From a scientific standpoint, the underdetermination thesis looms large.
Evidence can be explained by any number of seemingly conflicting theories or models. Any
claim might be true, any belief may be revised. If this is true in the sciences, it might be of
service in epistemology as well. This approach was what Quine was attempting with his
naturalized epistemology. One of the reasons why epistemology, both the non-naturalized and
Quinean naturalized varieties, has been resistant to feminist insights is that critical feminist
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responses put interests and values back into the process of inquiry. The worry is that such
insights will inevitably led to relativism. This response is characteristic of epistemology
informed by the Archimedean point of view noted at the outset. Relatedly, the notion that the
relation between epistemology and science is or must be hierarchical should be abandoned. I
interpret Harding’s position to be that epistemology and science are not and have never been
isolated pursuits and fighting for primacy is unproductive. Harding's response to the charge of
pernicious relativism levelled against FSE is that the problematic relativism is not necessarily
entailed in FSE since it is simply not the case that we are caught between no epistemological
standards or “a crowd of incommensurable heterogeneous” standards. First, there are local,
practical standards that allow for scientific inquiry to happen. In a similar way, I claim that such
standards are possible in epistemological debates.5 The second part of her response is “strong
objectivity.” This idea replaces the kind of objectivity and value-neutrality that have been taken
as essential aims of both epistemology and scientific inquiry. Harding links strong objectivity to
the emancipatory aspect of FSE. In this approach, different knowledge cultures have independent
claims to epistemic warrant. Harding describes this arrangement as a distinction between
historical (sociological or cultural) relativism and judgmental (epistemic) relativism.
Furthermore, she claims that historical relativism does not necessarily entail judgmental
relativism. From an epistemic standpoint, feminist scholars’ deliberate use of plural terms
“knowers” or “scientists” problematizes epistemology’s use of the singular, not only in terms of
which method best justifies epistemic claims, but also which claims are given primacy. Ásta
Sveinstόttir has interpreted the focus on clarity in analytic philosophy and its attitude that “no
claim and no argument is too holy to touch, none too offensive” as
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Sandra Harding. “How Many Epistemologies Should Guide the Production of Scientific Knowledge? A response
to Maffie, Mendieta and Wylie.” Hypatia. 23(4) (Oct-Dec 2008), pp. 213.
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“radical egalitarian potential.” 6 This claim is like the claim in epistemology concerning the
value of objectivity and value neutrality; namely, that all claims would be evaluated
evenhandedly. But this, I would submit, is just not the case. The supposed egalitarianism in
epistemology is missing, just as it had been missing in science. In this context, egalitarianism
would mean that epistemic subjects would enjoy the same fundamental status as it relates to
epistemic claims and justificatory assertions. As I discuss in detail in chapter two, women and
marginalized peoples have not enjoyed the same fundamental status as White, Western men. I
think the resistance to feminist insights has as much to do with protecting deeply held
metaphysical commitments to things that are difficult, if not impossible, for human subjects to
achieve -- including the ideal, Archimedean point-- as it does with avoiding epistemic
relativism. This ideal requires separating oneself from the object of study in order to see it in
relation to all other things, while remaining independent of both. Harding’s goal is to recognize
the necessity for standpoints from every culture to have access to evidence, claims to rationality,
and the grounds for arguing alternative ways to create objects and interpret events. This ideal is
especially relevant when the objects of study are human beings, as well as their cultures and
behaviors. As noted previously, pursuing the Archimedean point results in the persistent view
that science and epistemology are distinctive or special projects because they can claim
objectivity in the strongest sense, but also that the kinds of subjects doing this work are
paradigmatically rational and objective. Harding’s position is therefore taken as a move toward a
pernicious relativism that is further vitiated by the circularity of the grounding of FSE.
Harding’s response, however, is that epistemology and science are based on the study of and
reflection on nature and humans who respond to, impinge on, and change nature, and on the

6

Ásta Sveinstόttir. “To Do Metaphysics as a Feminist: Reflections on Feminist Methodology in Light of the
Hypatia Affair.” APA Newsletter: Feminism and Philosophy. Vol 17 (1): Fall 2017. p. 2.
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recursive transformations that ensue. She takes as given the fundamental circularity of human
subjects studying nature, of which we are a part. We study it and attempt some amount of
separation but can never entirely achieve it. This kind of circularity is important because it takes
seriously what ‘situated’ means. As I note at the outset of chapter one, Harding places great
importance on the shared historical development of science and epistemology, and their
commitments to knowledge claims about the world and humanity made by fungible subjects.
Harding’s assertion is that we constantly leave ourselves out of the equation, and that this
omission is untenable. Consequently, we should restructure our approaches and the epistemic
goals of our pursuit of knowledge to include human experience. And if we do so, the chance of a
more accurate and trustworthy model or explanation of the world is improved, and knowledge of
the world and ourselves as well.
The main topic of this dissertation is feminist naturalistic epistemologies. I make a claim
that feminist standpoint epistemology (FSE) provides a more authentic naturalistic method for
inquiry in its broadest sense, and further, that it should be a resource for epistemology. The
problems I ponder throughout include: What is non-naturalized epistemology, and how is
Quine’s proposal an improvement? In what ways are feminist epistemologies naturalistic and
how do they improve on Quinean Naturalized Epistemology? I take as given the position that a
naturalistic epistemology is a viable and desirable goal, and that it can contribute to epistemic
progress. To achieve this however, I argue that this requires a markedly different conception of
naturalism from Quine’s. Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology is the most
efficacious approach to a naturalistic epistemology that contributes to the progress of knowledge
production as it is studied in epistemology and practiced in scientific inquiry.
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This dissertation is also partially a consideration of the issue of naturalism in
epistemology as a distinguishing mark of epistemic progress, or the attempt at it. Naturalism, in
its manifold definitions, is often touted as a path toward epistemic progress, and I argue that it
can be. Reality as many non-feminist epistemologies have conceived it is a somewhat static
conglomeration of objects and humans whereby humans maintain their epistemic integrity in a
variety of ways: experiencing, deliberating, and acting within the confines of formal or
mechanistic rules. This view leaves little conceptual space for the notion that humans and nature
are co-constituted or for exploring how social and cultural beliefs shape what we believe reality
is like. On the other hand, feminist standpoint epistemologies advocate a naturalism that
recognizes and values the role of social and cultural beliefs that express epistemic difference and
its influence on epistemic labor and claims it as epistemic progress.

Chapter Outline
Chapter 1 is motivated by two purposes. The first is to give an account of both nonnaturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE) to show their
similarities. Secondly, details of their similarities provide the ground for my claim that QNE
fails as naturalized epistemology. I explain what non-naturalized epistemology is and describe
just two particular debates in the discipline. I then focus on Quine’s naturalized epistemology
with the goal of showing how it fails to improve on non-naturalized epistemology. QNE is useful
to me in that it serves as a pivotal point of feminist commendation and critique. I frame this
discussion in the opening section of the chapter by laying out Harding’s historical account of the
related projects of modern epistemology and science. I use this discussion to highlight two
important issues. The first issue is that epistemology, as a philosophical endeavor, is more

9

complex than the story of epistemology Quine offers in “Epistemology Naturalized” (1968). The
second and more important issue is that the shared histories and development of modern
epistemology and science bring to the fore the vast influence of social and cultural values on that
history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology and philosophy of
science. The second section of the chapter begins with non-naturalized epistemology as
comprised of two interrelated debates of modern epistemology, before turning to Quine’s view to
determine whether QNE is in fact a viable and sufficiently naturalistic alternative to modern
epistemology. I will argue that it is not, since it shares at least two problematic assumptions with
modern epistemology. First, they both center on reductionistic accounts of the epistemic process
and the characteristics of the epistemic subjects these accounts entail. Quine’s naturalized
epistemology calls for a reliance on the sensory stimuli of individuals as the basis of justification
for knowledge claims, though admittedly, these raw perceptions must go through another process
in order to become claims. This idea was Quine’s response to modern epistemology’s working
acceptance that there is a set of beliefs that serve as foundational for the justification of
knowledge claims. The complexity of epistemological and cognitive processes is reduced to
sensory data in Quine’s theory, and as a foundational set of beliefs in epistemology. The second
is the shared problem of “blind spots” that arise from what can be described as a lack of
appreciation for the situatedness of the epistemic subject, as well as a limitations cast upon the
overall epistemological project. The section on modern epistemology is neither historically or
conceptually exhaustive but limited to two debates in the field that help provide some context for
Quine’s proposal. The first debate concerns the structure of the grounds for knowledge claims
and the role access and reliability play in justification: Internalism vs. Externalism. The second
debate deals with the relationship between evidence and knowledge claims, and the metaphors
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used to express them: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism. This section has two functions. I want
to show that the complexities of just two of the many conceptual issues give us good reasons to
assume that epistemology is a complex, multi-faceted project with many conceptual issues that
are far from resolved. In virtue of this function, the second purpose is to shed light on Quine’s
naturalized epistemology and how it rests on an incomplete picture of epistemology—reducing it
to a few issues that are but a small part of the larger project. The shared history and assumptions
of modern epistemology and modern science outlined by Harding support the claim that Quine’s
naturalized epistemology is not an efficacious successor to modern epistemology. In the last part
of the chapter, I set out the ways Quine’s naturalized epistemology is still ensconced in the same
problems that plague modern epistemology. Like modern epistemology, QNE maintains
assumptions regarding knowers, whether they be individuals or communities, that makes no
allowances for the influence and role of social values and interests, nor the gender relations that
inform them.
With a clear view of how QNE falls short of its promise of naturalizing epistemology, the
issue of the feminist responses to Quine, both negative and positive, is taken up in chapter two.
The first part of the chapter is devoted to the earliest critical feminist responses to modern, nonfeminist epistemology, and to Quine’s naturalized epistemology. These various feminist critiques
of QNE highlight the relevance of the historical epistemological project on the critical feminist
response. These feminist scholars situate themselves as laying the foundations of successor
projects that provide worthwhile, more naturalistic, and less scientistic options for the practice of
epistemology and philosophies of science. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the
problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive
response to QNE, as well as for the feminists’ disenchantment with Quine’s proposal.
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Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess Quine’s naturalized
epistemology as not naturalized enough to address their concerns.
In large part, chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for
critical feminist responses to various aspects of epistemological theory discussed in chapter one,
both non-naturalized and naturalized. I lay out the common elements that tie the various feminist
critiques together. This discussion is followed by an account of the reception of QNE in feminist
scholarship. QNE was initially understood as a promising possibility for movement away from
distorted, androcentric theories and approaches that have dominated, and continue to dominate,
epistemology and philosophies of science. The discussion then focuses on three particular
feminist responses: feminist empiricism, the consilience model of justification, and local
epistemology. All three are categorized as social and naturalistic epistemologies since all three
assert a) that epistemic labor and the production of knowledge take place at the community level
rather than at the individual level, b) that epistemic labor and knowledge production are social
and gendered projects, in which social value and interests can contribute in a positive way to
‘good science’, and finally, c) that knowledge, justification, and objectivity must be reconceived
to include these communal and social elements as important and productive elements of
epistemologies and philosophies of science that are construed to be naturalistic . This
naturalizing is therefore an improvement upon historical, non-feminist epistemologies and
philosophies of science. QNE and the feminist responses share some features but ultimately,
QNE is determined to be too similar to non-naturalized epistemologies and philosophies of
science since it shares shortcomings that lead to distorted and sometimes, false knowledge: a
narrow and reductive conception of a human subject, its rationality, its place in the natural world,
and its relation to other human subjects.
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Chapter three is a discussion of a fourth critical feminist response to historical
epistemology and philosophy of science—that of feminist standpoint epistemologies.
Specifically, my objective here is to provide some support for the claim that feminist standpoint
epistemologies are far more naturalistic and therefore better at providing a multi-faceted theory
that 1) is based on actual scientific practice, 2) is validated by outside scientific/epistemic
communities, and 3) re-introduces social values and interests as a possible positive influence on
epistemology and philosophies of science. These are the result of critical and reflective analyses
that are deemed necessary characteristics of scientific practices, the epistemologies that underlie
them, and the philosophies of science that study them. The section begins with a definition of
standpoint epistemology and an outline of the common elements shared by the various sorts of
standpoint epistemology. This is followed by a justification for my reliance on Sandra Harding’s
FSE as the canonical version of standpoint theory with which to contrast the other critical
feminist responses discussed in the previous chapter. I discuss the definitive elements of
standpoint theories, including the role of a post-modern position, as exemplified by Donna
Haraway and others that work as foils to Harding’s FSE. Harding claims first, that FSE is a
successor to both modern, and feminist empiricist philosophies of science and, given the closely
shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE also serves as a
resource for a more naturalistic epistemology.
The fourth and final chapter focuses on varieties of naturalism, with some historical
background on how the meaning of the term changed, even as it remained in use. This partly
explains why there is a general commitment to naturalism, despite there being no clear
agreement on what it is. Harding reads this lack of clarity not as a weakness, but as an indication
of the generative possibilities for her emancipatory goal, and for epistemic progress. The
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naturalism she finds problematic is one that attempts the closest approximation of the God’s-eye
view, which has resulted in an epistemology that is too rigid to recognize epistemic difference,
and blind to the positive contribution epistemic difference can make to our epistemological
understanding and practice. Harding’s brand of strategic naturalism is a pluralistic and
naturalistic approach that would make a meaningful contribution to the project of naturalizing
epistemology and advancing epistemic progress.
Strategic naturalism would do this by problematizing relevant elements of inquiry. These
elements are historically and culturally situated, and the determination of the efficacy and
applicability of analytic categories, key concepts, and assumptions at work in inquiries requires
they be subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. This reflection and analysis includes
considering the position of the inquirers and the goals of the inquiry. Harding’s theory has
motivated critical reflection and discussion that has contributed positively to philosophy of
science. Evidence of this is found in the debate and discussion, from different marginalized
standpoints, that have helped in the production of less distorted accounts of phenomena being
studied in science. I argue that Harding’s strategic naturalism can be applied to the
epistemological project with the hope of the recognition of the value of epistemic difference in
our pursuit of knowledge. Harding’s strategic naturalism measures epistemic progress in terms of
how accessible it is to marginalized standpoints as well as to how the knowledge produced might
improve the lives of marginalized peoples. Applied to epistemology, it would more effectively
naturalize epistemology by revisiting its well-established assumptions and tasks, and arrive at
less distorted accounts of knowing subjects.
After the naturalism discussion I focus on two issues. One issue is how FSE fares when
weighed against the definition of naturalism discussed at the outset of the chapter. The second
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issue is to discuss the controversiality of FSE and the positive role that controversiality plays in
Harding’s theory, which supports my own claim of its usefulness. At issue are the various
responses to epistemology and philosophies of science—some of which count themselves as
successor projects to the historical one. That a successful epistemology should be naturalistic is
uncontroversial; there are few scholars who would reject the thesis. The issue is more
specifically: What does it mean to say an epistemology is naturalistic; and which of these many
theories proffered fit the bill? That feminist epistemologies are naturalistic seems fairly
straightforward. The question of whether they are sufficiently naturalistic is, I maintain, the
wrong question to ask. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that
entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. I
look specifically at Sandra Harding’s FSE as an exemplar of a productive, naturalistic theory.
FSE meets all the conditions of a critical theory that encompasses both the epistemological issues
and the broader philosophical issue of naturalism and its role in epistemology and philosophies
of science.
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CHAPTER 1:
Modern and Quinean Naturalized Epistemologies
Introduction
My claim is that Sandra Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Epistemology is an improved
naturalistic approach that would be a productive resource for epistemology. This requires an
account of what feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science are critical of, and where
they fall in the range of epistemological positions as it pertains to naturalistic theories. My
discussion of both non-naturalized epistemology and Quine’s naturalized epistemology serves
two purposes. One is to illustrate a small part of the complexity of epistemological debates as a
counterpoint to Quine’s analysis of epistemology in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and
“Epistemology Naturalized” (1969). Second, giving a detailed account of Quinean Naturalized
Epistemology (QNE) is useful to me in that it serves as a pivotal point of feminist commendation
and critique. Ultimately, QNE functions as a vehicle for the main focus of this dissertation, the
specific naturalism at work in Harding’s FSE and its usefulness to epistemology. My working
assumptions are first, that naturalistic epistemologies are valuable; second, that historicity and
situatedness are essential components of any truly naturalistic epistemology. Further, the shared
failures of modern epistemology and QNE to acknowledge these two features lead me to the
conclusion that neither of them is naturalistic in a way that recognizes and includes gender in its
theoretical explanations, nor is there any attempt in either to critically review explanatory
concepts, classes or kinds (of which gender is an example). This is because both projects are
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attempting to find some singular method by which to arrive at justified beliefs and knowledge. I
do not mean to say that the philosophical questions taken up in received epistemology are to be
discarded but that these questions and the answers we attempt could be less distorted than those
derived from narrow conceptions of human subjects and their rationality. I consider the prospect
that the resistance to feminist insights has to do with metaphysical commitments to things that
are difficult if not impossible for human subjects to achieve. Those under discussion here include
first, the notion that epistemology and science are, or should be, activities insulated from societal
interests and values; and second, that the products of the epistemic labor in epistemology and
science are objective and neutral because of this insulation.
I begin with Sandra Harding’s historical account of the rise of both modern
epistemological issues and modern scientific method that provides the backdrop for the next two
sections. This historical background and justification for the claim that historicity is an
important component of naturalism is necessary to my overall aim of showing Harding’s FSE is
a viable naturalism. In the following section, I describe two debates that are examples of those
parts of modern epistemology that have been determined to be non-naturalistic. Internalism and
foundationalism are deemed non-naturalistic since these positions begin with the assumption that
knowledge is grounded in some manner of self-evident and a priori beliefs. The assumption
amounts to a claim that a knowing subject has access to and relies on these self-evident and a
priori beliefs in order to properly justify knowledge claims. By contrast, externalism and
coherentism are defended by those who reject the internalist and foundationalist ideas and claim
a knower’s surroundings have some causal effect on beliefs, including those labelled knowledge
and those beliefs used to justify knowledge. However, those types of causal effects are still tied
to processes or methodologies internal to the individual. Nevertheless, there is a continued
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commitment to the notion of access and the self-evident quality of access that justifies a
knower’s rational knowledge claims. Quine’s argument grounds his proposal for naturalized
epistemology on his admittedly limited take on modern epistemology and its shortcomings, as he
characterizes them. In the final section, I consider the problematic aspects of Quines’ naturalized
epistemology and importantly, the commonalities QNE shares with modern, non-naturalized
epistemology that prevent his version of naturalized epistemology from being a truly viable
alternative to it. One of my aims is to show that Quine’s account glosses over many of the
debates that make modern epistemology a far more complex field of inquiry than the one Quine
critiques in his texts. Relatedly, he does not acknowledge naturalistic elements already present in
modern epistemology. Secondly, Quine’s naturalized epistemology continues to maintain
commitments that fail to distance QNE enough to deem it a successor to modern epistemology.
Thirdly, given the nature of his thesis regarding the relationship between scientific practice and
epistemology, QNE’s assumption is that scientific practice is (and remains in his proposed
successor epistemology) a specialized activity that is insulated from society, and relies on the
continued work and attitudes of objective, value neutral scholars. For feminist epistemologists
and philosophers of science, this means QNE fails at being a naturalistic epistemological theory
because it fails to acknowledge or correct the androcentrism of modern (non-naturalized, nonfeminist) epistemology, and the distorted knowledge it has produced.

Modern Epistemology and Science: Shared Histories
In The Science Question in Feminism (1986), Harding’s discussion of gender and science
begins with a review of dogmas (those delineated by Quine, as well as other dogmas), their
effects, and the resulting resistance to feminist critiques. She suggests clearing away these
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dogmas provides a couple of beneficial insights. One insight is that it is easier to see the
connection between science and epistemology in their common pursuits. The other insight
reveals their shared unwillingness to recognize the influence history has on science and
epistemology, and the questions they ask. A review of the history that is shared by modern
science and modern epistemology provides some explanation for why science and epistemology
have resisted feminist critiques. Additionally, the shared histories would explain the failure of
epistemologies, naturalized and non-naturalized alike, to respond constructively to the feminist
critique. The shared roots of modern science and epistemology become apparent by looking at
the historical beginnings of science and their implications for what it means to know. Harding
asserts that many modern epistemological questions were initiated “as “meditations” on the
implications of the emergence of modern science itself.” 1 Investigations of nature demonstrated
by those early scientists—Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton—became the focus of philosophers,
including Descartes, Hume and Kant, who were trying to make sense of this new way of
knowing. The creators of modern epistemologies were meditating on what they understood to be
a science created by what Harding calls individual “craft-laborers.” 2 From the perspective of
modern epistemologists, the intellectual activities of someone like Copernicus were taken to be
the result of an “ individual, “disembodied” but human mind, behold[en] to no social
commitments but the willful search for clear and certain truth.” 3 This view, according to
Harding, “remains the foundation from which the questions we recognize as epistemological
arise.” 4 A key implication for Harding is that “modern science, unlike medieval inquiry, seeks
knowledge that is free of moral, political and social values…truly scientific justification is
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concerned to establish claims about the regularities of nature and their underlying causal
determinants to which all relevantly situated observers, regardless of their personal, social, or
political commitments, can agree.” 5
The shared unwillingness to recognize the pronounced influence history has on science
and epistemology is explained by considering other dogmas Harding discusses that move beyond
the familiar Quinean dogmas—the analytic/synthetic distinction and radical reductionism. The
first dogma Harding discusses is the notion that “science is a fundamentally unique kind of social
activity [that] removes scientists from the realm of the completely human… [and] sets the limits
on human rationality for what are best thought of as religious or mystical reasons.” 6 Another
dogma is the notion that science is a distinct type of social activity that enjoys autonomy from
other social activities. This becomes “a conceptual obstacle to our ability to analyze science…as
a fully social activity.” 7 The result is what Harding calls the view of science as “Sacred
Science.” 8 Science’s sacredness makes it taboo 1) to see natural science as a social activity with
a “historically varying set of social practices;” and 2) to examine and describe “the regularities
and underlying causal tendencies of science’s own social practices and beliefs.” 9
In her book Is Science Multicultural? (1998), Harding refers to these dogmas as part of
the “internalist epistemology” of scientific inquiry. She suggests that this continues to be the
prevailing view of science held by the public and disseminated in science texts. 10 Science and
society are analytically separate, since social values would be detrimental to the determination of
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facts. 11 Nevertheless, science is seen as necessary for the progress of humanity generally, and
objective knowledge more specifically. Harding says that historians of science did not recognize
the importance of the social environment of the Early Modern period that made these new ways
of conceiving “nature and inquiry …more ‘natural’ and therefore, morally attractive.” 12
Harding’s point is that these dogmas have important implications for the openness of science and
epistemology to feminist critiques. These dogmas set science and epistemology in a special
sphere of inquiry immune to social values and interests. This implication shaped the definition of
naturalism: science and epistemology were naturalistic since they undercut theological
explanations for natural phenomena and the justificatory processes of knowing subjects. The
Enlightenment era in which this becomes morally “acceptable” begins with the rise of science in
the 17th and 18th centuries. Human reason becomes an important part of science’s narrative, and
contributes to assumptions about science and its role in society. These assumptions make the
influence of one on the other a one-way street: science can and must make a difference in society
by alleviating suffering and solving human problems. Science, however, must remain beyond the
grasp and influence of society, and its cultural and social interests.
To support her claim that these ideas had not waned in their acceptance in contemporary
times, Harding refers to a quote from Carnap’s “Autobiographical Statement” (1963) that
exemplifies these assumptions. In this statement, Carnap refers to three assumptions he and his
associates take as given:
The first is the view that man has no supernatural protectors or enemies and that therefore
whatever can be done to improve life is the task of man himself. Second, we had the
conviction that mankind is able to change the conditions of life in such a way that many
of the sufferings of today may be avoided and that the external and internal situation of
life for the individual, the community, and finally for humanity will be essentially
improved. The third is the view that all deliberate action presupposes knowledge of the
11
12
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world, and that the scientific method is the best method of acquiring knowledge, and that
therefore science must be regarded as one of the most valuable instruments for the
improvement of life. 13

What is also problematic is that the interaction between science and society only goes one way.
Science as a method of acquiring knowledge is what propels progress and improves life for
everyone. The idea that historical changes in social values, cultural and economic structures, and
practices might have some effect on science is not seriously considered. To the contrary,
Harding argues, we must take “modern Western epistemologies” and science as “culturallyspecific modes of constructing and exploring cultural meanings in support of the new kinds of
knowledge claims,” rather than “a set of philosophical givens.” 14
This background frames the discussion about how Quine understood the modern
epistemological project. In this brief account of the historical project of non-naturalized, and
importantly, non-feminist, epistemologies and philosophies of science, the focus will be on just
three principle issues particular to epistemology—accounts of what kinds of things count as
justification for knowledge claims, what a proper knower is, and finally, where that process
actually happens. Under consideration in this section is whether Quinean Naturalized
Epistemology (QNE) is in fact a viable and sufficiently naturalistic alternative to modern
epistemology. I will argue that QNE is not a viable alternative since it shares problematic
assumptions of modern epistemology. The epistemic issues described above, and the “blind
spots” all non-feminist epistemological projects share make the historical background a
necessary preliminary. The section on traditional epistemology is neither historically or
conceptually exhaustive, and limited to two debates in the field: Internalism vs. Externalism;
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and 2) Foundationalism vs. Coherentism. This section has two functions. The first is that—by
virtue of what is left out of the discussion, I want to show that the complexities of just two of the
many conceptual issues give us good reasons to assume that epistemology is a complex, multifaceted project with many conceptual issues that are far from resolved. In virtue of the first
function, the second function will be to shed light on Quine’s naturalized epistemology and how
it rests on an incomplete picture of epistemology itself, reducing it to a few issues that are but a
small part of the larger project. QNE is not naturalized sufficiently because it shares
commitments to epistemic individualism and scientism that also characterize his account of
received modern epistemology. By failing to distinguish itself from modern epistemology in
these ways, QNE cannot be a viable alternative. The weaknesses of QNE will be the motivation
for the following chapter, in which I discuss various feminist critiques of QNE, and in important
ways, the broader, historical epistemological project. The feminist scholars to be discussed
situate themselves as the proper starting place for successor projects that provide worthwhile,
more naturalistic, and less scientistic options. The focus of the next section is the discussion of
the two specific debates that center on internalism and externalism, and foundationalism and
coherentism.

Internalism and Externalism
Epistemic Internalism is a thesis about the basis of knowledge that supposes an epistemic
subject can or does indeed have privileged access to basic beliefs that are the foundation of
knowledge (Pappas (2014); BonJour and Sosa (2007)). Traditional analysis of knowledge is the
search for what is required beyond true belief, namely, true belief plus either good reasons or
good evidence. Pappas (2014) states that the “first form” of internalism holds that a knowing
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subject can or does have access to good reasons or good evidence. “The key idea is that the
person either is or can be aware of this basis.” 15 Laurence BonJour (2002) states access is a
requirement of “cognitive availability,” and a “credential” for a person’s justification for a
belief. 16 This means that the foremost principle of internalism is not merely the presence of
good reasons or good evidence, but the possibility of a subject that can or is aware of those good
reasons or evidence. Awareness of the access to such reasons or evidence provides a reliable and
irrefutable foundation for knowledge. So, as Pappas (2014) notes, this first form of internalism
claims that justification must result from either knowing that one knows, or reflecting on the
situation at hand and, without making any further inferences, directly knowing. Pappas also
describes two other internalist positions that are distinct from knowledge internalism. One is
mentalism, and it is concerned not with access to belief but with the basis for justification,
holding that “what ultimately justifies a belief is some [internal] mental state of an epistemic
subject holding that belief.” 17 The second is voluntarism, a deontological concept of justification
that understands justification in terms of one's intellectual duties or responsibilities.
Some forms of internalism hold that access to the source of knowledge, or justified true
belief, is what is internal to a subject’s mind. The more directly one has access to the source, the
less one can be mistaken. These beliefs, mental states, and inferences are known directly through
reflection because access means that one is aware of one’s state of knowing: “You know that you
know.” 18 Arguments offered for access internalism are varied but do seem to reduce to
mentalism. The first argument Pappas presents is that “one is justified in believing p only if one
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has justified the belief that p.” Being justified here implies having justified a belief that results
from being actively engaged in the activity of giving reasons or evidence to support one’s belief.
Justification is defined as being aware of the justifiers of one’s beliefs. A second argument,
closely aligned to the first, says, “that one is justified in believing p only if one can justify the
belief that p.” If one actively attempted to justify belief that p, at that point in time, one would
become aware of the justifiers. So, if one can justify the belief that p, then one can be reflectively
aware of the justifiers for p. 19
Steup (2005) provides a brief explanation of another form of internalism, evidentialism.
Evidentialism makes two claims: “1) One justifies believing in p by one’s evidence regarding p;
and 2) evidence consists of one’s mental states.” 20 Evidentialism becomes of form of access
internalism given two further claims about a subject’s psychology. The first one is “luminosity,”
which refers to one’s reliance on introspection to recognize what mental state one is in, and the
second is the interdependent claim of “necessity,” which means there are necessary, a priori
principles by which one can recognize, through luminosity, “whether one’s mental states are
evidence for p.” 21
Some scholars make an internalist claim that the rational work of justifying a belief is
internal to the subject. Feldman (2005), and Conee (2000) both argue that, at the end of the day,
what ultimately justifies a belief are the internal, mental states of a subject. Feldman specifically
asserts that the argument for internalism is strong because inferences and reasons are things that
“determine or settle epistemic facts,” 22 and they are themselves internal. A subject’s reasons,
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memories, and other beliefs, Feldman argues, are all “mental things” 23 and these all aid in a
subject’s determination. Feldman also emphasizes the relation between these mental things and
epistemic facts such that when believers are compared, they will be “mentally alike” in ways that
bear on justification: “if two things are alike with respect to internal factors, then they must also
be alike in the relevant epistemic ways.” 24 This, Feldman says, reveals true belief alone is not
enough to be called knowledge, but requires “good reasons” or adequate evidence to support it.
Thus, either they are both justified in a belief or they are not…[and] “if they differ with respect
to justification, then there must be an internal or mental difference.” 25
Earlier, I asserted that the internalist arguments seem to reduce internalism to mentalism.
To recall Pappas’ definition mentalism holds that what justifies a belief is an internal mental
state of a subject holding that belief. This definition of mentalism underwrites an internalist
account of a subject who justifies her beliefs either by her cognitive awareness, or her active
engagement in giving support for a belief by inference, whether or not the evidence for a belief
can be recognized through luminosity and necessity. There are, however, arguments to defeat
mentalism that begin with the claim that not all justifiers are mental states but might be “logical
or probabilistic relations” or other epistemological commitments, such as a commitment to
foundationalism or coherentism. Conee and Feldman (2001) respond with a “higher-order
requirement” that can be met directly from insight or reflection, and could be met by a subject’s
awareness of a “supporting connection…between what is ordinarily regarded as one’s evidence
and what it is evidence for. 26
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Internalism’s claim on epistemology is largely a function of its response to the two-fold
skeptical challenge—a) that nothing at all can be known and b) that neither knowledge nor
justified true belief can avoid circular reasoning— that has shaped epistemology’s beginnings
and informs contemporary debates in epistemology. Williams (2005) contends that the skeptic’s
challenge has placed two different constraints on the philosophical understanding of knowledge
and justification. The first is a “totality condition” defined by the demand for justification for
“the possibility of knowledge in general.” 27 In other words, epistemology attempts to defend the
possibility of knowing anything at all. Epistemology’s primary goal then is to determine a set of
epistemic norms that could be extrapolated to any pursuit of knowledge, which is undergirded by
this totality condition. As a corollary to the totality condition, Williams presents a second
constraint: the achievement of “full epistemic awareness.” 28 This kind of epistemic awareness
requires complete cognitive access, which is possible from the internalist position in two
important respects. The first aspect of the totality condition described by Williams asserts
complete cognitive access responding to the skeptic’s challenge with an explanation both of “full
epistemic self-awareness,” 29 and how any belief can be directly justified. This response requires
not only access to that which justifies beliefs, but also that the subject knows how that belief
came about and how reliable her method of justification is. 30 Claims of foundational knowledge
because are justified by recourse to first person access to internal states and beyond those to the
internal reflections of a subject. The second aspect of the totality condition described by
Williams when considering the evaluation of sources or motivations of belief asserts that
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privileged and full access is reliable in a way that avoids circularity, which is another part of the
skeptic’s challenge mentioned earlier. From Williams’ perspective, however, internalism is not
particularly plausible for two reasons. First, internalism is incomplete if taken as a “fully general
view of ordinary justification,” and secondly, “everyday justification often seems to work as
externalists say it does” (i.e., the self-conscious exercise of dependable recognitional abilities). 31
Williams concludes that because justification appears this way, “in the particular context of the
skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option.” 32
Steup (2005) and Greco (2005) both claim that epistemological arguments for this
reliability are based on an “epistemic duty” 33 or “epistemic responsibility” 34 that asserts
“epistemic justification is a matter of meeting one’s epistemic duties [and] the things that
determine whether a subject has or has not met her duty are internal” to the subject. 35 A subject’s
evaluation or motivation for belief might require a consideration of the role that experience does
or does not play in the epistemic process. However, to formulate the response in terms of the
skeptic’s challenge is to claim foundational beliefs are a priori, and internal. Consequently,
experience as a repository of foundational belief plays no role in the epistemic process. These are
but a few of the responses to the skeptic’s challenge that account for the dominant internalist
theme in epistemology.
The other side of this debate is the set of externalist theories that were articulated initially
as arguments against internalism (Goldman (1967); Armstrong (1973); Putnam (1975)).
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Externalist theories claim that internal states are not the only source of justification for
knowledge, which may well rest on factors external to the subject. The internalist notion of
justification being “within the cognitive grasp” of a subject is replaced with the possibility that
there could be specific kinds of reasons that are not entirely cognitively available to the subject,
but are “nonetheless intimately connected…with the operation of [the subject’s] cognitive
process.” 36
Reliabilist theories, as one of the central externalist responses to internalist accounts of
justification, diverge depending on the answer given as to whether or not a reliable process is
enough to justify knowledge or belief, or if there is some other requirement and what that
requirement should be. 37 Reliabilism begins with a causal account of justification, and generally
advocates that epistemic justification be caused by a process or method that most reliably
produces a true belief. According to Foley (2005), Gettier (1963) disputed the traditional
philosophical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, which maintained three principles
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge: 1) that knowledge was a
kind of belief, 2) that belief had to be true, and 3) that this true belief was justified. Gettier’s
challenge that these principles could jointly fail to guarantee knowledge set off a flurry of
responses that attempt a more suitable analysis typically involving the addition of a fourth
condition to the traditional definition of knowledge. From Foley’s perspective, that search
initiated a “shift…away from questions of one’s being able to justify one’s belief intellectually
and towards questions of one’s being in an appropriate causal…relation with one’s external
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environment.” 38 The search for a reliable process or method that might precisely characterize
this relation led to externalist accounts of epistemic justification. Contrary to internalist and
Cartesian theories that maintain there are classes of beliefs that have an intrinsic claim to
credibility, David Armstrong (1973) argues for a theory that encompasses not only an account of
non-inferential knowledge, but a general theory of the nature of knowledge. In the first place,
externalist theories deny that one always has full cognitive awareness, that is, that a person
always either is or can be aware of the basis of her knowledge and justified belief. This claim is a
rejection of the “knowing you know” aspect of access, and the internalist requirement for total
cognitive awareness previously discussed. A person can have a justified belief without knowing
how it is she knows, and does not necessarily know if the process or cause of her beliefs is
reliable. 39
From Armstrong’s point of view, full cognitive awareness and the access it provides
would make it necessary to distinguish between non-inferential and inferential knowledge (basic
and non-basic beliefs), and further imply that non-inferential knowledge is arrived at through this
full cognitive awareness and access. Armstrong gives some consideration as to what might be
considered examples of non-inferential knowledge that are not, in fact, entirely internal to the
subject. He begins with an example of non-inferential knowledge found in “the simpler
judgments of perception.” 40 Judgments such as “‘There is a noise within earshot’, ‘It is getting
hotter’”, for instance, are instances of non-inferential knowledge and as such, Armstrong
contends, can be understood as more than reports of sensory states but still not be enough upon
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which to claim knowledge. For Armstrong, the distinction between causal and reliabilist theories
is important: a causal theory is one in which a subject has a belief that is based on something in
the environment causing that belief. A reliabilist theory is specifically one that focuses on the
empirical reliability of the belief involved. 41 The problem, as Armstrong sees it, is “the
temptation to make inferring a far more explicit, hesitating and self-conscious affair than it
always is.” 42Seeing a dog in front of us may seem to be non-inferential, but the “actual process”
of knowing there is a dog in front of one’s eyes is based on both the sensory data provided by
vision and our inference. Why is this? Because a hologram of a dog would have the same effect
as a real one. Ultimately, these notions point to empirical discussions and could not be
understood as internal or a priori, and consequently, not an entirely internal process either.
Similarly, the reliabilist theory articulated by Alvin Goldman (1967), in response to
Gettier, is that the causal connection between a belief and the facts that may justify that belief, 43
points to an external factor as underwriting knowledge, rather than a reflective or other mental
state of a subject. Importantly, Goldman maintains that perceptual knowledge, as a result of
vision, for example, is non-inferential in nature since “a percipient does not infer facts about
physical objects” from brain states or sensory stimulation, and need not know or be aware of
either of these processes. 44 Reliable belief-producing processes can be caused by empirical data,
logical or propositional inference, and sensory perception. 45 According to BonJour (2007),
epistemic justification is widely held to be that sensory perception is based on the reliability of
“perceptual and introspective modes of belief formation…[and] that if these processes are
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reliable in the way we normally believe them to be,” then it makes little difference whether the
subject believes or knows it. 46
The other side of the externalist position I will discuss comes from outside of
epistemology— from philosophy of language more specifically. Lau and Deutsch (2014) assert
that some arguments for epistemic externalism were thought experiments motivated by semantic
externalism, which is the idea that the meanings of words are determined by external factors and
thus not determined solely by internal mental states. 47 In this section, I will discuss Hilary
Putnam’s contribution to the externalism discussion, after a short, but important digression
concerning the link between the discussion of epistemological theories and the turn to concepts
from the philosophy of language. There are several reasons that motivate the brief discussion of
the connection between externalism in epistemology and externalism in philosophy of language.
I rely here on some ideas garnered from Sanford Goldberg (2007), in his introduction to
Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Goldberg notes that epistemology
and philosophy of mind and language face similar concerns that prompt their respective
distinctions between internalism and externalism. In epistemology, internalist and externalist
theories of justification focus on the distinctions between “states and processes available to the
reflection and those that aren’t.” 48 In philosophy of mind and language, theories about mental
content are constructed by analyzing the properties of mental content and linguistic meaning. 49
The bridge between these two disciplines is their similar core concern for the relation between a
subject (or a mind) and the world. Goldberg’s assessment is that this shared concern arises
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because a) epistemology is concerned with the nature of justificatory concepts and processes, and
how they might result in knowledge or justified true belief; and b) philosophy of mind and
language are concerned with those “materials needed for the mind to represent, refer to and
conceptualize the world,” 50 and ultimately, whether those representations amount to knowledge
as well. Beyond the shared concern for the relation between mind and world, Goldberg stresses
the implications both disciplines have on other related disciplines such as psychology, linguistics
and cognitive science. 51
One such implication is illustrated by Hilary Putnam in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”
(1975). Putnam makes an early argument for semantic externalism by calling into question
assumptions that are implicit in the philosophical psychology generally, and appear more
explicitly in Cartesian epistemology. This theory was then extended to mental contents and had
a lasting influence on how externalist theories were developed. 52 These assumptions idealize the
state or condition of the subject, as well as the relation between the world and the structures of
knowledge. Putnam believes philosophy of language could benefit from a consideration of
linguistics by “shedding some light on the structure of mind.” 53 His thesis is that “meanings
don’t exist in quite the way we tend to think they do” since the concept of meaning is based on
an erroneous “pre-scientific” semantics. 54 The theory of meaning rests on two unchallenged (and
false) assumptions:
(i) “That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain
psychological state”
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(ii) That the meaning of a term (intension) determines its extension (in the sense that
sameness of intension entails sameness of extension. 55
These assumptions produce erroneous understandings. The first error is that the relation between
psychological states and meaning and the relation between those meanings and the world, are
psychological states ascribed to an individual subject. More importantly, Putnam asserts,
psychological states entail a form of solipsism that is “implicit in just about the whole of
traditional philosophical psychology.” 56 This form of solipsism does not presuppose the
existence of other individuals other than the subject to whom that psychological state is
ascribed. 57 The second error is that intension (meaning) determines extension (reference).
Putnam claims that Frege’s introduction of terms that attempt to account for the ambiguity of the
concept of meaning—sense and reference—is another instance of an idealization about how we
arrive at meaning. 58 The third error is that intension is a psychological entity or state that can be
shared. Putnam explains this error as an assumption that psychological states are ““public” in
that different people can be in the same psychological state.” 59 These errors arise from the
rational reconstruction of these situations, rather than looking at the actual process. According to
Putnam, the “linguistic division of labor” accounts for the failure of assumptions (i) and (ii),
since the average speaker’s psychological state does not match or fix with the extension of the
word. Only the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker
belongs fixes the extension. 60 The distribution of the labor of proper use is spread across a public
community. What is important to the consideration of externalism here is some members of the
community—experts, and scientists—are doing the work of explaining the extensions of words.
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Meaning is arrived at publicly and communally, not from the individual psychological states of a
subject, but through the public use of words and concepts in use within the community. This
theory of language has consequences for epistemic externalism because if the meanings of words
are not internal, then it would seem to mean that words used to state propositions, knowledge
claims or beliefs, are not entirely internal either.

Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
Another polemic in epistemology centers on the foundationalism/coherentism issue that
for my purposes focuses on two interrelated disagreements. First, there is a dispute over making
a distinction between a set of self-evident, intrinsically justified beliefs that serves as the
foundation for other beliefs requiring more justification. Second, there is a dispute about how
this distinction impacts the manner of justification. Foundationalism is internalist in character
since it appeals to justification to something of which the believer is aware, and has direct
cognitive access. Those beliefs justified by direct access become the ground for the justification
of other knowledge claims, indicated by the well-worn metaphor of a building’s foundation and
the structure built upon it. Per Steup and Sosa (2005), the foundationalist approach imposes two
conditions on justification that have already been mentioned. The first condition is that
justification must be supplied for all beliefs that can count as knowledge and must be robust
enough to be the foundation for all other beliefs. The second condition is that this justification
must not rely on other beliefs. 61
Foundationalism, like internalism is shaped by the two-pronged skeptical challenge that
nothing at all can be known and that neither knowledge nor justified true belief can avoid
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circular reasoning. The response to the first of the skeptic’s challenges is the set of claims made
about foundational beliefs that are internal and a priori. The regress problem arises when, after a
subject determines or identifies good reasons or evidence for justified true belief, a subject asks
what the justifications for those good reasons themselves are. If a reason counts as knowledge, it
must itself be justified with reasons, and those reasons must be justified as well. This process
would continue ad infinitum. The foundationalist thesis calls for all knowledge and justified
belief to rest on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief, which ultimately
answers the second challenge by providing an “end point” for the justification process. Fumerton
(2010) asserts that the thesis falls short since upon reflection, one would recognize that most of
the beliefs that have achieved the status of knowledge have done so “only because we know or
justifiably believe other different propositions.” 62 Fumerton discusses the two main forms of
arguments in support of the foundationalist thesis: the epistemic regress argument and the
conceptual regress argument, which Fumerton claims are intimately connected. The epistemic
regress argument is basically what has been already been articulated: For any belief p, if a
subject has a good reason to believe that p, then a subject knows some q such that q supports p
and knows some r that supports q, and so on. Thus, no belief is known unless it is supported by
an infinitely long chain of other beliefs. The classical foundationalist view relies on the
unacceptability of a vicious epistemic regress. This view is rebutted by infinitism. Peter Klein
(2005) claims that foundationalism cannot solve the problem because foundationalism is
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assumed to be an account for a “self-conscious practitioner” who could rely on what Klein calls
“an autonomous bit of warrant” that is founded on non-basic propositions. 63
Fumerton briefly outlines the internalist and externalism versions of foundationalism that
respond to skepticism beyond what he terms the “epistemic conservatism” of classical
foundationalism by which “one takes the mere fact that you find yourself believing some
proposition P to be a prima facie justification for believing the proposition in question…[which]
present wonderful advantages in dealing with the skeptic.” 64 Fumerton claims there is no clear
articulation of the key disagreement between internalists and externalists but narrows it down to
a controversy about what the properties of internal states are or the question of whether
justification requires a particular sort of access. He considers Huemer’s views concerning
distinctions between belief and “seemings,’ as well as James Pryor’s claim that sensory states
just are representational states that are “ ‘belief-like’ in that they represent the world as being a
certain way…[and are] simply prima non-inferential justification for beliefs that share their
content (that represent the same aspect of reality).” 65 Fumerton emphasizes that both Huemer
and Pryor argue that these kinds of states may provide justification without the subject being
aware of being in such or any of these sensory or representational states. Ultimately, these states
may justify beliefs but provide no guarantee. Externalist versions of foundationalism, much like
other externalist theories, contend that one can justify beliefs without being aware of a
connection between the belief and that from which one infers that belief. Nevertheless, Fumerton
argues that despite these disagreements, the structure of knowledge and justification that emerges
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from some [externalist] theories are often foundationalist in structure. 66 Fumerton calls upon
Goldman’s (1979) version of reliabilism discussed previously. Fumerton claims this position
avoids epistemic regress “by embracing a kind of justified belief that does not owe its
justification to the having of other different justified beliefs. 67
Pryor (2005) makes the claim that coherentism was “historically directed” at theories that
allowed for immediately justified beliefs. Some coherentists accept that a belief can be justified
by “non-beliefs” like perceptual experiences, while others reject this notion. 68 In general terms,
coherentist approaches take issue with the foundation/superstructure metaphor, and prefer the
metaphor of a web: the strength of any given belief in one area depends on the strength of the
beliefs in other areas. Consequently, coherentism generally rejects the basic/non-basic belief
distinction, and posits that justification for any belief is provided by its place in a system of
beliefs. What justifies any belief is how it hangs together with the entire system of beliefs. These
characteristics allow for the fallibility of the epistemic subject and generally deny that it is
possible for most beliefs to be immediately justified. Olsson (2014) holds that “most, if not all,
influential coherence theorists…[assign] some beliefs that are close to experience a special role,
whether they are called ‘supposed facts asserted’ (Lewis, 1946), ‘truth-candidates’ (Rescher,
1973), ‘cognitively spontaneous beliefs’ (BonJour, 1985) or something else.” 69 Olssen contends
that these theories more correctly be classified as forms of weak foundationalism than as pure
coherence theories, since some beliefs may be justified by some small degree of warrant, such as
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beliefs that result from experience or observation. 70 Both Pryor (2007) and Olsson (2014) agree
that the issue of justification and accounts given by foundational theories show the
contentiousness of defining, evaluating or determining which experiences or qualities count as
epistemically efficacious. The coherentist approach comes with its own problems. Two
mentioned by Olsson are that some forms of coherentism do not give experience any essential
epistemic role; and that if a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs or system of
beliefs, then it is conceivable that there are alternative, incompatible systems of belief that could
justify a belief just as well. 71
This falls in line with Fumerton’s view that both foundationalist and coherentist theories
may call for either internal or external grounds of justification. There is no consensus on how to
understand or clearly separate the concepts issues thus far: internalism, externalism,
foundationalism, coherentism. My focus has been on the discussion of access in these debates,
but the issues of justification and access overlap and intersect, and are in evidence in much of
the literature reviewed here. Because of this overlap, two of the primary issues that arise in these
debates are how to explain the role of a subject in the epistemic process who enjoys a special
kind of access to her mental or psychological states, and how a subject utilizes and evaluates
those mental states. The theories discussed all stipulate at least two conditions. The first is the
picture of a subject with either a strong or attenuated form of access that either solidifies the
control a subject has over her epistemic claims or weakens or destroys the link between a
subject’s epistemic claims and the world to which a subject’s claims refer. The second condition
is the unsuccessful attempt to hang too much of the weight of justification for epistemic claims
on some facet of the epistemic process- the subject, her mental states, or the world. The notion of
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access seems to be the main point of intersection and overlap for a good reason. Perceptual
experience suggests that we have infallible access to certain private experiences, but we must
entertain the possibility that we could be mistaken about what those experiences mean because
this is what happens to any epistemic subject. This is most evident in the type of access that has
been discussed and falls within the category of non-inferential knowledge. This is “the Given.” 72
The basic idea is that givenness is the status enjoyed by ordinary cognitive states, and a subject’s
access seems not to be in question. This status consists of the feature of a cognitive state that
both serves to justify other beliefs by “its assertive or at least representational content, which
enables it to confer justification on other states,” and “creates the need for it to be itself
justified.” 73 Foley (2005) rightly claims that the paired concepts of internalism and externalism
are usually understood as rivals, “but an alternative and more charitable interpretation is that
externalists and internalists have different interests.” 74 What Foley says about internalism and
externalism can also be said for foundationalism and coherentism. Given their different
interests, each give an account shaped by those interests about the central epistemological issues
at stake: determining a definition of knowledge, giving an account of justified belief, and criteria
by which to evaluate them.
My goal in this section has been to review just two of the many debates that mark the vast
and varied landscape of epistemology to show the complexity of these debates, that make it
difficult to accept an account of epistemology as reducible to one or two issues or even a small
constellation of issues. The naturalism Quine contends is missing in epistemology is, in fact, the
motivation for the critical responses to internalism and foundationalism. Externalism and
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coherentism were anticipated by the responses to the naturalizing that occurred in the modern
era, beginning with the removal of theological justifications for knowledge, and seeing human
subjects as individual knowers as well as belonging to a natural kind subject to the same causal
laws that were once only applicable to mere objects in nature. In the next section, I discuss
Quine’s meager account of modern epistemology and its reduction of the project of epistemology
to the few claims of interest to Quine. This serves as evidence for the notion that QNE continues
to be committed to the distorted dogmas about science as a specialized social activity that
unilaterally influences the society in which it is embedded. Quine’s proposal for a naturalized
epistemology as a successor project must ultimately be rejected.

Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology
This section is an account of Quine’s theories regarding epistemology and his goal of
subsuming it within the scientific study of psychology. An underlying question I consider is
concerned with how accurate an account of epistemology Quine has given to distinguish his
naturalized epistemology from classical epistemology. The short answer—with a more detailed
discussion occurring later— is that, given the complexity at which I’ve merely gestured at in my
quick account of two core epistemological debates, Quine is not providing either a full or fair
description of the work in modern epistemology. This is partly due to the analytic tradition at the
time he wrote “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) that was still in the grip of some tenets of
logical positivism, which Quine was intent on confronting. In the next section, after a discussion
of Quine’s articles provides a good picture of both Quine’s critiques and a sketch of his proposed
successor project to classical epistemology. Finally, in the last section, I come to some
conclusions regarding Quine’s cursory treatment of modern epistemology and his ultimate
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inability to distinguish his theory from its modern precursors. The tensions will be discussed in
terms of those elements of his theory that are problematic for feminist epistemologists and
feminist philosophers of science.
The epistemology that Quine is analyzing in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) and
“Epistemology Naturalized” (1968), is a partial account of epistemology alluded to previously.
In “Two Dogmas,” Quine explicitly criticizes two key assumptions at work in empiricism, the
rejection of which lay the groundwork for his later thesis in “Epistemology Naturalized.” 75 At
the same time, Quine implicitly reiterates his commitments to important aspects of empiricism,
which are strong currents or themes in modern epistemology. The first assumption Quine
considers in “Two Dogmas” is the analytic/synthetic distinction, which grounds the distinction
between analytic truths and synthetic truths. 76

The second assumption is a form of

reductionism that begins with the idea that any meaningful statement is equivalent to some
logical construct based on terms that refer to “immediate” experience. 77 This leads further to the
idea that singular statements are the “unit of significant discourse” 78 for confirming or refuting
claims. For Quine, both assumptions are false.
Quine begins with a discussion of Kant’s definition of an analytic statement. An analytic
statement is “one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in
the subject.” 79 Quine restates this as: “a statement is analytic when it is true by meanings and
independently of fact.” 80 In restating Kant’s distinction, Quine can now tackle the issue in a way
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that illustrates his interests as a philosopher of language. He examines the concept of meaning
and its relation to naming. Quine’s goal in this analysis is to show the ways in which the
analytic/synthetic distinction, the grounds for analyticity, and each of the other related concepts
fail to explain every instance of analyticity, synonymy or interchangeability. Additionally, none
of these concepts can be defined without invoking the others; hence Quine’s charge of
circularity. In “Quine on the Intelligibility and Relevance of Analyticity” (2006), Creath says
that Quine imposes his implicit criterion for evaluating analyticity and the other concepts that is
behavioral or empirical in nature. 81 Quine suggests that the distinction between meaning and
naming is highlighted by Frege’s example of “Evening Star” and “Morning Star” by which we
use two singular terms to name the same thing; but the meanings are different. Quine notes this
kind of distinction is present at the level of abstract terms that are “different but parallel” to the
considerations of singular terms. 82 Frege’s example shows that meaning cannot always be
identified with naming or references.
Quine’s next move is to consider the aspect of truth and its connection with names of
general terms. Here, too Quine considers the notion of truth and finds it also lacking as a solid
concept on which to ground meaning. The class of all entities of which a general term is true is
called the extension of the term. Here Quine considers the distinction between a general term’s
meaning and its extension. 83 “The most conspicuous question is as to the nature of its objects:
What sorts of things are meanings?” Because the answer is difficult to pin down, “there seems
little hope of erecting a fruitful science about them.” 84 The failure to understand the distinction
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between meaning and naming has resulted in the failure of empiricism to stake its claim as a
successful approach to epistemological issues. Quine asserts that
once the theory of meaning is sharply separated from a theory of reference, it is a short
step to recognizing as the business of the theory of meaning simply the synonymy of
linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; meaning themselves, as obscure
intermediary entities, may well be abandoned. 85
Quine calls predicts that any attempt to maintain the various accounts of meaning and naming
upon which the relations of synonymy are built will meet with the same failure to attach meaning
to the singular terms, or general terms. 86
Because meaning has lost its value, synonymy, heretofore explained in terms of meaning.
Quine then considers related issues including definition, interchangeability, and semantical rules.
The issue of synonymy is an expression of the notion of synthetic truths, and its relation to
definition that expresses the notion of analytic truths. The standard relation is that the former
reduces to the latter. Quine argues that this relation might be clarified by stating it in terms of
“linguistic behavior.” 87 Only one connection between terms considered synonymous is clear;
they come “as reports upon usage.” 88 These reports are also indicative of the assumptions made
from “pre-existing synonyms.” 89 From Quine’s perspective, given that synonymy is not clearly
defined, it is merely presupposed by the power and influence of use, so too analyticity is a faulty
concept.
Definition, for a variety of reasons, “does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity”
either; so, Quine moves on to interchangeability in which two linguistic forms may be
interchanged “in all contexts without a change of truth value, and “synonyms so conceived need
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not be free from vagueness, as long as the vaguenesses match.” 90 Quine uses the classic example
of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’. Since ‘bachelor’ might refer to an unmarried man but the
term also occurs in other, unrelated terms such as a kind of flower (bachelor’s buttons) or an
academic degree (Bachelor of Arts). 91 The problem could be resolved and interchangeability
could be a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy, if one construed analytic statements
more narrowly. This bit of “hocus pocus” is the problematic supposition that terms used to
restrict or narrow our propositions—words like “necessarily”—are “so construed as to yield truth
when and only when applied to an analytic statement.” 92 But this falls apart once applied to the
criterion of analyticity of that very word, which makes it a somewhat circular argument. Quine
concludes that “interchangeability salva veritate” is meaningless until relativized to a language
whose extent is specified in relevant respects.” 93
Having considered and rejected the shortcomings of definition and synonymy as the
grounds for analyticity, Quine considers analyticity in terms of semantic rules used in translating
from ordinary languages and statements in logical languages. 94 The purported relation between
statements and languages requires a clear account but these considerations are still limited by the
muddled understanding of the term ‘analytic.’ In previous considerations of analyticity in terms
of definition, synonymy, and interchangeability, all failed to precisely map out their connection
to each other. In every consideration, the notion of analyticity is a “will o’ the wisp” concept
whose validity (truth) “depends on both language and extralinguistic fact.” 95
In his discussion of the second dogma, Quine challenges reductionism which he defines as
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verificationism and its epistemological implications. In the first place, Creath (2006) says:
This challenge…is slightly unexpected because…Quine in some sense is a reductionist
and a verificationist. Quine generally favors whatever reductions can be achieved” with
behaviorist criteria” because on Quine’s view, “verification theory purports to be an
account of synonymy…so the topic is still analyticity.” 96
To add further support to the claim, we recall that Quine says analyticity and reductionism “are
two sides of a single dubious coin.” 97 This point is important to my overall argument for Quine’s
entanglement with modern epistemology. Additionally, in the final section entitled “Empiricism
without the Dogmas,” Quine concerns himself with “epistemic matters, with the shape and
structure of an account of confirmation.” 98 Quine’s point is that analyticity and any other
concepts that touch on meaning are “no longer epistemically relevant concepts.” 99 Quine states,
“even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn the grid too finely. The unit of empirical
significance is the whole of science.” 100 “Empirical significance” I take to mean the unit of
empirical (or behavioral) confirmation. Quine gives a brief outline of Carnap’s account of the
relation between statements and experiences that contribute to their confirmation, which Quine
characterizes as “a naïve view…one of direct report…[or] radical reductionism.” 101 Carnap’s
initial attempt was to translate all meaningful statements concerning immediate experiences into
atomic, true or false statements. However, Quine remarks that Carnap abandoned that part of his
project. The failure of “reductionism in its radical form has long since ceased to figure in
Carnap’s philosophy.” 102 This reductionism continues to survive in the hypothesis that
confirmation of singular statements is possible. Quine continues, “my countersuggestion…is
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that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but
only as a corporate body.” 103 Creath claims that Quine’s intention was to “tar reductionism…but
also to inspire and legitimate the holistic countersuggestion of modest reductionism.” 104 Having
shown the untenability of confirmation atomism in “Two Dogmas”, in “Epistemology
Naturalized,”(1969), Quine stakes out some of the implications of the failure of these two
dogmas in order to propose a successor project.
In “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine’s account of classical epistemology is that it has
failed in its attempts to establish the certainty of beliefs about the world. Even though this
epistemology is already “concerned with the foundations of science,” there has been no success
in deriving beliefs (and certainty) about the world from our sensations. 105 Sensations and the
claims to knowledge we make based on them can be understood in this way: “Just as
mathematics is to be reduced to logic…so natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense
experience.” 106 This seems more interesting when we recall his determined critique of Carnap’s
similar goal. Quine recommends that epistemology, as it had been practiced in the classical
tradition, should be abandoned. Because of the failure of epistemology to determine a general
set of norms by which to pursue certainty and knowledge Quine argues that, the concept of
justification needs to be re-evaluated. Justification must be understood not as a unidirectional,
“bottom up” process—i.e. moving from a set of foundational beliefs to larger or more complex
structures—but justification as a process that works without the distinction between basic and
non-basic beliefs, which relies on a larger body of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge should be
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taken up as a descriptive project that rejects the a priori by calling for a reliance on empirical
insights of science, in lieu of what had heretofore been a project independent of the sciences. In
the broadest sense, human beings can best be understood and studied — within the field of
psychology more specifically—allowing human experience to be measured and patterns found in
the stimulation of sensory receptors. The individual is no longer an ideal epistemic subject, but
rather an idealized “experiencer.” As Quine claims, epistemology is properly a part of science
because it studies the “physical human subject.” 107 This is the result of what Quine takes to be
the physical or material underpinnings of epistemology. Quine sees traditional epistemology
failing in its efforts at finding a general notion of justification. What has shown signs of success
is the attempt to capture knowledge as an issue of physical, or sensory stimulation.
In subsuming epistemology within science, Quine means to preserve the status of
knowledge by maintaining that traditional epistemology and the “rational reconstruction” of
knowledge have failed, and that this work should be transferred to science. “It seems sensible to
settle for psychology. Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than to
fabricate a fictitious structure and similarly fail.” 108 For Quine, human knowledge is a
combination of two factors: the world that provides the “stimulation” of sensory receptors, and
the human subject responding to her environment. First, Quine’s assertion about the contribution
of the world expressed as stimulation of sensory receptors is in fact a statement about the
specificity and universality of human sensory receptors. “The human subject is accorded a
certain experimentally controlled input—certain patterns of irradiation in certain frequencies for
instance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-

107
108

Ibid., pp.22-24.
Ibid., p. 24.

48

dimensional world and its history.” 109 Secondly, the human subject responding and describing
her world is uncertain about the truth or falsity of her knowledge claims, but this uncertainty is
ameliorated by Quine’s acceptance that any description or response is to be judged by the totality
of a person’s theory about the world that has already been confirmed by the scientific
community. Quine’s concern with those elements of individual experience that are measured or
explained in physical terms or empirical data is informed by his faith in scientific knowledge and
its epistemological authority. Here, Quine makes a claim that echoes sever years later in
Putnam’s claim concerning the nature of “linguistic labor” in “The Meaning of Meaning” (1975).
For Quine, epistemic labor—justification—is distinguished from non-naturalized epistemology
in at least three ways. One element of the epistemic labor continues to be in an epistemic subject,
however, it is as a “sensing” subject that receives “input” and theorizes from the output. The
second change in Quine’s account of epistemic labor is that it is shouldered by the community of
which the subject is a part; a subject’s theories are holistically confirmed by that community.
The individual is subordinated to the community’s claims or theories, rather than her own
beliefs, such that a large part of the epistemic labor—the judging, evaluating and inferring—
happen at the community level. Finally, one of the implications of Quine’s theory is that the set
of those who can actually make knowledge claims verified would be limited to epistemic
subjects who have access to the most current, and best available science. Quine’s theory is
communal in its conception of an epistemic subject that is defined by its relation to the scientific
community. In consequence, Quine’s theory is naturalistic enough to have made some
epistemological improvement by introducing a larger context within which an epistemic subject
exists. This larger context describes how epistemic labor actually happens, and the way
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epistemic labor is shared by a group of knowers, rather than labor done by individuals. However,
the theory is not naturalistic enough to eliminate the individualism that results from positing an
idealized and universalized subject serving as the source of the data (sensory input) that an
epistemic community evaluates.
Lastly, Quine’s naturalized epistemology fails to distinguish itself in its lack of a
conceptual space for evaluation of the social and cultural commitments underlying a
community’s epistemic labor, which include theories and explanatory models, and the acceptable
criteria used to judge those theories and models as productive. I make this claim based on larger
historical factors at play in Quine’s theorizing. In “Two Dogmas,” Quine reviews these central
tenets to remove the “supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural
science.” 110 Blurring the line between metaphysics and science has two different and seemingly
contradictory consequences. On the one hand, it maintains Quine’s empiricist commitment by
referring to the contribution of behavioral, extralinguistic or empirical criteria to community
judgments. He rejects theoretical arguments for analyticity bolstered by external factors—in this
case, external factors are those factors such as cultural and social interests and values that lay
outside of science. This is problematic, however, since, given Quine’s holistic view of science,
there is nothing outside of science. On the other hand, blurring the line between metaphysics and
science is achieved in a scientific account but not an epistemological account of science. In a
chapter entitled, “Bridges of Our Own Making,” Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1990) asserts that
Divisions in cognitive authority and labor in scientific communities and our larger society
involve epistemology only if the identities of scientists make a difference to the content
of scientific knowledge— only if who is theorizing has a bearing on the research
undertaken, the methodologies adopted, and ultimately, the content of scientific
theories. 111
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Nelson claims that for Quine, these identities, which are social and political, may indeed have a
place in our accounts of science. From Quine’s perspective, however, the generation of theories
and standards of evidence would not include these social and political factors. 112 The implication
is that an account of science must include social and communal elements. At the same time, he
points to the role of the behavioral or empirical in confirming or infirming claims. This claim
finds its basis in several instances in “Two Dogmas” in which Quine indicates the central place
of empirical concepts. In one instance, Quine refers to “astronomical observation” as the
deciding factor in distinguishing between the meanings of “Morning Star” and “Evening Star.”
113

In another, “linguistic behavior” is part of what a lexicographer records as facts in order to

formulate a definition of a word. 114 In still another instance, Quine suggests that analyticity
might be useful “if the mental or behavioral or cultural factors relevant to analyticity…were
somehow sketched into the simplified model.” 115 In Creath’s “Quine on the Intelligibility and
Relevance of Analyticity” (2002), he reflects first on Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic
distinction and the prospects for an epistemology defined by this rejection. Creath’s claim is that
Quine’s implicit criterion for evaluating all of these concepts is behavioral: “This is a demand…
for empiricist criteria of significance. Quine is demanding behavioral criteria because he is still
in line with the empiricists, which Creath says is his way of rejecting previous arguments for
analyticity based on semantics or definition. 116 Creath then considers Quine’s critique of the
second dogma, reductionism (verificationism). Creath argues: “This challenge…is slightly
unexpected because…Quine in some sense is a reductionist and a verificationist. Quine generally
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favors whatever reductions can be achieved” with behaviorist criteria. The “two notions
(analyticity and reductionism) are two sides of a single dubious coin.” 117 The point here is that
regardless of the elements of non-naturalized epistemology that Quine is rejecting, he continues
to give primacy to individual behavioral and sensorial information. Quine’s account of
epistemology is characterized by his response to the very narrow set of issues of analyticity and
reductionism, but still maintains a reductionist commitment.
Quine does not explicitly claim that analyticity and reductionism exhaust the work and
concerns of Modern epistemology, but it is implied in Quine’s own approach to epistemology
and the commitments entailed by that approach. From his point of view, “Modern empiricism has
been conditioned in large part by these two dogmas.” 118 He speaks to empiricist epistemologists
committed to a linguistic approach as the best approach to progress in scientific inquiry and
knowledge. Because this approach failed, we should cut our losses and transport the entire
epistemological project into psychology. Quine’s purpose in giving his particularized account of
classical epistemology is to provide the motivation for his thesis, naturalized epistemology. The
outcome, however, is that Quine fails to disentangle his theory from classical epistemology on
two counts. First, his account fails to distinguish itself in by virtue of retaining some element of
individualism and reductionism that generally define non-naturalized epistemology. Quine’s
naturalized epistemology calls for a scientific community to evaluate theories and explanatory
models. A scientific community’s evaluation and judgment of a theory relies on the data (the
input) of an individual’s sense apparatus. Presumably, even the theories constructed from the
data would originate with an individual’s theorizing that is based on the input: “The stimulation
of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his
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picture of the world.” 119 Secondly, Quine’s unwillingness to consider the influence of social and
cultural values and interests in the epistemological account of science results in the same
problem feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science have with non-naturalized
epistemologies: distorted or erroneous knowledge. Even as QNE moves in the right direction
towards a naturalistic account of knowledge and scientific inquiry, by not reflecting critically on
those social and cultural values and recognizing their influence on these practices, QNE fails to
extricate itself from non-naturalized epistemology and therefore brings with it the issues feminist
epistemologies and philosophers of science find problematic in non-naturalized epistemology.
The next chapter will provide an account of the general response of critical feminist theorists to
Quine and specific attributes of QNE that make it indistinguishable from non-naturalized
epistemology.
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CHAPTER 2:
Feminist Epistemologies

Introduction
Critical feminist epistemologies first emerged out of several critiques lodged against a
received epistemology that emphasized a general and universalized account of knowledge.
Various sources, including individually published articles ( Crasnow, Wylie, Bauchspies, and
Potter 2015; Anderson 1995, Nelson 1994; Longino and Lennon 1997; Code 1996; Longino
1994; Baier 1991, and anthologies of feminist epistemologies (Bailey and Cuomo 2008; Alcoff
and Potter 1993; Antony and Witt 1993; Lennon and Whitford 1994; Kourany 1998) concur that
feminist epistemologies should be referred to in the plural because there are many positions
within the project concerning a variety of epistemological issues. These include definitions for
knowledge, reason, objectivity, as well as the traits of the epistemic subject. Longino (1994),
articulates an account of the generally shared assumptions in her article “In Search of Feminist
Epistemology.” Longino offers two motives for a proposal for feminist epistemology. One is a
response to the fact that “the scientific cards have been stacked against women for centuries.” 1
The upshot is that misogyny and gynophobia have shaped conceptions of knowledge and
rationality such that the impetus for feminist epistemology springs from the need to consider new
ways of knowing the world that would include women in epistemological endeavors. This
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underpins two important roles for a feminist epistemology that are “critical and constructive:”
One is identifying “masculinist ideologies” in the methodologies of scientific practice as well as
revealing the androcentrism of the content of that inquiry; and second, “identifying and
realizing….the emancipatory potential in the sciences.” 2 Longino remarks that this “does not
require any rethinking of fundamental philosophical issues.” 3 Echoing Longino’s point,
Anderson (1995) points out that a primary indicator that knowledge has been influenced by
gender is the distinction between objective, theoretical knowledge, which is masculine, and
“natural,” “practical know-how and personal knowledge,” which is feminine. 4 Anderson’s
distinction is based on a consideration of a common conception of “the knowledge privileged in
the academy” as “impersonal, theoretical and scientific.” 5 It is this kind of knowledge that is
considered masculine.
There is an abiding misconception that feminist epistemologies are merely the study of
“feminine ways of knowing.” 6 These historical conceptions are compounded by the ways
women have been prevented from both acquiring knowledge as well as participating in its
production. 7 Anderson’s main goal in the text is to give a new interpretation of what feminist
epistemology is: “a branch of naturalized, social epistemology that studies the various influences
of norms and conceptions of gender and gendered interests and experiences on the production of
knowledge.” 8
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The second motive for a feminist epistemology, Longino points out, does require some
rethinking of philosophical issues, and this comes from within philosophy itself. Longino
contends that the acceptance of fallibilist and anti-foundationalist theories generally, along with
arguments in support of the underdetermination thesis, have been consequences of accepting
naturalistic views that acknowledge the relevance of psychological and sociological facts about
human knowers to epistemological accounts. This acknowledgement would seem to invite the
consideration of empirical information about gender and gender difference. 9 Longino bases the
distinction between those philosophical issues that does not require rethinking and those that do
on the goals that define feminist critiques, and the goals of the historical practice of
epistemology. The labor of critical and constructive work of feminist critiques emphasizing
issues of sex and gender occur outside the domain of philosophy because this critical and
constructive work, from Longino’s perspective, is of little to no concern in many philosophical
debates, including those of epistemology. The goal of philosophical epistemology that is at issue
for the feminists indicates that quite a bit of work and rethinking of epistemological theories has
resulted from the acceptance of fallibilist and anti-foundationalist theories, as well as other
naturalistic views. While this rethinking required acknowledgement of the relevance of
psychological and sociological facts about human knowers, these naturalistic views were mostly
silent on the issues of sex and gender and their impact on knowledge and the practices of science.
In the introduction to their anthology, Feminist Epistemologies (1993), Alcoff and Potter
tackle the term “epistemologies” a little differently. Alcoff and Potter acknowledge that using the
term in the plural is, in part, an indication of the variety of approaches to epistemological
concerns. However, they also point out that the plural term is a way of emphasizing the
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problematic assumption that there is only one feminist epistemology or one epistemological
account or approach that aligns with the feminist designation. This is important because this
clarification already flies in the face of an epistemological tradition that takes for granted that
there is one set of epistemological norms, one account of knowing that discovers, a priori,
justificatory standards that are universally applied. 10
By contrast, in their introduction to Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in
Epistemology, Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford assert that the investigation of the
connections between power and knowledge are “feminism’s most compelling insight.” 11 This
means that not only does knowledge facilitate empowerment, but more controversially that
“legitimation of knowledge-claims is intimately tied to networks of domination and exclusion.” 12
The result is feminist philosophers sharing the work of epistemology, and more specifically,
making knowledge claims about the influence and power of these networks of domination and
exclusion, and working with “social scientists, political theorists, historians, and literary
theorists,” 13 and the “hard” sciences, in order to provide justification by way of empirical data
for those claims.
Feminist epistemologies challenge the definitions of a central epistemic concept such as
knowledge—including what counts as knowledge, who can make legitimate knowledge claims,
the objectivity of such claims, and the “recognition of difference” 14 between male and female
experience, as well as the difference between the knower and the objects known. They challenge
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the possibility or value of one single account of knowledge, and the idea that the social and
economic positions of the knowers can be ignored. Lennon and Whitford categorize feminist
epistemologies as being “rooted in Enlightenment ideals of justice and freedom,” but charge that
the Enlightenment idea of an “Archimedean point where a universal knower can stand and see
the world without perspective” is no longer viable. 15 Finally, Lennon and Whitford point out
that feminist epistemology is “neither the articulation of a female way of knowing nor simply an
articulation of female subjectivity, which reveals itself to be too diverse, contradictory and at
least partially discursively constructed through patriarchal oppositions.” 16 The articles in their
anthology are reflections on the “nature of knowledge and our methods of attaining it,” 17 which,
it is important to note, mesh with the concerns of what Lennon and Whitford refer to as
“mainstream” epistemology, i.e., epistemology that pursues the discovery of a set of general, a
priori, and justificatory standards that can be universally applied.
In A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (1993), Antony and
Witt’s focus is not merely on rejecting androcentric definitions of reason and objectivity, but
more notably, to recognize the importance of these concepts to the epistemological project
generally and to the “potential usefulness for feminist theorizing.” 18 Here too, the authors portray
feminist epistemology as multi-faceted, shaped by diverse interests and goals that ultimately
“reveal that the thought of traditional philosophers is rich with possibilities for feminist
interpretations.” 19
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My objective is to describe the motivations for the scrutiny of mainstream epistemology
by feminist philosophers of science as motivated by the inquiries and findings that come out of
scientific practice. Potter (2006) describes a series of scientific findings in the 1970s and early
1980s that attempted to explain and justify the great number of men in high ranking jobs and the
higher wages earned by men in comparison to women in similar positions. Validation of male
dominance was provided by scientific studies of a variety of traits including intellectual or
cognitive abilities, aggressiveness, and verbal and visual-spatial abilities based on sex. These
findings received a lot of media coverage, but refutations of the findings received no such
attention. Potter surmises that these occurrences “beg for attention from feminists, not only for
the specific hypotheses and claims…but [with respect to] the nature of the sciences themselves
and our understanding of them.” 20 For Potter, as for Anderson, the feminist critique of science
and philosophies of science are “to a greater or lesser extent naturalized philosophies of
science.” 21 Feminist philosophies of science attempt to understand the actual history and practice
of science, and subject their theories to the same criteria as the sciences such that empirically
adequate data provide support for theories. For this reason, they reject philosophies of science as
formerly practiced because non-naturalizing philosophers rationally reconstructed scientific
practices to justify knowledge, rather than considering them without preconception. 22 Quine’s
naturalized epistemology, thought a non-feminist theory, suggests theoretical approaches that
give accounts of how scientific knowledge is actually reproduced. Additionally, Quine’s
naturalized epistemology offers feminist philosophers of science the possibility of applying
different criteria to make distinctions between good science and bad science. There have been
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several responses to Quinean naturalized epistemology and, in the next section, I will parse those
elements of Quine’s naturalism taken up by feminist empiricists. I will set these out as four
distinct but interdependent elements of Quine’s naturalism. After describing the general
reception of Quine’s naturalized epistemology by critical feminist epistemologists and
philosophers of science, there will be a description of some elements of Quine’s naturalism that
are of particular concern, both to the discussion as a whole, and to concern to the feminist
critique in particular.

The Emancipatory Promise
Given the critical stance of feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science toward
epistemology as it had been pursued, and given Anderson’s explicit interpretation and defense of
feminist epistemologies as belonging to the category of naturalized, social epistemology, the
shift from non-naturalized epistemology to “naturalized epistemology” was taken as a definitive
move in the right direction. In "Feminist Perspectives of Science" (2015), Crasnow, Wylie,
Bauchspies and Potter express the positive reception of naturalized epistemology as an
“emancipatory promise.” 23 In “What is Natural About Epistemology Naturalized?” (1996) Code
asserts naturalized epistemologies were a “shift…from idealized abstraction to establish
connections with epistemic practice that could enable theories of knowledge to engage
constructively and critically with everyday cognitive activities.” 24 Quine’s proposal was indeed
an attempt to move away from the “rational reconstructions” of epistemological work that had
dominated theories in both epistemology and philosophy of science. His approach to
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epistemology, as he understood it, was meant to be corrective. From his perspective, what was
lacking in epistemological theory was a naturalism that acknowledged the human epistemic
subject as itself an object of scientific study. Quine’s naturalism takes his version of nondogmatic empiricism to be a necessary component of epistemology. He takes for granted that
science is the exemplar of epistemic pursuits, and as such, any account of knowledge, and any
methods of justification and verification ultimately fall under the heading of science. Indeed, he
makes this point in both “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and “Epistemology Naturalized”
(1969). Code claims, “naturalists assume knowledge is possible and seek to understand its realworld (natural) conditions,” and [are] not committed to idealized knowers. 25
At this point, it is important to clarify Quine’s notion of what “natural” means as it refers
to the study of knowledge and features of a knower: what is natural in the broadest sense are the
natural responses of any human subject’s sensory apparatus. These construed Quine’s notion of
“natural” responses of human subjects’ and was a very narrow category of phenomena. Other
feminist scholars, to varying degrees, and with diverse responses, agree with Code (Kourany
1998, Baier 1991, Antony 1993, Nelson 1990, Potter 1993, Lovibond 1989) about the
significance of this shift in approach and the “radical feminist import of Quinean naturalism.” 26
These scholars agree that a big part of the emancipatory promise of naturalized epistemologies
had to do with the possibility of uncovering those practices in knowledge production that
“sustain a social-political status quo… [since] epistemic agendas and social-political
commitments are inextricably intertwined and mutually constitutive” in order to maintain
epistemic authority. 27 The scope of hypotheses and questions are issues that feminist scholars
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claim motivate scientific inquiry, and should include discerning and measuring the impact of
socio-political factors on human subjects. Quine believes a viable scientific process is a holistic
endeavor that proceeds by accumulation of empirical data about human experience and
evaluation of data applicable to community-derived theories. The results of this process
contribute to our knowledge of the world and are sufficient to naturalize the broader
epistemological enterprise. Scientific methods, theorizing and research programs are not at issue
for Quine. At issue are our metaphysical commitments and their effects on scientific theorizing
and confirmation. These feminist philosophers of science agree with Quine on two points. The
first point is that important information can and should be gleaned from a human subject’s
sensory apparatus, and secondly, that there are implicit commitments expressed in theories,
hypotheses, and research programs. Feminist philosophers of science part ways with Quine in
their critical stance about those implicit commitments, and in how these commitments shape
theories, hypotheses and research programs.
According to Code, Quinean naturalized epistemology (QNE), “limits its promise”
because of features that are “interconnected, mutually informative and yet separate.” 28 One
feature is a reductive scientism that gives an unexamined, privileged epistemic status to science
in general, and psychology in particular; and the other is the recreation of “contestable
representations of ‘nature’ both physical and human” 29 in laboratory settings and in theoretical
explanations. Quine’s claim is that humans, as objects of psychological study, are understood
more thoroughly and successfully through scientific protocols for the qualitative study of the
individual human subject. Quinean naturalism paints a picture of human subjects as solitary
information processors: “the abstract individual who figures, implicitly, as the knower is one
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such construct, a faceless, dispassionate, infinitely replicable ‘individual’ who knows only when
he is successful in suppressing interdependence, affect, and meaning, and indeed all aspects of
his individuality.” 30 The consequence of this picture of the human subject in Quinean naturalism
plays out in two steps: first universality is extrapolated from innate biological and psychological
qualities or processes of a human object of study, and secondly, the “individualism in its
empirical-scientific psychology forms fails, indeed refuses, to individuate. Rather, it reduces and
assimilates differences, both ‘natural’ and socio-political, under its universality and objectivity
requirements; and in so doing it denatures the very natural kinds to which its best intuitions
appeal.” 31
Baier (1990) speaks more specifically to the second limitation Code discerns in Quinean
naturalized epistemology. For her, a naturalist view is a “personalist view of nature” that
emphasizes the interdependence of persons, allowing us—through written and spoken
language— to be communicative and responsive to one another. 32 This view “takes our
biological nature seriously…not as a handicap but as a source of strengths as well as
weaknesses.” 33 A naturalist, Baier contends, must attend to our inclination for representing, or
perhaps more importantly, misrepresenting anything of interest to ourselves, including our
origins, our defining traits, our responsibilities, and limitations. The notion that we are singular
selves, “free from our actual history” of dependency, biological limitations and mortality makes
it easier to make claims of personhood and in this context, epistemic labor that are free from any
“shared responsibilities, or equally shared burdens.” 34 These are just two criticisms—in broad
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strokes— of Quine’s naturalism. To provide more detail concerning the feminist critique, the
next section will be a review of specific elements of Quine’s naturalism—his holism, nondogmatic empiricism, anti-individualism, and anti-foundationalism— with which most of the
aforementioned feminist philosophers of science are in agreement.
The starting point for this discussion is Quine’s holistic approach because it informs all
the other elements of his naturalized epistemology. In Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist
Empiricism (1990), Nelson provides an account of Quine’s theory that she claims shares some
accord with feminist concerns. Quine’s holistic approach is about “rubbing out boundaries,” 35
which Quine alludes to in the introduction to Two Dogmas: “One effect of abandoning [these
dogmas] is …a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural
science.” 36 One branch of his holistic approach is linguistic analysis. Language is, some ways,
an implicit expression of our metaphysical commitments. Nelson asserts that for Quine it is
impossible to discuss ontology without discussing theory, and theory is formulated in language.
Ontological commitments are “always propounded in theorizing; they are not established,
discovered or posited prior to that activity.” In making this claim, Quine takes a step away from
the method of a non-naturalized epistemological theory that prioritizes individual, internal beliefs
and the epistemic claims based on them, and confirms those beliefs and knowledge claims by
means of reductive analysis of the smallest units of meaningful content. On his holistic
understanding of language, it is the whole of a language that establishes meaningful content, not
in words or sentences but in language itself. Claims are always confirmed holistically, given the
ways in which theories already carry in them several metaphysical commitments. Fodor and
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Lepore (1992) contend that Quine conflates his semantic holism with his epistemological holism
such that what Quine means in saying that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of
science,” at bottom means “the unit of [any] significance is the whole belief system.” This
interpretation is validated in “Things and Their Place in Theories” (1981), in which Quine
describes the series of shifts in empiricism, from the semantic primacy of words, to the primacy
of sentences that then gives way to primacy and analysis of “systems of sentences.” This shift is
necessary for the “recognition that in a scientific theory even a whole sentence is too short to
serve as an independent vehicle of empirical meaning.” Quine takes Duhem’s
underdetermination thesis, which pertained specifically to confirmation of theories in physics,
and extends it such that the confirmation of knowledge claims —common sense claims and
scientific claims— must be attempted holistically by reference to several parts of the network of
theories in use, rather than just one. A holistic understanding of science means “all sciences
interlock to some extent.” 37 The whole of science is a network of theories that are assumed in
language that explains experience at the everyday, common sense level, as well as at the level of
scientific investigation: “total science, mathematical and natural and human, is similarly but
more extremely underdetermined by experience.” 38 An important aspect of this holism lies in
Quine’s insistence on the continuity of knowledge claims: scientific claims are formalized in a
way common sense claims are not. However, because of their places within a network of belief,
they are also equally subject to revision. As mentioned earlier, this holism shines through in the
other elements of QNE.
Non-dogmatic empiricism is the second element of Quine’s naturalism to be considered.
Quine’s charge is that the separation of epistemology from science is wrong. An epistemology
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that is taken to be autonomous, and conceptually first in relation to science, is not empirical, and
therefore is not naturalistic. That is, non-naturalized epistemology ignores the behavioral and
empirical aspects of the human subject by focusing on that which is outside or beyond
experience and a deliberate discounting of other theories and constructs that we assume and use
in language and science. Quine understands language to be a natural phenomenon that should be
studied using the same scientific methods used to study and understand all other kinds of natural
phenomena. As discussed in the previous chapter, Quine is critical of dogmatic empiricism that
attempts to theorize about the human subject and her epistemic claims from a pre-theoretical,
pre-experiential position. A non-dogmatic empiricism, as Quine holistically conceives it, is one
that understands the nature of language and science as interdependent tools of scientific inquiry
that help one theorize about experience, articulate hypotheses based on that experience, and
collect and interpret data based on the metaphysical commitments implicit in the language used
to theorize and hypothesize.
The third component of Quine’s naturalism is his critical anti-individualism with regard
to knowledge claims. Epistemology is not naturalized if it gives primacy to an individualistic
account of knowledge that starts from the internal mental processes and ideas of individual,
knowing subjects. Quine believes that beginning with the epistemological standards of an
individual and extrapolating to a general set of epistemic norms has been a failed project. This
can be extracted from Quine’s discussion in “Facts of the Matter” (1978). One of the reasons he
rejects an individualistic account of knowledge is because there is too much reliance on ideas.
Ideas are “frail reeds” that language reinforces.” 39 Words should therefore be the place to begin
philosophical analysis. Some epistemologists have failed to recognize the essential role practice
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and use play in language and the articulation of theories, and the criteria used to evaluate those
theories. What they miss is that epistemic labor is properly done at the level of communities that
can rely on public scrutiny of knowledge claims and the community’s criteria for judging them.
Nelson (1990) notes “ontology is not what mainly matters” to Quine. It is theories that matter
because they are ‘artifacts of what we produce and use to bridge our experience and, as the scope
of our theories becomes more general, to bridge other such bridges.” 40 Adding to this, his claim
that theorizing is done collectively explains why Quine argues that what has empirical meaning
is ‘the whole of science’ – including sense data and common sense. The collective use of
language and its expression of the bridge between theories and experience qualify as activities in
the pursuit of knowledge—regardless of the level at which it is practiced.
The last component is Quine’s anti-foundationalism. The dogmatic epistemology that
begins from the internal processes of individual subjects also errs in its commitment to
foundationalist approaches to justification. These approaches claim, first, that there is a
distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs, which is closely related to the notion of
necessity and contingency as it pertains to justificatory processes. In building on a foundation of
basic, a priori beliefs that are necessary and thus supposedly immune to skepticism, all beliefs,
however far along on the chain of inferences they are located, can ultimately be traced back to
those basic, a priori beliefs. Secondly, foundationalist approaches make a parallel move to
reduce the unit of analysis and confirmation to individual words in sentences. Regardless of
which aspects of those words or sentences are analyzed, consensus on meaning and conditions of
truth or falsehood cannot be guaranteed. Attempts to analyze the building blocks of claims,
observations and theories have failed. Quine’s response is to argue for a broader view of what
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science and epistemology are: a singular phenomenon that operates within, and expresses the
same commitment to, a network of theories concerning humanity and its connection with the
world, and humanity’s attempts to comprehend and explain it. This is a call for a holistic
approach to confirmation that understands a theory as a network in which statements are nodes
and the paths between the nodes are the relations between the statements. If any part of the
theory changes, there is a corresponding change to the semantic meanings of all the statements in
the system. Changes in the theory would be subject to a community’s judgments that plausibly
would take the entire network of beliefs into consideration in its judgments. My objective in the
next section is to talk about responses to Quine’s naturalized epistemology, with emphasis on the
aforementioned elements.

Critical Feminist Responses to Quine
In Feminism and Philosophy of Science: An introduction (2006), Potter marks out the
feminist critique in four distinct categories: naturalized feminist empiricism, the cooperative
model of theory justification, feminist contextual empiricism, and standpoint theory. I will
consolidate the discussion of the naturalized and contextual empiricisms for the most part,
because they align themselves in important ways with Quine’s empiricism and naturalism. The
works of Harding (1986), Longino (1989), Nelson (1990), and Solomon (2001) support Quine’s
steadfast commitment to non-dogmatic empiricism. Nelson contends that her fundamental goal
is to “reopen or redirect a discussion of scientists and the feminist philosophers of science about
the nature of science.” 41 Nelson’s goal points to a broader claim made by feminist philosophers
of science. It has been assumed in both science and philosophy of science that when “social
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values and interests (understood as biases) enter the laboratory, they enter scientific research in
itself, and the result is bad science.” 42 Feminist scientists and philosophers of science would
agree that this is sometimes the case, but they would certainly question whether it is always the
case. Therefore, Potter observes, “no one is well served by philosophies of science that make it
impossible to find out.” 43 Giving a feminist account of the impact of social values and interests
on scientific inquiry begins with the feminist empiricists. Potter’s take is that feminist empiricists
have accepted a consequence of Quine’s holism and empiricism that is important to their own
feminist theories: there are simply no “pre-theoretic” observations. Rather, all observational
experience in scientific settings itself rests on theoretical accounts supported in turn by data
acquired in a variety of biological sciences including neurobiology, developmental biology, and
neuropsychology. 44 Another point on which they agree with Quine is the denial of epistemic
individualism- understood by feminist philosophers as the general picture in which autonomous
individuals can produce knowledge promulgated and maintained by groups, or by communities
of people as illustrated by practices such as peer-review and replication. 45 There is consensus
about communities in which individuals are situated as the primary vessels of knowledge, but
there is no consensus on what it means to say that epistemic communities are the primary vessels
of knowledge. Feminist philosophers of science are also in accord about the idea that individuals
“tacitly hold the explicit beliefs of their communities.” 46 Proposed remedies would find and
highlight those values. The “remedies” include 1) an attempt to balance naturalizing and
normative considerations; closely related to 2) a critical analysis of the relationship between
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science and values, and 3) the nature of objectivity and how to achieve it, 4) acceptance of
pluralistic theories and explanations, 5) recognition of the effects of underdetermination on
theories and explanations, 6) how best to characterize the agents of knowledge, and finally, given
the aforementioned remedies, 7) offer ways to respond to the problem of epistemological
relativism. Feminist philosophers of science aim to determine whether and how social values
and interests “enter the ‘content’ of good scientific work, what is termed ‘the context of
justification.’ 47 To clarify, Reichenbach’s distinction between context of discovery and context
of justification was a way of addressing “irrational guessing” and other elements of scientific
inductive method by which theories are conceived. Context of discovery includes the “actual
circumstances under which a hypothesis or model is conceived, and personal, commercial, and
social values and interests at play.” 48 Context of justification includes work confirming or
disconfirming a hypothesis, or a model, or any work carried out in accordance with the best
relevant methods. Reichenbach notes, “The act of discovery escapes logical analysis” [but] “the
logician’s task is to account for scientific discoveries; all he can do is to analyze the relation
between given facts and a theory presented. Logic is concerned only with the context of
justification. And the justification of a theory in terms of observable data is the subject of the
theory of induction.” 49 With Potter, several other feminist empiricists maintain this distinction as
a valid one; including Longino (1989), and Solomon (2001).
Nelson’s critique of dogmatic empiricism builds on Quine’s version of non-dogmatic
empiricism. Nelson asserts that for many feminist scholars, empiricism is “an inherently flawed
doctrine that underwrites an erroneous view of the world of evidence, and theory formation.” 50
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Feminist science criticism of empiricism has developed outside of the arena of Western scientific
practice for decades. It might be said that this is the reason why the wider scientific community
is indifferent to feminist science criticism. It seems disingenuous, however, to assume this is the
only reason for the indifference. Given the commitments to empiricist tenets and empiricist
accounts that dominate science, the scientific community deem the feminist critique a “category
mistake.” 51 The community’s indifference can more forthrightly be attributed to the “assumption
that feminist criticism has few or no implications for the soundness of our current understandings
of science or current scientific practice.” 52 Nelson’s claim is that while feminist criticisms have
been characterized as anti-empiricist, they are not inevitably non-empirical. The call for
empiricism to be discarded as a foundational tenet of science is unwarranted. What is necessary
is that work should be done to incorporate feminist criticisms of science, which would include
incorporating values into the practice. She admits that “the science we should work to bring
about will be different from the conception many scientists and philosophers have about science,
and it will be different from science as it is actually practiced, just as these are already different
from one another.” 53
For Nelson, there is no viable alternative to a theory of evidence based on something
other than empiricism. The only viable option is a feminist empiricism whose view of science
can both account for the success of science in explaining and predicting experience, and
encompass feminist insights into the relationships between sex/gender, politics and science.
What this means, first, is that the “new” feminist science will incorporate values, and not deny
when they are incorporated: “The infusion of values will be self-conscious and subject to critical
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scrutiny.” 54 Secondly, this work is already presaged in the work feminist philosophers of science
have done and are currently doing. Nelson asserts that the feminist critique challenges what we
think science is by criticizing current science and leads to a conception of science as it should be.
Feminist empiricism is a view of science that can account for the success of science in explaining
and predicting experience and encompass feminist insights into the relationships between
sex/gender, politics and science. This makes it “a viable and powerful option.” 55
Nelson’s defense of empiricism is important because it is of a particular implication of
Quine’s holism with which she disagrees. Nelson provides a brief discussion of Quine’s
consideration of values and science in a section entitled “A Remaining Boundary.” 56 She notes
that although Quine was interested in “rubbing out boundaries” (i.e., boundaries between
epistemology and science) he is was less willing to take on values in a scientific context for a
couple of reasons. One reason is that Quine states values are social (like language) but
“derivatively so for they are probably grounded in natural selection and inherited by
individuals.” 57 Values, if indeed they are the product of natural selection, would imply that they
are “uncontroversial” and thus good because they have aided in survival, and “they meet the
common needs of society, and of humankind.” 58 Secondly, values can be incorporated into
science only as a matter of discovering scientific explanations for the origins of moral values.
However, because there are no agreed upon criteria by which to judge values in terms of
empirical content, science should remain removed from value judgments. Nelson writes, “a view
clearly implied by Quine…[is] that…there is no judging [values] in the way that scientific claims
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can be judged and adjudicated by reference to evidence.” 59 Because there is no empirical
content to values, they lie beyond the work and scope of science. Quine’s reluctance in removing
the boundary between science and values is problematic because, Nelson argues, science must
involve itself in the “business of explaining values because to make a claim about values as
products of evolutionary processes implies “any” moral values could be justified, requires that
we be very “self-conscious” about our explanations. Quine’s position is also problematic because
it is contradictory to say science could explain the origins of values and still claim that it stands
aloof from values. Ultimately, Nelson supports “the spirit of Quine’s use of science, of the
knowledge we acquire about how things are being brought to bear on moral, social, and political
values.” 60 However, we must tread carefully since that which is “brought to bear” on values is
evidence. Nelson bases her evidence model on what she calls “a feminist account of evidence”
that uses community-produced standards and methods that evaluate evidence. A detailed
discussion of this account of evidence will be included in the next section.
Nelson (1990), Longino (1989), and Solomon (2001) would agree that a naturalized
feminist philosophy of science should first, be commensurable with actual historical and
contemporary practice of science. This would mean that it would also be subject to “empirical
adequacy and conform to a rich body of evidence and/or have a scope or range of
applications.” 61 Secondly, it should be grounded in sciences relevant to theories of theorizing,
e.g. empirical psychology, social psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and/or
sociology; and finally, the methodological principles used should be consistent in order to
“explain consensus and dissent”, and “progressive and less progressive episodes in science.”
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Nelson contends “philosophers of science attending to the practice of feminist and non-feminist
scientists and to results in feminist as well as mainstream science scholarship satisfy these
criteria “better than those who do not.” 62 In “Empiricism Without Dogmas” (1996), Nelson
argues for a more naturalized philosophy of science that is distinct from traditional epistemology
in both its core research questions and its goals. The methodology of this naturalized philosophy
of science is constituted by a theory of evidence—what Nelson calls a “feminist account of
evidence” (FAE) that holistically includes claims and theories informed by social beliefs and
values in its interpretations of evidence. 63 “It is science communities rather than scientists qua
individuals that are the appropriate loci of philosophical reconstructions and explanations of
scientific practice. A broader implication of holism is that naturalized philosophy of science is a
normative and not simply a descriptive enterprise.” 64 Nelson’s theory begins with Quine’s
conclusions that there is no distinction between theory and observations, and no a priori
foundations of knowledge. With Quine, Nelson claims that evidence is the “final arbiter of our
theories”:
The evidence supporting a specific theory, hypothesis, or research program is constituted
by observation, itself largely structured as current theories would have it, and other
theories that together constitute a current theory of nature, inclusive of those informed by
social beliefs and values. 65
Thus, FAE claims that evidence is established by both observations and other theories that are
also supported by scientific evidence and other scientific theories. Nelson’s FAE, Potter claims,
distinguishes Nelson’s empiricism from other feminist empiricisms because other empiricisms
would hesitate to accept the broad notion of evidence entailed by FAE, since empirical data are
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“held to be independent of any theories” to avoid begging the question. 66 FAE also distinguishes
itself from Quine’s holistic approach if we recall that Quine argues that a network of theories
encompasses all of our theories, common sense, philosophical and scientific. Potter reads
Nelson’s theory of evidence as continuing to uphold the norms of non-feminist science that
distinguish between good and bad science by leaving intact values such as empirical adequacy,
explanatory power and predictive power.” 67 Nelson, however, maintains the “normative import”
of her model disavows the old understanding of those norms on two levels:
1) These principles, implicit or explicit, constitute norms for practitioners of philosophy
of science: “prescribing and…circumscribing, the questions and consideration
legitimately pursued and emphasized in the practice.”
2) These principles “shape philosophical explanations and the criteria that function in
philosophical evaluations of that practice.” 68
Maintaining normative import has contributed to a revitalized view of science such that “feminist
scientists and science scholars have identified a wide range of cases in which social processes,
internal and external to science, and social beliefs and/or values have been at work in cases [and
nevertheless] taken to constitute good science.” 69 Theories put forth by Nelson and Longino
share the following aspects: they advocate non-dogmatic empiricism, anti-individualism, and
reliance on confirmation holism. Similarly, they both reject some of the traditional values of
non-naturalized philosophy of science and favor the installation of new epistemological values
that articulate the continuity of social and rational accounts of knowledge and entail redefined
notions of knowledge and objectivity.
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Nelson’s emphasis on the normative import of naturalized epistemology is reiterated in
Longino’s articulation of the motives for feminist epistemology of science. Two dimensions of
importance were discussed at the outset of this chapter: the “demonstration of masculine bias
…that grounds “philosophical analyses of objectivity, reason, knowledge and rationality,” and
the constructive “carving out a space for specifically feminist programs of inquiry, identifying or
defending epistemic guidelines of feminist inquiry.” 70 These include feminist standpoint theory,
feminist empiricism, and feminist forms of pragmatism. 71 This pluralistic position is essential
for several reasons of which I highlight two. Pluralism is the ground of Longino’s argument for
the analysis of theoretical values in inquiry she calls a “contextualist” account of objectivity by
which theories and models are justified by a set of community standards grounded in the
agreement of that community, which also sets the cognitive goals for inquiry. Pluralism is also
an important element of Longino’s rejection of the monism in scientific practice that assumes the
aim of science is to produce a unified account of the natural world, and that the ultimate success
of science consists in producing that account. These, in turn, rest on two further assumptions:
first, that all models and theories scientists produce can be unified into one set of theories (such
as the Grand Theory of Everything), and second, that the models and theories produced can
completely describe all the processes in a way that represents nature. 72
For Longino, a good epistemology and, by extension, a good philosophy of science, both
set out the practical conditions that must be satisfied to classify something as knowledge, and
describe what knowledge seekers do. Potter categorizes Longino, like other feminist empiricists,
as attempting to naturalize epistemology and philosophy of science by “giving accounts of
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knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular based closely on what scientists and
other knowers actually do when they produce and transmit knowledge.” 73 Knowledge is social,
guided by social norms, and therefore Longino also assumes there are no pre-theoretical
observations or theories, and importantly, that “philosophy should be both normative and
empirical,” disputing the dichotomy drawn between social and rational accounts of knowledge. 74
Removing the dichotomy highlights the continuity between values and interests, and knowledge,
supports the idea “that scientific knowledge is produced through practices carried out primarily
by communities working with background assumptions.” 75 Longino is not aiming to prescribe
one theoretical model but rather an overlapping set of theoretical models, each with its cognitive
goals, which would not privilege any specific perspective. This is just one implication of
Longino’s denial of individualistic conceptions of theory production or confirmation. There are
two different ways this anti-individualism is articulated. The social/communal aspect of
Longino’s theory argues that benchmarks set by a community (or communities, depending on the
scope of the research program) aid in the development of cognitive goals and criteria for
evaluating theories. Furthermore, Longino argues “the under-determination argument
necessitates a move away from individualism in philosophy of science and epistemology: “in
light of the gap between hypotheses and the statements describing data, the statements acquire
evidential relevance for hypotheses only in light of the background assumptions. Justificatory
practices must include not only the testing of hypotheses against data but the subjection of
background assumptions to criticism from a variety of perspectives.” 76
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Longino, with Nelson, also relies on non-dogmatic empirical methods of scientific
inquiry, while advancing feminist theoretical values in inquiry, theories, models and hypotheses
that have “empirical adequacy (common to all researchers), novelty, ontological heterogeneity,
complexity or mutuality of interaction, applicability to human needs and decentralization of
power or universal empowerment.” 77 I want to emphasize two particular values here that are
necessary for both the critical and constructive dimensions of feminist epistemologies. Just as
importantly, these two values make it possible for the other values to be considered. One value
is novelty, which Longino describes as a value of frameworks of understanding that “protect
against an unconscious perpetuation of the sexism and androcentrism of traditional theorizing.” 78
Novelty would aid in the discovery of “salient aspects of experience or reality hidden or
marginalized by presently accepted theory.” 79 The other value that stands out is “ontological
heterogeneity,” by which differences in phenomena are prioritized along with similarities. Nonnaturalistic theoretical models favor and encourage uniform specimens with a view toward
generalization, but this uniformity misses important differences. Consequently, “the male of a
species is taken as paradigmatic for the species” or that males are “the only causally effective
agents in a population.” “Heterogeneity is thus opposed to ontological simplicity and the
associated…virtue of unification.” 80 The institution of these values, along with the others
previously enumerated, point to the increased possibility of achieving the cognitive goal of
feminist researchers: to reveal the operation of gender, “by making visible both the activities of
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those gendered female and the processes whereby they are made invisible, and by identifying the
mechanisms whereby female gendered agents are subordinated.” 81
Longino contends that these values tell us something about the prospects for a normative
feminist epistemology based on them. In the first place, while most (but not all) feminists
endorse these values, their subordination to a “broader cognitive goal means that they are not in
and of themselves feminist theoretical values. They have no intrinsic standing as feminist
theoretical virtues but only a provisional one … consequently, whilst these values promote the
goal of revealing gender, they can serve the norms of feminist inquiry.” 82 Secondly, the
normative claim of these values is also limited to the community that shares the primary goal:
“On those who do not share it, these values have no claim.” 83 Longino refers to this as a “local”
scope that emphasizes “the provisionality and locality of alternative virtues, which contrasts with
traditional values which, as (purely) epistemic are represented as universally binding.” 84 Thus,
traditional values of “domination and control” are missing in her conception of “local”
epistemology. 85
Like Nelson, Longino prefers a method of confirmation that does not rely on rational
reconstructions of scientific practice, and argues that evidence for hypotheses, models, and
theories is not definitive but “always depends on one’s background beliefs and assumptions.” 86
Longino argues, as a strong proponent for the importance of underdetermination in any
consideration of evidence, that “hypotheses, models and theories are logically underdetermined
by the evidence/data used to support them.” Thus, a set of observations can provide evidence for
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several different, and at times, conflicting hypotheses. 87 Underdetermination is an important
component of the holistic approach feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science
advocate. This holism justifies the use of a wide range of empirical science. Making use of
empirical data from other disciplines aid in providing a representation of the world we live in
that is more accurate in light of values and interests under which that representation is forged. I
now turn to Alison Wylie’s consilience model of confirmation that has a different take on what
confirmation holism contributes to a robust empiricism that acknowledges background
assumptions in both theorizing and confirmation.
Alison Wylie’s consilience model of confirmation and Nelson’s naturalized feminist
empiricism are both holistic and empirical in that they both argue that evidence depends on
scientific communities—as creators of observations and theories—as producers and maintainers
of knowledge. The standards and methods of science, on which these observations and theories
depend, shift and change over time. Wylie’s notion of evidence garnered through her work and
experience in archeology and the basic claims she makes based on that work points to what she
sees as a less relativistic model for confirmation than Nelson’s. Archeologists begin inquiries
with a range of assumptions about people that include assumptions they make about themselves.
They then “use evidence from an enormously diverse range of natural and social sciences and
different lines of evidence that mutually constrain a hypothesis when they converge or fail to
converge on a coherent account of a particular past context.” 88 Wylie argues this type of
confirmation model results in a “mitigated objectivity” that avoids both extreme epistemological
relativism 89 and the problematic circularity of Nelson’s FAE.
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The consilience model of confirmation assumes that knowledge can be achieved through
the agreement among different academic disciplines, in their approaches especially the
agreement cuts across the boundary between the sciences and the humanities. Wylie’s own
experience in the field of archeology provides a good case study, since archeology is a hybrid
science that exemplifies the desired agreement between science and the humanities. It uses
specialized tools of the physical sciences, e.g. carbon dating, and life sciences, such as
paleobiology, paleo-botany and paleoenvironmental sciences, and evidence from the social
sciences. Wylie states that a primary concern in archeology has been the problem that arises
from an assumption taken as given in feminist philosophy of science, the theoryladenness of the
evidence archeologists find. Wylie begins to build what she takes as an important element of the
consilience model of confirmation—namely, a way of relying on knowledge and evidence from
other disciplines without committing oneself to a vicious circularity. This method is referred to
as “tacking.” According to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, tacking means taking “‘experiencedistant’ concepts from [one’s] own culture and using them to try to understand the ‘experiencenear’ concepts of the people [one] studies.” 90 Ethnographers make use of the “distant
concepts—theoretical, abstract concepts—from [one’s] own culture and then tack back and forth
between them and the subjects’ experience-near concepts—concrete, experience-embedded
concepts.” 91 This tacking of one’s own experiences toward abstract and concrete concepts, is
really two different kinds of tacking. There is vertical tacking from the researcher to the subjects:
researchers apply concepts across contexts— “abstract to concrete, familiar to alien.” The other
kind is horizontal tacking, in which theoretical concepts are applied from within the context of
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the subjects being studied. 92 Thus, ethnographers begin with their own practical knowledge, as
well as general theories about human motivations, beliefs and capabilities. Potter states that
Wylie’s mitigated objectivity depends on taking the hypotheses and theories offered by
archeologists and testing them “against evidence that ethnographers have grasped the meaning of
their subjects’ practices.” 93
Actual archeological practices provide Wylie with an empirically adequate model of
confirmation. ‘Tacking’ practices provide evidence that researchers’ experience-near and
experience-distant concepts are used as starting points for theorizing about their findings. To
avoid claims of relativism, however, Wylie must then show how empirical evidence is used to
confirm theories based on evidence gathered from contemporary peoples, which is then applied
to archeological sites. 94 In practice, archeologists challenge theories and interpretations of
evidence by providing evidence or additional background knowledge that either supports or casts
doubt on a particular theory or interpretation. In this way, archeologists judge each other’s claims
and, rather than leading to disagreement and relativism in archeological theory, Wylie finds
many points of agreement among archeologists including the idea that data and evidence are
neither stable nor independent of theory; that identification of archeological data and their
constitution as evidence are based on linkage principles (represented by the tacking concepts);
and that archeological data and evidence are interpretive constructs without being viciously
circular. 95 She believes this is possible because even though evidence must be theory-laden in
order to be considered evidence at all, archeological hypotheses are constrained by what Wylie
refers to as “mitigated objectivism” or modern scientific realism, which Wylie takes as “crucial
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to archeological practice.” Mitigated objectivity constrains the credibility of claims about
evidence presented such that “while judgments [about theoretical claims or confirmation of
evidence] aren’t certain, they aren’t arbitrary either.” 96 What this means is that objectivity is
achieved when the theories used, infused with the tacking of researchers, nevertheless are judged
“secure” and “epistemically independent.” Security is understood in two senses:
Security₁: The background knowledge used to link the present record (data) with
antecedent causes or past events must be credible in its home context.
Security₂: The inferences supported by this background knowledge are secure to the
degree to which the links between the present record (data) and antecedent causes or past
events (background assumptions) are unique or deterministic, and to the degree to which
the argument chains are relatively short and simple.” 97
Likewise, epistemic independence has two senses:
Epistemic Independence₁: Background assumptions used to establish the evidence, must
be vertically independent of the hypothesis being tested; and
Epistemic Independence₂: Background assumptions (linking principles) derived from one
or more different sources used to establish the evidential import of archeological data
must be horizontally independent of one another 98
Any claim, any background assumption, and any theoretical model proffered must meet these
constraints. What seems to be absent in the discussion is any consideration of its categorization
as a specifically feminist theory. What makes this a particularly feminist perspective is made
more evident by her response (1992) to charges from other North American archeologists
concerning a lack of objectivity in the practice of archeology generally and in particular,
archeological research that focuses on women and gender as subjects of study. The worry is that
background assumptions and conceptual tacking imperil the neutrality of scientific practice with
what might be considered “explicitly political (feminist) commitments,” since this might result in
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a standpoint that I specific and partial. Wylie’s take is that “a feminist perspective, among other
critical, explicitly political perspectives, may well enhance conceptual integrity and empirical
adequacy of knowledge claims.” 99 Wylie believes that “explicitly political feminist thinking”
has undoubtedly contributed to increased attention to gender or willingness to advocate for
research programs about gender. However, this influence, Wylie notes, is most likely indirect.
That is to say, feminist critiques of discourse and practice in scientific disciplines would likely
make one aware of or at least sympathetic to women’s issues in both abstract “experiencedistant” concepts, and “experience-near” concepts that in turn become the background
knowledge a researcher brings to the research and the data. Even if feminist-inspired
background assumptions are utilized, as long as the theories offered can be proven secure and
independent in every sense previously noted, they would not be considered biases that distort
theories and confirmation (and consequently make for bad science). For Wylie, this is made
evident in “feminist-inspired research across the social and life sciences [that] has provided
strong, substantive grounds for questioning the ‘self-cleansing’ capacity of scientific method,”
partly motivated by the Reichenbach distinction, and “identified myriad instances of gender bias
that have persisted” in both “bad” and “good” science. 100
In epistemologies presented by Nelson, Longino, and Wylie, the elements of what Quine
deems necessary to a naturalized epistemology have been considered. These epistemologists
found ways to take these important Quinean elements—holism, and its influence on the
definitions of anti-individualism, anti-foundationalism and non-dogmatic empiricism— and use
them to make clear how it is gender influences conceptions of knowledge and how we evaluate

99

Alison Wylie, “The Interplay of Evidential Constraints and Political Interests: Recent Archeological Research on
Gender,” American Antiquity. 57 (1), 1992: p. 15; emphasis added.
100
Ibid., p. 19.

84

knowledge claims as they pertain to epistemological and scientific practices. Just as importantly,
they have called much-needed attention to the ways in which women and people of color have
been excluded from scientific inquiry, and the necessity for informed, feminist critiques of
theories and “objective” findings that reflect distorted claims and interpretations of empirical
data that had gone unquestioned. Nelson, Longino, and Wylie have offered differing accounts
not only of how to overcome these distorted claims and interpretations, but how to devise new
models that acknowledge values and interests such that they can contribute to good science.
Feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science disagree with Quine in ways mentioned
earlier: his scientism gives epistemic privilege to science and psychology, which leads to an
unquestioned faith in scientists’ ability to recreate physical and human natures in laboratory
settings. In analyzing these weaknesses, it becomes apparent that Quine’s naturalism continues
to lack a proper view of the human subject, as well as the communities in which the subject is
embedded. As Baier (1991) has argued, a persistent conception of the individual as freed from
“actual history of dependency, biological limitations and mortality,” in turn defines epistemic
labor as free from “shared responsibilities, or equally shared burdens.” 101 Nelson (1990)
contends that engaging with Quine’s critique of the Hempel/Nagel tradition of empiricist
philosophy of science helped her recognize that sociological accounts of science “raise serious
questions about the adequacy of viewing science as a body of theories [that focus], to the
exclusion of broader considerations, on the logic of justification.” 102
My objective has been to consider feminist responses to Quine and his attempt to
naturalize epistemology. The assumption is that the pursuit of knowledge is a holistic matter. For
most of the feminist epistemologists, any naturalistic account of science must challenge
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boundaries between science and epistemology and the implicit methodological and sociological
assumptions and biases that invariably make their way into theories and models of explanation,
and the values that underlie them. Quine provides some promising avenues for feminist
philosophers of science, but at bottom, Quine is not interested in the intersection of science and
values. In his disregard to this particular issue, feminist philosophers of science find the greatest
limitation of his theory. To ignore the values at work in the theories and practices of traditional,
non-naturalized science would remove much of what motivated the feminist critique in its
earliest stages and so much of the work that has ensued in the last four decades. Many feminist
philosophers of science—with the possible exception of Nelson—read Quine’s unwillingness to
engage with the issues that arise with values and with scientific inquiry as a basic reason for
throwing Quine back into the “mainstream” of non-naturalized epistemology from which Quine
was intent on disassociating himself.
Critical feminist epistemologists were motivated initially to accept QNE as a positive
move toward a more naturalistic production of knowledge and scientific inquiry. They expected
this naturalistic move to provide a theoretical space to address concerns regarding androcentrism
in epistemological endeavors. As I have shown, critical feminist theorists approved of the move
from the “idealized abstraction” of non-naturalized and non-feminist epistemologies to theories
that constructively and critically engage with “everyday cognitive activities.” 103 This positive
view began to change with time and consideration of those elements of QNE that run counter to
the commitments feminists argue are necessary for a truly naturalized epistemology. These
would include an account of science as it actually is practiced and importantly, and
acknowledgement of social and cultural values and interests in both the social account of
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scientific practice and the epistemological account of science. It would also require a pluralistic
approach to both the accumulation of data as well as construction of explanatory models,
hypotheses and theories used to explain the data. Finally, a naturalistic account and approach
would retain the normative import of these commitments to the practices of scientific inquiry,
epistemology and philosophies of science, since the feminist critique is informed by a common
set of political goals. In the chapter that follows, the discussion of the critical feminist response
continues with an account of feminist standpoint epistemologies with the aim of distinguishing
Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology (FSE) as a particular version of standpoint
theory that I claim provides the best course towards a critical, naturalistic philosophy of science
that can serve as model for a more robustly naturalistic epistemology that is critical and selfreflective.
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CHAPTER 3:
Standpoint Epistemologies
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology (FSE)
and its place in the category of feminist responses to Quinean Naturalized Epistemology and
other non-feminist epistemologies. Ultimately, I am attempting to position Harding’s FSE as a
candidate for the project of naturalizing epistemology. I do not mean to say that FSE would serve
as a singular approach, but rather part of a pluralistic one that would be revised. In the previous
chapter, I gave a broad overview of the feminist response to Quine and set a specific boundary
on this overview by focusing on those feminist epistemologies commonly held in the literature as
exemplars of the feminist critiques of science and philosophies of science. In locating feminist
empiricism, the consilience model, and local epistemology within that range, I did not include
the post-modern critique put forth by feminist scholars such as Donna Haraway. This omission
can be attributed partly to my reliance on Elizabeth Potter’s book, Feminism and Philosophy of
Science: An Introduction (2006), in which she categorizes some of the feminist critiques as
generally promoting the notion that the introduction of social values and interests can result in
bad science. These feminist scholars hold fast to the idea that it is “possible to determine whether
and how social values and interests enter the ‘content’ of good scientific work.” 1 Good scientific
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work that recognizes social values and interests as a part of good science is what Potter assumes
defines naturalistic theory. Potter borrows from Nelson three criteria for naturalized
epistemologies that should: 1. Reflect the history and practice of science and, importantly, 2. Be
subject to the same criteria as the sciences, and “grounded in sciences relevant to theories of
theorizing,” and 3. Use consistent principles by which to explain both consensus and dissent, and
progressive and less progressive episodes in science. 2 By virtue of these criteria, the feminist
critiques discussed in the previous chapter, as well as Harding’s FSE, are considered naturalized
epistemologies. What makes Potter’s account relevant to my project is that, as she explains in the
introductory remarks of Feminism and Philosophy of Science, the order of the feminist critiques
in the book are arranged by how naturalized and how normative the critiques are. These
discussions include accounts of the different views toward issues such as justification, values and
objectivity, underdetermination and pluralism, among other topics. Potter places Harding’s FSE
at the end of the list in virtue of its status, by Potter’s lights, as the least naturalized feminist
epistemology and least normative. Furthermore, Potter does not include the postmodern feminist
response because she does not believe it meets the aforementioned criteria. By way of contrast,
Harding makes it clear in her writings that the postmodern feminist critics, most notably Donna
Haraway, make an important contribution to Harding’s FSE, and to the epistemology project in
general. As a postmodern feminist, Haraway is skeptical of feminist projects that do not question
or attempt the disruption of, what she takes to be fundamental aspects of the western,
androcentric scientific endeavor. Specifically, Haraway rejects feminist critiques or proclaimed
successor projects because they continue to incorporate gendered and humanistic features of the
scientific enterprise at issue. Haraway has been consistently critical of modern humanism,
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characterizing it as a subjugating force that find its source in man’s narcissism. From her
perspective, disembodied scientific objectivity has fostered scientific practice that is
misogynistic, racist, and speciesist. As she articulates in “Situated Knowledges” (1988),
scientific inquiry turns everything it studies into “passive and inert things.” 3 Her critical view of
humanism undergirds her challenges to the origins of biological theory and the language
employed in it, as she argues in “In the Beginning Was the Word: The Genesis of Biological
Theory” (1981): “Biology is the science of life, conceived and authored by a word from the
father. Feminists have inherited knowledge through the paternal line.” 4 Therefore, it seems that
most attempts at feminist science are doomed to complicity or cooptation. Harding’s perspective
is not so dark. In both The Science Question, and The Feminist Standpoint Reader, Harding
acknowledges that it is useful to see standpoint epistemologies as “‘successor science’ projects
… [since] they aim to reconstruct the original goals of modern science.” 5 Harding makes clear
that feminist postmodernism more directly challenges those goals in a way that Harding finds
indispensable, even as it is, in some important ways, at odds with her own project.
From Haraway’s perspective, feminists must argue for a theory of representation that
attempts to avoid both the exclusion of women from the scientific process and the disorder that
may result from the rejection of common representations or metaphors used in biological or
scientific explanation. As a result, skepticism about non-feminist epistemologies and the
universalized knower they posit becomes necessary to the feminist project. Haraway describes
the projects of Harding and others as merely responding to how “the life and human sciences
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have been obscured by the position of the knowers--on top,” 6 and ignoring the ways in which
“naming a thing is the power of objectifying.” 7 With this remark, Haraway expresses her concern
for any project that attempts to name or rename objects of study and the epistemic products that
result, since these would repeat the objectification and creation of erroneous dichotomies already
set forth by traditional science. Haraway does not find these approaches convincing, although
she recognizes their value. 8 She takes any of these successor projects to be another instance of a
humanist project and therefore, “all of the epistemological and political problems of humanism
and realism are latent--or patent--here.” 9 As indication of the clear-eyed perspective with which
most feminist scholars view their projects, however latently humanist or realist they may be, I
take note first of Lorraine Code, writing in “Taking Subjectivity Into Account”(1993), “[T]he
project of remapping the epistemic terrain…is subversive, even anarchistic, in challenging and
seeking to displace some of the most sacred principles of standard Anglo-American
epistemologies.” 10 Secondly, I look to Ruth Bleier’s (1982) commentary on Haraway’s “In the
Beginning” article. Bleier responds to Haraway’s distrust of the scientific observations provided
by Bleier and other primatologists:
While we recognize that in science, as in any other field, all “knowledge,” “evidence,”
“data,” “observations,” “facts,” “truths” are products of the perceptions, judgments,
opinions, methodologies and language of those who describe them, they are nonetheless,
all that we have as the material objects of our discourse; they are our subject matter when
we attempt our deconstructions and reconstructions of our scientific theory. 11
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Bleier suggests that feminist scientists would be more interested in looking for or presenting
alternative conceptual frameworks that “reveal the complexity and ever-changing nature of
natural and social relationships,” even as they recognize the subjective nature of reality. 12 These
assertions offer support for my claim that Harding’s FSE represents an optimistic view of the
feminist critique, and the scientific and epistemic enterprises, in general. Additionally,
Haraway’s position—that feminist postmodernism is usually understood as a way of decentering,
a negation of not only a method but the possibility of knowledge that is both useful and as
nondiscriminatory as possible on those groups it affects— is a strong counterpoint to Harding’s
optimistic standpoint theory. The tensions expressed in these counterpoints foster the critical
self-reflection Harding sees as necessary for her approach to be epistemically productive.
The chapter is divided into five sections, beginning with a general definition of
standpoint theory, and the three claims common to the approach. Next, I offer justification for
placing Harding’s FSE at the forefront of this discussion. This explanation will provide the
context within which much of the discussion in this chapter is located, especially given both the
number of scholars who identify as standpoint epistemologists, and the historical roots of
standpoint theory. I then will draw connections between FSE and the other feminist
epistemologies discussed previously. In important ways, FSE and other feminist epistemologies
share assumptions about critical feminism and the objectives of their analyses. Showing these
assumptions requires talking about the epistemic dimensions of FSE without engaging too much
with the political roots of the feminist critique, if for no other reason than it would lead the
discussion too far afield. My focus will be on the epistemological goals and characteristics of
FSE and other standpoint epistemologies. In the fourth section, I will parse out the important

12

Ibid., p. 726.

92

distinctions between FSE and other feminist epistemologies using criteria formulated by theorists
within the philosophical tradition of the Frankfurt School. Finally, I return to a central element of
support for FSE’s standing as a naturalistic theory by responding to Potter’s (2006) position
concerning FSE. As mentioned previously, standpoint theories, and specifically, Sandra
Harding’s version are the last approach she discusses since she takes Harding’s FSE to be the
least naturalized and the least normative of the theories she examines. This claim is one with
which I must take issue. My assert that Harding’s FSE is the most naturalized and normative of
the feminist responses discussed. By reviewing criteria set out by Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and
used by Potter in her work, I will determine whether Harding’s FSE is the most naturalistic and
therefore, the best response to QNE and other empiricist epistemologies, both feminist and nonfeminist varieties.

Standpoint Theories
Harding (2004), Crasnow, Wylie, Bauchspies, and Potter (2015), and Bowell
(2010) define feminist standpoint theory as a political strategy that is emancipatory because it
attempts to empower marginalized and/or oppressed groups by valuing their experiences, and aid
in the development of an “oppositional consciousness.” 13 In producing oppositional and shared
consciousness in oppressed groups, it “creates oppressed peoples as collective subjects of
research rather than only as objects of others’ observations.” 14 Crasnow et al. (2015) point out
the commonalities of the various philosophical accounts of standpoint epistemology. These
include the endorsement of three common propositions: situated knowledge, epistemic privilege,
and the achievement thesis.

13
14

Sandra Harding, “Introduction,” In The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader. New York: Routledge. 2004. p. 2-3.
Ibid.

93

The situated knowledge thesis, argued for in a variety of ways by Haraway (1988);
Longino (1989); Longino and Lennon (1997); Harding (1983), (1984), (1991), (2004), Code
(1993) and Wylie (2004), among others, is based on the understanding that “knowledge is for
and by a particular set of socially situated knowers and so is always local.” 15 It is a social,
cultural and political “location” characterized by the power relations that occur in such settings.
Of importance is the recognition that this socially situated community of knowers must contend
with the tension inherent in this thesis. Haraway (1988) describes this incongruity as the desire to
“have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and
knowing subjects … and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” world.” 16
Harding reiterates this point in The Science Question in Feminism (1991): “Feminists who deny
the possibility of access to a real world and an objective standpoint appear to cut off the
possibility of a degendered science at all.” 17 Harding ultimately staves off this conclusion by
recognizing that science is a social endeavor that has never been and never will be gender-free.
In recognizing the irreducibly social and gendered aspects of scientific inquiry, objectivity does
not have to be surrendered, but rather reconceived. Harding acknowledges the value of
Haraway’s articulation of this ambivalence, and sees it as a boon for feminist critiques,
motivating self-critical reflection in feminist standpoint epistemologies. 18
The second shared thesis is epistemic privilege. Feminist standpoint theories argue that
the epistemic privilege of an oppressed group is defined by the different experiences and
understandings that group has vis-à-vis the dominant group. Standing outside of the dominant
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group’s experiences and practices provides the oppressed group with the insight not only to see
and experience the distorted knowledge of the dominant group, but also to illumine the “blind
spots” that shape those distortions and the knowledge produced. Harding (2004), Haraway
(1988), and Grasswick (2013) argue that epistemic privilege is not automatic as one might expect
if one were a member of the dominant group and embedded in its practices. The location
occupied by the oppressed group achieves this privileged position, and the “moment of critical
insight,” 19 as a result of political struggle. This is a rejection of the claim made by conventional
non-feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science that political interests and values distort
the production of what would otherwise be “good” science, and objective scientific knowledge. 20
For these non-feminist epistemologies, objectivity is defined as a neutral, disembodied “view
from nowhere.” This phrase was made famous by Thomas Nagel in his 1986 book, A View from
Nowhere, in which he attempts to reconcile both objective and subjective descriptions of the
world, while giving primacy to objectivity. 21 The full range of critical feminist analyses, from
feminist empiricism to feminist postmodernism, point to a scientific tradition that utilizes a
universal objectivity that “devours” all other perspectives and is presented as transparent and
totalizing, and thus hard to analyze or question. 22 Critical epistemologies, including standpoint
epistemologies, insist instead that political interests and values be acknowledged and valued as
contributing to good science. Rather than argue for a view from everywhere, and the relativism it
would entail, Harding (1983), (1984), (1991) and Haraway (1978), (1988) advocate for the
efficacy of partial perspectives that derive from communities claiming an epistemic privilege that
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contributes to good science, replacing the value-neutral objectivity traditionally aspired to.
What’s more, these partial perspectives have already had effects on scientific practice. Bowell
(2011) argues that traditional, non-feminist epistemologies and their distorted theories of
knowledge, after confronting the critique of feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science,
have subsequently been shaped by “the political inflections of the feminist movement.” 23 What
this means is that when confronted by the feminist critiques and evaluations, non-feminist
scientists responded to those criticisms, and consequently instigated changes in research
programs, theoretical models, and funding. 24 In many ways, however, the changes have been
limited. Methods and theoretical models in use continue to view values and interests as
contributing to bad science, rather than serving as a resource for good, or perhaps, better science.
The third thesis, entailed by epistemic privilege, is the achievement thesis. Harding
argues that understanding this thesis properly “requires distinguishing a standpoint from a
perspective.” 25 The achievement of a standpoint requires a political and reflective struggle to
create a group consciousness, rather than an individual shift in perspective. 26 The emphasis on
the political and reflective struggle to create a group consciousness is shaped by the situatedness
of that group and its local knowledge. The fact that the struggle, including the epistemic work
done to recognize their distinction from the dominant group, is socially shared is what makes this
achievement a standpoint rather than merely a perspective. There are a variety of standpoint
epistemologies that specify the social location and scope of the privileged standpoint, the nature
of the epistemic superiority claimed by each, and the critique informed by that privileged
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standpoint. 27 In the next section, I offer some justification for my use of Harding’s FSE as
canonical in this discussion. There are elements of her standpoint epistemology that make it a
more fruitful and constructive response than other feminist responses discussed in chapter two.

Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
In what follows, I focus on Sandra Harding’s brand of FSE. I chose this particular strand
of FSE largely because Harding’s presence has been detected in the earliest accounts described
as feminist epistemology. Grasswick (2016) cites Harding’s 1982 article, “Is Gender a Variable
in Conceptions of Rationality: A Survey of Issues” as one of two articles that year to be “clearly
identifiable” as such. 28 In this article, Harding recounts the feminist challenges to theories and
observations that use sex as a variable in the distribution of rationality represented by the many
“empirical and theoretical studies [that] attempted to restore women as missing ‘objects of
knowledge’ to the body of social and natural knowledge.” 29 What is of interest is that Harding
acknowledges this critical work in two ways. In one way, this critical work has failed. The idea
that women’s experiences could be restored into the body of social and natural knowledge is not
feasible: to simply “add women” to a conceptual framework and the working assumptions it
entails would make it difficult, if not impossible, to produce undistorted accounts of women’s
experiences. Secondly, in a positive sense, the critical feminist work to which Harding refers has
been incredibly beneficial and has served as the empirical resource that both motivates the
critical element of feminist standpoint epistemology and provides it with evidence on which to
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theorize. These two seemingly contradictory conclusions about critical feminist scholarship and
scientific data point to the value and purpose of a critical feminist approach and its impact on
scientific inquiry. This tension will be an important aspect of Harding’s FSE and one aspect of
its usefulness as a productive resource for epistemology and perhaps a stimulus for progress.
Beyond Harding’s early and significant presence in the feminist literature, further support
for taking Harding’s brand of FSE as canonical is Grasswick’s emphasis on the influence of
Harding and Hintikka’s (1983) anthology Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. “[R]ates of publication in
feminist epistemology picked up significantly” 30 after 1983. According to Grasswick, Harding
and Hintikka’s volume “set the stage for future discussions within feminist epistemology that
included the following undertakings: deconstructive projects, scientific studies that showed
‘congruences’ between scientific theories and contemporary socio-political theories, and
“reconstructive epistemological projects in response to such findings.” 31 Standpoint theory offers
an extensive argument “for the grounding of epistemic perspectives in one’s social position,”
which made and continues to make the anthology, one of the most “fruitful and heavily debated
areas of theorizing for feminist epistemologies.” 32 In Discovering Reality, Harding and Hintikka
lay out their commitment to the value of empirical data garnered by feminist scientists for the
complementary projects they see before them. The first is the deconstructive project of showing
how the social and natural sciences, as well as philosophy, have been informed by “masculine
experience.” 33 This critique targets a broad range of canonical philosophies, including Plato,
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Aristotle, Descartes and Rousseau, all taken to be foundational sources for assumptions, both
metaphysical and practical, in the sciences and philosophy. The second project of the anthology
is the reconstructive project, in which authors employ empirical data and theoretical models that
discusses distinctive elements of women’s experience in order to build a “more representatively
human understanding.” 34
Harding and Hintikka’s anthology has been characterized as productive for standpoint
theory because it presented theoretical knowledge and empirical data collected from critiques
that highlighted the shortcomings of non-feminist scientific practice by authors and theorists
"actively engaged … in disciplines other than philosophy." 35 Standpoint theories have become a
central outlet for feminist critiques within various disciplines. Beyond criticism, these critiques
offered methods to improve the production of knowledge and mitigate the sexism and
androcentrism that defined scientific inquiry and knowledge production in their respective
disciplines. Improvements, however, though discernible, are still slow. In the introduction to the
second edition of Discovering Reality (2008), Harding notes one chief implication of the
publication of a second edition: "Unfortunately, mainstream epistemology, metaphysics,
methodology, and philosophy of science as practiced in the natural and social sciences as well as
in philosophy have not yet fully adopted feminist insights (to understate the issue)" but they have
nonetheless "stimulated self-reflection in these fields." 36 Importantly, standpoint theories have
contributed to the improvement of the natural and social sciences in at least two important ways.
One way is the motivated self-reflection in mainstream or non-feminist science and philosophies
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of science highlighted by Harding. The second way is that active feminist scientists now have a
space within science in which to add to the body of scientific knowledge. Finally, Harding’s
canonical influence is further supported by a research bibliography for critiques of science
compiled by Alison Wylie and Kathleen Okruhlik (1990), Harding’s work— as author, co-author
and editor of articles and books— is part of the core literature. Wylie and Okruhlik acknowledge
that given the volume of the literature, they limited their compilation to those sources that dealt
with epistemology and methodology specifically and raised issued involving “scientific
rationality, knowledge claims and research methodologies from a feminist perspective.” 37
Beyond the common features Harding’s FSE shares with other standpoint theories, it also
takes as given some basic tenets of the diverse feminist responses to non-feminist epistemologies
and philosophies of science discussed in the previous chapter, and specifically, to Quinean
naturalized epistemology. FSE is a social epistemology in that it locates epistemic labor at the
community level, rather than at the individual level. Like the other feminist epistemologies, FSE
focuses on the influence of norms and conceptions of gender on the production of knowledge.
Which is to say, it is concerned with “how our social relations of gender have shaped our
knowledge practices…[and] whether and how these relations should play a role in good
knowing.” 38 Feminist epistemologies theorize a community of knowers that are situated; and
importantly, this fact results in “experiential differences that lead to differences in perspective,
and these perspectival differences carry epistemic consequences.” 39 The difference, as Bowell
puts it, is that FSE “puts the relationship between political and social power and epistemic labor
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front and center.” 40 It should be noted however, that though the relation between political power
and epistemic labor does indeed have an important place in Harding’s distinctive theory, she
parts ways with socialist feminist theories that are suspicious of the possibility of “truly” feminist
scientific practice until feminist theories and models are also fully assimilated by society. This
claim has been made by Elizabeth Fee (1981), as well as Jaggar (1983), and Longino and Doell
(1983), who argues that the construction of a feminist science can only begin when a feminist
society has been established since, now quoting Fee, “we can expect a sexist society to develop a
sexist science.” 41 Haraway (1981) remarks that Harding and other feminist scholars have to
“wait” to authentically contribute to a science that is new and freed from the untenable
weaknesses of humanistic science (or science as usual). Harding does not believe this “wait” is
necessary and adds that “feminist theoreticians have already proposed concepts of knowers, the
world to be known, and the processes of knowing that distinguish feminist theories of knowledge
from the dominant Western view of the last few centuries.” 42 This issue points to the fact that
Harding’s FSE, like some other feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science, does not
adopt a “monolithic position with respect to epistemic work.” 43 The implications of these varied
and diverse critiques will be considered in a later section of the chapter in which I discuss
distinctions between Harding’s FSE and other feminist critiques.
We can surmise three things from Harding’s claims that help draw out the descriptive and
prescriptive features of FSE and its relation to other feminist epistemologies. One is that the
descriptive project Harding describes emphasizes FSE’s place within social feminist
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epistemologies exemplified by the feminist empiricists. They agree knowledge production is a
social and gendered phenomenon. In this sense, the shared features of FSE and other feminist
epistemologies dovetail naturally. First, by exposing the androcentric biases and assumptions at
play in the actual practices of non-feminist scientists and philosophers of science, the descriptive
part of the critique is made evident. Secondly, the critiques coming from those feminist scientists
and scholars provide the constituents for improvements in actual scientific practices, expressed
as research programs and theoretical models that are more inclusive, and explanations of
empirical data that are receptive to explanatory schemes from other disciplines exemplifying the
(re)constructive part of the feminist critique. In the following section, I consider some important
distinctions between FSE and the other feminist epistemologies. To help make these distinctions
apparent, I will begin with account and application of two interrelated issues from Raymond
Geuss’s (1981) discussion of the Frankfurt School project of critical theory: its three conceptions
of ideology and the theses of critical theory proper. Secondly, I highlight some commitments
entailed by Harding’s FSE that distances from the more political stances articulated by other
critical feminist responses, especially the earliest articulations of feminist standpoint theory. At
the outset, I want to make clear that I do not intend to categorize Harding’s FSE as critical theory
of the Frankfurt School variety. I merely find some of these distinctions helpful in describing the
subtle but important distinctions between Harding’s FSE and other feminist epistemologies
discussed in the previous chapter.

Ideology and Critical Theory
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For a general account of ideology, and its role in Harding’s FSE, I turn to two texts. The
first is The Idea of a Critical Theory (1981), in which Raymond Geuss examines the various
ways ideology develops, marks out the three theses that designate a theory as critical, and
analyzes the cognitive structures and epistemology of critical theory. The second text is Critical
Theory: A Very Short Introduction (2011), in which Stephen Bronner provides a broader,
historical view of critical theory. Geuss’s account aids in delineating the common positions
between Harding’s FSE and other critical feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science.
Bronner’s account emphasizes what I take to be several important distinctions between
Harding’s FSE and other feminist critiques. I begin the discussion with Geuss, who outlines
three ways ideologies are formed and used. Geuss’s case for outlining the different conceptions
of ideology is to shed light on how each conception results in a different approach to critical
analyses. There is a conception of ideology that is descriptive, the result of some part of a
system or cultural arrangement that is or can be studied. Ideology in this descriptive sense shapes
the research program: it objectifies all or part of a social or cultural system in order to describe it
or create a taxonomy of features. 44 Secondly, there is “ideology in the pejorative sense, as
delusion, [and is] critical or negative.” 45 The research program that arises is a program of
criticism of the beliefs, attitudes, and wants of the agents in a particular society. Finally, there is
the definition of ideology “in the positive sense [which] isn’t something ‘out there’ to be
found…[but rather] something to be constructed, created or invented; it is a verité à faire.” 46
In the descriptions I have laid out so far, feminist critiques, including feminist standpoint
theories use all three of these critical conceptions of ideology, pointing again, to the
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commonalities between FSE and the other feminist critiques. In turn, Geuss’s accounts of
ideology determine how the theses common to critical theories are manifested; and specifically,
how it is I have ascertained FSE to be not only distinct from the other feminist critiques, but also
more naturalistic in its theoretical scheme. The first thesis is that criticism of society and
dominant ideology are “inseparable.” 47 Many of the feminist critiques discussed make explicit
that the biases and androcentric dispositions displayed in scientific practice also can be found to
be in society generally. To criticize scientific practice is to criticize society as well since they
share an ideology. The second thesis is that the dominant ideology is criticized “for being
false…a form of delusion.” 48 This is illustrated in the three-pronged ideological feminist critique
against the dominant group: the epistemic distortions and errors of the dominant group, the ways
these distortions and errors have shaped the structures and institutions of a society, and finally,
given the focus of this discussion, the ways in which knowledge produced by the dominant group
is similarly distorted and in some instances, erroneous. The last thesis is that a critical theory has
a different cognitive structure from that of scientific theory. This last thesis, when applied to
Harding’s FSE, highlights what I claim distinguishes FSE from other feminist theories. It further
explains the placement of Harding’s theory at the end of Potter’s analysis of feminist
philosophies of science, where Potter believes is the least naturalized of the theories discussed.
Importantly, it becomes the motivating characteristic I argue makes Harding’s FSE a more
authentically naturalistic approach to philosophy of science and epistemology.
Bronner’s historical account acknowledges the Marxist origins of critical theory but also
marks the shift in focus from critical theory that emphasized economic and systematic claims to
a focus on Marxism’s critical method. This indicates the emphasis on the political and cultural
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“superstructures” of society rather than the economic base and the concern with alienation and
reification. Alienation is defined “with the psychological effects of exploitation and the division
labor,” and reification is “identified with how people are treated instrumentally, as ‘things’
through concepts that have been ripped from their historical context” Ultimately, this shift
expresses a stronger commitment to contesting “the deformation of the individual.” 49 These
superstructures and their varying influences on feminists and their critiques are targeted by
Harding in Whose Knowledge? Whose Science? (1991). Harding acknowledges that feminists
who struggle together also disagree about important issues. Such fundamental disagreement is
what the task of feminist analysis is. There are those who believe the task of feminist analysis is
to object to “bad science” and those who think that “the whole scientific enterprise, its purposes,
it practices and its functions should be the target of feminist criticisms.” 50 Critics of bad science
see the critics of the scientific enterprise itself as undermining their attempts “to end sexist hiring
practices, [as well as] sexist and androcentric biases” 51 in science. Critics of the entire scientific
enterprise, which Harding refers to as “critics of science-as-usual” see bad science critics as a
distracting and particularly difficult part of the problem of science-as-usual: essentially bad
science critics are complicit “with our culture’s failure to question deeply enough the ethics,
goals and functions of science.” 52 Harding’s discussion, she reveals the manner in which
feminist empiricism (FE) is an expression of the first and second conceptions of ideology
discussed by Geuss. First, FE scholars have turned their attention to the specific elements of
scientific practice that are directed by the interests and attitudes of a specific group. The research
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program of FE scholars objectifies the social and cultural segments of the scientific enterprise in
order to describe it. Secondly, FE uses the data and observations of their research to analyze the
beliefs and attitudes of that particular group. In this case, their focus is on male scientists, their
beliefs and attitudes, as well as the ways in which knowledge production is limited by these
beliefs and attitudes. Harding discusses this thorny issue in this text as well as in The Science
Question in Feminism (1986). She describes FE as an epistemological strategy that advances a
critique of “bad science” that is an interesting instance of “limited critique”: “[FE’s] practitioners
do not usually label it at all; they see themselves as primarily following more rigorously the
existing rules and principles of the sciences.” 53 She emphasizes that while she is critical of FE,
she is critical not of empirical research per se, but rather, “of FE as a theory about how to do
research and to justify its results.” 54 As a method, Harding finds FE has two important strengths
that are beneficial to science. One such strength is that many of the claims in biology and social
research generated by feminist research are true or ‘less false’ than those they oppose and
“research intending to re-evaluate women’s nature and roles and the social dimensions of gender
certainly meet overt standards of ‘good research.’” 55 Harding’s point is that when feminist
claims are considered appropriate it is because they are claims that are explained “in terms of
conventional scientific virtues” and also supported by sufficient empirical data. 56 Another
strength of FE is that it “appears to challenge mainly the incomplete practice of the scientific
method, not the norms of science themselves. 57” As a result, FE encounters less resistance in
entering “conventional bodies of knowledge” because it uses accepted conceptual frameworks
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and language. This has had the positive result of expanding the number of women in scientific
ranks. The aforementioned strengths and the positive result of more women practicing science
are two of the reasons why Harding, while critical of FE, does not dismiss or deny its value,
since “its central assumptions and claims are not false and…it is effective at explaining the
successes of feminist-inspired research.” 58 The value of the work of this group of feminist
epistemologies and philosophies of science is that they contribute to the descriptive element of
the feminist project, broadly construed. This value is evident in many of Harding’s own books.
In Discovering Reality, Harding and Hintikka anthologize and cite the analyses of empirical
work by feminist scholars including Haraway (1978) in history of science and biology, Flax in
philosophy, Fox-Keller in biology, philosophy, and history of science, Longino in philosophy of
science, Nelson in epistemology and philosophy of science, and Moulton in philosophy.

In a

similar vein, the first section of The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (2004) is dedicated to
several foundational feminist critiques from the late 1970s and early 1980s that reveal the
implications of Marxist insights on the specific practices in which these feminist scholars work.
These include: Smith (1974) and Rose (1983) in sociology, Hartsock (1983) in political science,
Jaggar (1983) in ethics, and Collins (1986) in philosophy and black feminist thought.
Importantly, these diverse works and analyses serve as data out of which to construct the
prescriptive element of feminist work, and they become a part of the specific prescriptive and
emancipatory elements that motivate the distinctive aspects of Harding’s FSE. Feminist work in
science helps bring together many facets of actual scientific practices by revealing old
assumptions and distorted results, and offering critiques of the rational reconstructions that form
the narrative of science-as-usual. The benefits of FE analyses support Harding’s call for the use
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of interdisciplinary theories and strategies that value the data and knowledge from other fields of
study, usually kept separate from epistemology and philosophy of science. In using the data
provided by FE scholars, Harding situates FSE as a broad, critical program with several ongoing
processes. These includes data, and theoretical models from FE and other disciplines that serve
two purposes: one, to establish the descriptive parts of FSE, and the second, to supply empirical
and theoretical support for a portion of the reconstructive goals of the FSE program. The
feminist critiques described fit well in the conceptions of ideology in Geuss’s account. The
ideology that is the object of inquiry is the ideology of the dominant group practicing science—a
group distinguished as male, White, and Western. The critique entails describing the origins and
practices of the dominant group’s ideology, in order to show a) its shortcomings and delusions,
and b) its complicity in practices and institutions that oppress those outside of the dominant
group. The third thesis held by critical theories is their use of a cognitive structure that differs
from that of natural science. In the following, I point out the ways in which FSE’s cognitive
structure differs not only from natural science, but also from the bulk of the feminist empiricist
theories previously discussed. The key point of difference Geuss identifies in the cognitive
structures specific to critical theories is that, contrary to those inherent in received science, they
are reflective rather than objectifying.
Most of the feminist responses reviewed here and in chapter two could be categorized as
critical theories based on these three points. First, an assumption the feminist critique shares with
a critical theory is that science and society are inseparable, as Geuss asserts. Secondly, critical
theory criticizes the dominant ideology for being “false knowledge,” or a form of delusion. A
consequence of this is the recognition that critiques by feminist empiricism and feminist
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standpoint theories are, in fact, a “cognitive enterprise, a form of knowledge.” 59 The third point
is where we see a distinction between feminist empiricism and Harding’s FSE: the cognitive
structure of FSE is distinguished from the cognitive structure of natural science in that it
requires, for proper analysis, some basic changes in the epistemological view we have inherited
from traditional and feminist forms of empiricism, which are modeled on natural science.
According to Geuss, the difference between the cognitive structures of critical versus scientific
theories is illustrated in three different features. “First, they differ in their aim or goal, and hence
in the way agents can use or apply them.” 60 The goal of scientific theories is “instrumental.” That
is, the interpretation of data and the formulation of hypotheses and theories are used to deal with
and control the external world. From Harding’s perspective, those critical feminist scholars
whose focus is “bad science” or “science-as-usual” (feminist empiricism, local empiricism and
the consilience model) are motivated in the same way natural science is motivated to do its work,
which is to explain, predict, and control the outside world. They themselves would characterize
their own work as aligned with good science. Harding’s FSE, motivated as it is by “emancipation
and enlightenment” differs from both natural science and (although less so) from other feminist
epistemologies. 61 The second difference lies in the cognitive structure. In natural science, there is
a clear distinction made between the theory and the objects the theory describes. As Donna
Haraway (1991) points out in “Situated Knowledges,” science objectifies everything it studies.
Science is an “ideology of direct, devouring, degenerative and unrestricted vision whose
technological mediations are simultaneously celebrated and presented as utterly transparent.” 62
Harding is in agreement with this element of Haraway’s critique, although Harding talks about
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this objectification in terms of specific concepts such as “woman” and “feminine.” In Science
Question (1986), Harding explains that scientific projects and inquiries dominated by male
experiences created these terms. This is also the case for other such terms such as “African,” and
“Third World.” Because these terms are neither questioned nor revisited, they illustrate the
ahistoricity of underlying concepts. Harding concludes that concepts referring to culture or
ethnic identity “paper over the differences between the histories and present projects of hundreds
of indigenous … cultures.” 63 Additionally, using ahistorical concepts such as these assume that
colonial rule “has left unchanged the presumably ancient ways of understanding self, others, and
nature.” 64 The same can be said of a “women’s world view.” These always change over time and
yet use of these terms assumes “continuity between, before and during the historically specific
history of men’s subjugation of women.” 65 FSE is reflective and self-referential and questions
its own use of concepts, methods and techniques. It can also give an historical account of its own
history and its place in the domain of objects described in theories. 66 Historical changes in
critical theory also provide a way to understand the distinction between early feminist standpoint
theories and Harding’s FSE. In Bronner’s discussion of critical theory, he describes the
willingness of critical theorists to submit their own principles to keen critical analysis because
ultimately, “contesting hegemony” 67 in its many forms is a method for achieving its goal of
emancipation. Much like Harding’s attitude toward Enlightenment ideals, she maintains a
critical and optimistic view of the other feminist theories already discussed, but also maintains
every aspect of FSE. As I note in chapter two, to be committed to the Quinean metaphor of a
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web or network of interrelated beliefs means that critical analysis of one set of beliefs entails
looking at other beliefs too. A theory such as Harding’s FSE does this in its attempts to describe
the historical particularity of the objects of study and in a reflexive manner, makes use of what
Harding calls the “tensions” in our understandings and explanations of the world. Harding
concludes that “we should explicitly recognize the ambivalences and contradictions within both
feminist and androcentric thinking and learn how to cherish beneficial tendencies while
struggling against the social conditions that make possible regressive tendencies in both.” 68
In this context, Bronner’s description of the shifting concerns of critical theories gives a
sharper outline of the critical and ideological approach Harding takes, and shapes the practical,
experiential consequences of FSE as an emancipatory theory. First, the significance of revealing
embedded beliefs, values and interests in scientific inquiry point at the distorted knowledge
produced by objectivity commonly understood and pursued in non-feminist scientific inquiry.
Concepts and definitions are static and result in a harmful instrumentalism that is exploitative
and seemingly floats outside of any historical context. Harding’s goal is to foster an approach
that “tr[ies] to fashion conceptual schemes that are more alert to the complex and often beneficial
ways in which the modernist world(view) is falling apart.” 69 Secondly, as Bronner describes, the
Marxist critical method as practiced in the West stresses the role of ideology but with less
emphasis on how “theory must change in order to meet the changing needs of changing times.” 70
Harding, however, places a strong emphasis on changing need and changing times. Scientific
theories require empirical evidence, garnered from experience and observation. As has been
shown, other feminist epistemologies align themselves with the sciences in striving for the same
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kind of evidence. In this sense, when it comes to concepts and categories in use in scientific
practice and theorizing, feminist epistemologies lack a more thoroughly historical perspective.
For Harding, this is not an uncharitable criticism of the theories, but she does see these theories
as limited in their ability to accomplish the over-arching goal of Harding’s project, which is to
emancipate the aforementioned “others” and to give them a space in which to contribute to
scientific progress and the accumulation of knowledge. This requires acknowledging historical
contexts and the reevaluation of definitions and concepts Harding’s motivation is to consider the
possibility that there is a “mode of knowledge-seeking not structured by … sets of dualisms”
used in the androcentric ideology of contemporary science and posited as necessary: culture vs.
nature, rational mind vs. pre-rational body and irrational emotions and values, objectivity vs.
subjectivity, public vs. private. In each dichotomy, there is a favored, or more highly valued
term, and a less favored term. These dualisms then link men and masculinity to the former, and
women and femininity to the latter. 71 As a distinct epistemic strategy, FSE is not restricted to
only social and political issues in scientific practice, but targets “the very standards for what
counts as knowledge, objectivity, rationality and good, scientific methods.” 72 The criteria and
kinds of evidence considered relevant for determining whether evidence is cognitively
acceptable are different from those of the natural sciences. Scientific theories require empirical
confirmation through observation and experiment and, per Geuss, a reflective critical theory will
accept evidence that is “reflectively acceptable,” i.e., that the theory “survives a more
complicated process of evaluation.” 73 In “Gender as Variable for Rationality” (1983), Harding
calls not only on feminist scientists, but other feminist scholars to be a part of this process. She
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specifically cites reviews of several disciplines in two issues of Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society (Autumn and Winter, 1975) that mark the epistemological implications of
the feminist critiques in those disciplines to uphold her claim that gender bias has been implicit
and explicit in scientific methodologies. 74
Similarly, in the introduction to The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (2004), Harding
contends that FSE has both an “explicit and implicit history.” 75 FSE has an explicit, intellectual
history that begins in the origins of Marxist theory that were used in various disciplines (Smith
1974; Rose 1983; Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986) to explain and consider the epistemic
disadvantages that result from gender-related, economic, and social disadvantages. These
epistemic extrapolations, Harding contends, also “make up an implicit “folk” history visible in
its appeal to groups around the world seeking to understand themselves and the world around
them in ways that have been blocked by the conceptual frameworks dominant in their
cultures.” 76 Feminist standpoint epistemology has its beginnings in the work of feminist
thinkers who independently found Marxist insights useful for understanding institutionalized
relations between men and women. Early on, some standpoint theorists, including Smith (1974),
Collins (1986), Rose (1983), and Hartsock (1983) use “ideology” to explain dominant accounts
of relations of gender, race and class that provide different accounts of native and social
relations. The critical ideology develops, as we recall, from the project of critiquing a dominant
group’s beliefs, and attitudes, and the way these beliefs and attitudes have shaped their relations
with others and their epistemological and scientific endeavors. Standpoint theorists, working and
theorizing from outside the dominant group make observations “that agents (in this case, men) in
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the society are deluded about themselves, their position, their society, their interests…ideology
in this sense is a delusion.” 77 This set of beliefs, produced by economic and social conditions,
about social life misrepresents and distorts the world and reproduces these distortions. Different
“locations” in gender, racial and class relations generate distinctive accounts of nature and social
relations that arise from the Marxist insight that “the material conditions of people’s lives can
actually shape their understanding of the social and natural world.” 78
This “explicit history” explains the resemblance of standpoint epistemologies even as
they articulate their projects differently. These common elements—the situatedness of
knowledge, epistemic privilege, and achievement theses are also the sources of contention
between other feminist philosophies of science and standpoint theory. The feminist empiricist
theories and Wylie’s consilience model, discussed in the previous chapter, illuminate the
continuity between social and rational accounts of knowledge. However, what this means is that
ultimately, knowledge and objectivity must be redefined. Nelson offers a version of objectivity
she calls a Feminist Account of Evidence, Longino offers an account of local objectivity, and
Wylie proposes mitigated objectivity. Harding will also provide her own reconceived concept of
objectivity—what she calls “strong objectivity.”
To summarize, my account of the characteristics of Harding’s FSE have replicated her
own way of describing the theory as descriptive, prescriptive, and emancipatory. Firstly, FSE is
a descriptive theory that questions the accuracy of rational reconstructions in non-feminist,
naturalized epistemologies and philosophies of science. FSE serves as specific method by which
to analyze critically, as all standpoint theories have done, the actual history and practice of
scientists. Importantly, this history and its legacy become important elements with which to
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contend. The priority given to knowledge claims that have observational content and can be
scientifically tested, as Quine has argued, is problematic in that they restrict definitions of
knowledge and by extension, definitions of rationality, to those definitions shaped by a dominant
group within the society. Secondly, FSE is a prescriptive theory because it provides a
methodology that not only utilizes knowledge from other disciplines to discern not only the
distinctive conceptions of human nature at work in epistemology, philosophies of science, and
scientific practice, but also anticipates critiques of conceptions that serve the interests of a
dominant group and look to acknowledge the central role sociality, psychology and political
values and interests play in these conceptions and in practices. Thirdly, the influx of women in
the scientific disciplines, as well as the reflection and responses to feminist critiques provide
empirical data to support the critical analysis of the limitations and biases of a dominant group,
serving as the first step toward the emancipatory goals that motivate FSE.

The location of

epistemic labor is another essential and authoritative feature of feminist standpoint
epistemologies since they have a more nuanced account of what “social” epistemology means,
especially given their aim of including different standpoints in practice. FSE holds that
communities produce knowledge in two different senses. One sense is that different
communities differ from each other culturally, and racially, among other things, and the other
sense is “that communities as epistemic agents are internally heterogeneous, multiple and very
likely contradictory or incoherent, not homogenous, unitary, and coherent.” 79 Another crucial
aspect of the community as epistemic agent is that “generating critical questions about received
belief marks the process of producing and maintaining a standpoint. This critical questioning
requires reflection and constant self-reflection.” 80 This self-reflection requires a redefinition of
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objectivity. Harding calls this kind of objectivity “strong objectivity.” 81 This will be the focus of
the following section. This requires some discussion of the overall approach of standpoint
theories generally and Harding’s FSE specifically, with regard to objectivity and the valueneutrality it entails. In the final section of the chapter, I recall L.H. Nelson’s criteria for a
naturalistic epistemology and show how Harding’s FSE meets them.

Strong Objectivity
Given the discussion so far, two assumptions about objectivity should be reiterated: one
is that the goal of non-feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science is an objectivity that
requires value-neutrality. In conventional accounts of objectivity, beliefs or scientific claims that
achieve the status of knowledge must “transcend their original ties to local, historical interests,
values and agendas.” The second assumption is that value-neutrality is the best method for
getting an accurate account of the “real world,” and that there is, indeed, one accurate account of
the world. By Harding’s lights, the problem with this definition of objectivity is not that it’s “too
objectifying” but “that it is not rigorous or objectifying enough; it is too weak to accomplish
even the goals for which it has been designed.” 82 Scientists suspicious of social interests and
values endeavor to practice “good” science and produce objective knowledge that serves society
by providing an accurate account of nature. For Harding, another way to understand the standard
account of objectivity is as a means to “depoliticize” science. To depoliticize science is to
remove scientific inquiry from he influence and dynamics of historical, social, and cultural
forces and changes. “Philosophical and scientific appeals to objectivity and value-free inquiry
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have often provided covers for the refusal to scrutinize the social values and projects that have
played an important role in the history of science and its intellectual structures.” 83 The
widespread assumption is “that while false beliefs often require social explanations, true beliefs
are the consequence only of natural processes.” 84 Objectivity requires value-neutral and
disinterested inquiry and feminist critiques have done much to show how this definition of
objectivity has been used to exercise power “less visibly, less consciously, and not on but
through the dominant institutional structures, priorities, practices and languages of the
sciences.” 85 This is not to say there have not been great successes in the knowledge produced;
the issue for feminist scholars is that some of the knowledge produced has been at the expense of
women and marginalized peoples.
In “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?” (1993), Harding
isolates two interrelated concerns that motivate feminist scholars’ critical stance regarding
conventional accounts of objectivity. The first concern is to “explain the surprising fact that
politically guided research projects have been able to produce less partial and distorted results of
research that those supposedly guided by the goal of value-neutrality” (e.g., discoveries of
sexism and racism, distorted accounts of nature and social life, especially as it pertains to people
of color and women). 86 The second concern is to determine how feminists can create research
that begins with questions that arise from women’s lives, and provides answers to those
questions that are less distorted, and less partial. 87 From Harding’s perspective, “How one
answers the second question depends on what one thinks is the best answer to the first one” since
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“recommendations for future scientific practices should be informed by the best accounts of past
scientific successes.” 88 The aforementioned concerns are revealed in the critiques and the work
of feminist scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, which demonstrated that it is possible to have
socially situated knowledge, and that research guided by, rather than eschewing social values and
interests, can indeed give rise to “good” science. Feminist researchers highlighted the problems
they encountered in the standard procedures in their field, and through their own research
processes, assumed “they were doing more careful and rigorous research and that consequently,
sexism and androcentrism could be eliminated from the research conducted.” 89 This was
followed by the articulation of feminist epistemologies and philosophies by Longino (1994,
1993) and Nelson (1990), among others, “that incorporate social values and interests in the
context of science.” 90 These points go to show how strongly feminist reflections on scientific
knowledge have challenged non-feminist epistemologies and philosophies of science. The
drawback, however, is that “most of these feminist discussions have not arisen from attempts to
find new ways either to criticize or carry on the agendas of the discipline.” 91 Citing critical
feminist standpoint theories (Smith 1987, Hartsock 1984) and others, Harding points to
standpoint epistemologies that provide a theory of knowledge, “a fundamental map or “logic” for
how to criticize and carry on the agenda of the discipline.” Harding quotes Dorothy Smith: we
must “start thought from marginalized lives [and] take everyday life as problematic.” 92 Value
neutrality and objectivity would have to be defined differently in order to do this. That which
characterizes Harding’s FSE as a critical theory provides the point of departure from the other
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feminist responses. Standpoint epistemologies, in contrast to previous feminist responses, are
attempting to reconstruct the agenda of the discipline. This requires a reevaluation of the
working assumptions and goals of scientific activity and critical self-reflection, which is applied
to the notion of objectivity. She contrasts standpoint epistemologies and “older epistemologies”
in terms of the respective grounds for knowledge, and the kinds of subjects/agents of knowledge
needed prove the necessity of a stronger standard of objectivity that provides “systematic
methods for locating knowledge in history.” 93
Standpoint theorists claim that the methods and norms of scientific inquiry—both in nonfeminist and feminist empiricists forms— are too weak a strategy to facilitate the systematic
identification of social values, interests, and agendas shared by an entire scientific community
and develop strong criteria for systematic ways to maximize objectivity. This plays out in two
different ways. The scientific method described by these groups has not been ““operationalized”
to detect sexist and androcentric assumptions “that are collectively (versus only individually)
held.” 94 Harding places high value on recognizing these changes in concepts because they have
significant effects on the methods employed in scientific research. As she asserts in “The Method
Question” (1987), “preoccupation with method mystifies what have been the most interesting
aspects of feminist research processes.” 95 The critical work of women in the sciences illustrates
her opposition to proposals for any method of research that is distinctively feminist. One of the
first and most important aspects of that critical work is the questioning of the narrow range of
methods favored by researchers. This has been productive in that many concepts, methods and
techniques used without question for decades were investigated and found deficient. It is
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important to add that at the end of the day, Harding finds the argument for a distinctively
feminist method just as problematic as the acceptance of mainstream scientific concepts and
methods, and for the same reasons. Her wariness of endorsing one particular method is in line
with FSE’s status as a type of critical theory that wants to reconstruct the agenda of feminist
critiques to make themselves an object of critical reflection. Standpoint theories start with the
idea that in societies stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality, these collective
assumptions shape activity at two levels. At the top, the activity of the dominant group shapes
how scientific inquiry is organized and “sets limits on what persons who perform such activities
can understand about themselves and the world around them.” 96 In contrast, the activities of
those at the bottom of social hierarchies can provide starting points for thought—for everyone's
research and scholarship—from which humans’ relations with each other and with the nonhuman natural world can become visible. This is because the experience and lives of
marginalized peoples, as they understand them, provide particularly significant problems to be
addressed or to become the focus of research agendas. This kind of objectivity is less distorted
because it takes situatedness to be essential to the pursuit of knowledge. According to Harding,
objectivity is maximized with the inclusion of values that permit accounts of nature and human
relations that meet the admittedly difficult aim of having both a “no-nonsense commitment to
faithful accounts of a “real” world and historically contingent knowledge claims and knowing
subjects.” 97 Consequently, the grounds of knowledge for standpoint theories are “from the lives
of marginalized people.” Even so, Harding is quick to point out that this epistemologically
advantaged starting point does not guarantee maximized objectivity. It provides “only a
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necessary not a sufficient starting point for maximizing objectivity.” 98 Scientific inquiry
motivated by the assumption that value-neutrality is the best method for getting an accurate
account of the (one) “real world” attempts to trump all other accounts with what Donna Haraway
called “the God-Trick.” Science practiced in this way provides the “God’s eye” view from
nowhere that objectifies everything it studies with “devouring, degenerative and unrestricted
vision.” 99 This objectifying vision draws attention to the assumed value of a specific kind of
subject. For empiricist, non-feminist epistemologies, the subject or agent of knowledge is
supposed to be 1) culturally and historically disembodied since knowledge is universal, 2)
homogeneous and unitary because knowledge must be consistent and coherent, and 3) distinct
from the objects being studied. As discussed in chapter two, feminist empiricist epistemologies
reject these traits. Feminist empiricists, however, maintain a commitment to the notion of a
subject that is “trans-historical since knowledge is initially produced (discovered) by individuals
and groups of individuals, not specific societies or subgroups” 100 since they question the rigor of
non-feminist scientific inquiry and not its constitutive assumptions and commitments. The
subjects of knowledge for standpoint epistemologies, including Harding’s FSE, construe the
subject/agent of knowledge as embodied and visible, and as such, “the same kinds of social
forces that shape objects of knowledge also shape (but do not determine) knowers and their
scientific projects. This includes the fact that nature is an object of knowledge.” 101 Objectivity
itself must be an object of knowledge, shaped by historical, social, and cultural forces, and
should be critically reevaluated. This is a crucial element of Harding’s strong objectivity. Thus,
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strong objectivity requires “strong reflexivity,” a deliberate and reflective scrutiny at all stages of
knowledge production:
This is because culturewide beliefs function as evidence at every stage in scientific
inquiry: in the selection of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research,
the collection of data, the interpretation and sorting of data, decisions about when to stop
research, the way results of research are reported, and so on.” The subject of knowledge
and the historically located social community whose unexamined beliefs its members are
likely to hold “unknowingly” must be considered as part of the object of knowledge from
the perspective of scientific method. 102
A notion of objectivity that requires elimination of all social values and interests from research
process and the results of research assumes all social values will result in bad science or
knowledge distorted by unchallenged assumptions, concepts and definitions. Harding’s point,
again, is that not all social values and interests undermine results. And if, as Harding contends,
epistemology and research methodology are indeed “deeply implicated in each other,” then
“there is not just one legitimate way to conceptualize objectivity, any more than there is only one
way to conceptualize freedom, democracy or science … The notion of objectivity is useful in
providing a way to think about the gap that should exist between how any individual or group
wants the world to be and how in fact it is.” 103
There is broad acceptance of at least two assumptions of strong objectivity: theories are
underdetermined by possible evidence to support them, and observations are theory-laden. These
reiterate Quine’s own commitments. The difference is that Harding and other standpoint theorists
take on the social and cultural elements that shape underdeterminism and theory-laden
observations, rather than setting them outside the boundaries of scientific and epistemological
labors. Drawing on a standpoint-pluralistic approach, strong objectivity maximizes objectivity
rather than neutrality by examining social and cultural relations. The issue then becomes how to
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determine “which competing grounds for claims about nature and social relations” we should
prefer. 104 This question brings with it concerns about a deleterious relativism that seems
inevitable to those who cling to the old objectivity. Harding outlines how the term “objectivity”
is a contested concept since it has no specific reference. She confirms that “maximizing
objectivity is not identical to maximizing neutrality, as conventional understandings have
assumed,” 105 and that scientific explanation has been shown to be inadequate for understanding.
Hence the charge that without conventional objectivity, we are faced with either “no
epistemological standards” or “a crowd of incommensurable heterogeneous standards.” 106
Harding is unwilling to take this all or nothing view. Harding’s position is that we must resist
being drawn to the implications that there is no cognitive value in epistemic heterogeneity, or
that there are no guiding principles that might help us navigate this heterogeneity. 107 The guiding
principles she looks for may be found in whatever it is that enabled cultures to engage effectively
with their natural and social environments. On offer is a general and normative epistemic
principle that might serve as a benchmark for resolving the conflict of competing knowledge
claims. One such principle would be a weak universalist empiricism, defined broadly as “being
grounded in experience.” Everyday experience grounds the understanding every culture has, and
relatedly, every culture therefore relies on some empirical epistemological standards just as
Western sciences do. In Is Science Multicultural? (1998), arguing for a kind of epistemic
pluralism, Harding acknowledges and values the resources provided by the responses and
critiques of the traditional narrative of modern science, both in terms of where the critiques
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converge with and diverge from the narrative. There are “epistemological lessons” to be gleaned
from those intersections and variances without entirely rejecting the epistemology of modern
science. 108

FSE’s Controversy and Productivity
Since its introduction, standpoint has been a controversial methodology, and has been
disseminated across a wide range of research disciplines. It is controversial in part because “the
scientific/epistemological and ethical/political are inseparable in standpoint approaches.” 109
Standpoint is a “trans-disciplinary regulative ideal” 110 that has been used in research projects that
focused specifically on race, class, sexuality and post-colonial research, though unacknowledged
as a logic at work in these projects. A 2009 issue of Hypatia was devoted to standpoint theory’s
value as a resource for feminist epistemology. Crasnow suggests that even if it fails to develop a
feminist epistemology, standpoint theory’s successes in the social sciences indicate that it would
be worthwhile resource to explore. 111 My claim is that Harding’s FSE is not only useful for a
feminist epistemology, but useful for epistemology more generally. I would suggest that
Harding’s position is an attempt to articulate an epistemology that is not constrained by any
particular political goal, nor any particular group, except insofar as it pursues an emancipatory
goal for a marginalized group. The political goal and the marginalized group are always yet-tobe-determined.
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Evidence of FSE productivity is discussed in detail in Schiebinger (2008), who frames
the works anthologized in Gendered Innovations in Science and Engineering as an exploration of
how “gender analysis” has already changed these disciplines. Schiebinger sets out three levels of
analysis that have practical goals, echoing the account I’ve given of theoretical claims of
Harding’s FSE. Furthermore, Schiebinger’s levels of analysis form a network of interrelated
practical goals that also fit well with Harding’s perspective. The first level looks at “fixing the
number of women participating in science and engineering.” This was a treatment of the history
and sociology of women in scientific institutions and practice. Schiebinger describes this as both
a historical analysis as well as a practical matter, which is to say, the fixing came about by way
of increased funding for women’s research and workshops to teach women “how to succeed in a
man’s world.” 112 This analysis arose out of the first surge of women who joined the ranks of
science and engineering researchers. As recounted in chapters two and three, gender analysis
was initiated by feminist scientists and researchers in the 1970’s and 1980’s, which questioned
research methods and techniques, as well as formulations of hypotheses and interpretations of
data. Gender analysis at this time was seen as something that was done by women.
The second level of analysis was aimed at ‘fixing the institutions” and the cultures of
science and engineering. Schiebinger speaks of “the unspoken assumptions and values of its
members” that developed in the constructed absence of women in those fields. Programs have
been put in place to remedy this with grants that focus on “transforming university cultures.”
The third level of analysis is “fixing the knowledge” which focuses on the consequences of
excluding women, and more specifically, on the consequences of “this exclusion (of women) for
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human knowledge more generally.” 113 People inside and outside of scientific disciplines
practice feminist virtues but are wary of calling themselves feminists. She explains this as a
distinction between liberal feminism and difference feminism. Liberal feminism is the position
of supporting equality in professional opportunities for women. Difference feminism, which
emphasizes differences between men and women, including cultural differences—codes of
behavior, language, and interaction—that have excluded women. From Schiebinger’s
perspective, “the term feminist continues to refer to people and policies on the radical cutting
edge.” 114
Another aspect of “fixing the knowledge” is the use of gender analysis to rectify the
negative effects to our knowledge due to ignoring gender in the results of science and
engineering. Gender analysis is central to all levels of analysis but seems to be of highest benefit
in this third level. Acknowledging the exclusion of women (and, Harding would add, other
marginalized groups), as well as the need for reform in social attitudes and institutions is not that
difficult to accomplish. What is harder to concede is the need for analyses to determine precisely
how gendered ideologies have structured knowledge. Specific training of scientists and
researchers in the performance of gender analysis becomes a central element of innovation and
progress not just for scientific disciplines for the progress of knowledge in the broad sense.
Gender analysis is shown to augment human knowledge with creativity that generates new
questions and new avenues of research. As Schiebinger notes, “We need to be open to the
possibility that human knowledge—what we know, what we value, what we consider
important—may change dramatically as women become full partners.” 115 To those who are
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suspicious or critical of the controversial aspects of this new logic, Harding suggests that both
the controversiality and productivity of standpoint theories like hers are “two sides of a coin that
can be best explicated in terms of the politics of standpoint research.” This is due to the fact that
the ethical and political and the scientific and epistemological are” inseparable” in all standpoint
approaches. The research that uses standpoint logic is committed to getting information”— about
bodies, environment, economic, governmental and legal institutions and practices— that will
help people “survive and flourish.” 116 Harding then poses a question: “Whose experience is to
count in formulating ideals of objectivity, rationality, and good method?” Tellingly, she suggests
that this same question could be posed to the well-established ideals already in place in Western
scientific practice. 117
Schiebinger’s work is motivated by the prospect of gender analysis being incorporated
into the methodology of scientific research. Both the levels of analysis Schiebinger describes, as
well as the move to change methodologies in light of those analyses, mirror Harding’s own
project. There has been success in integrating gender analysis in disciplines that have high
numbers of women in their ranks—biomedicine, primatology, archaeology and biology— with
less commitment to it in physics, chemistry, and electrical engineering. Nevertheless, training
students and faculty to integrate gender analysis into their research is a strong first step. Step two
would be to actually conduct gender analysis on current research. 118 Schiebinger also notes that
the NSF has policy initiatives that would require federally funded research programs integrate
gender analysis into their design. 119
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Rouse asserts that standpoint theories are a naturalistic conception of knowledge that
frames all knowledge claims and their justifications as arising in specific circumstances, and with
real consequences. The implication of this view is indicated by how we understand knowledge
claims, what criteria are necessary to achieve knowledge, and importantly, by an epistemic
normativity with a flexibility that results from the critical, self-reflective approach of FSE. He
believes that in philosophy, seeing standpoint’s naturalistic character “has been impeded by
narrow and reductive conceptions of nature and naturalism.” Nature conceived from a God’s-eye
point of view lacks the richness and the resourcefulness of standpoint theory’s naturalism that
seeks not only to know the world but also “to understand knowledge and inquiry as integral
aspects of the world we seek to understand.” 120 Standpoint theories also show that “the world is
not an epistemically homogeneous space of reasons and normative authority,” and can avoid
claims of relativism and inaccessibility by taking the approach that epistemic claims are part of
practical activities that happen in shared contexts of specific power relations, as well as issues of
identity and difference. 121 Finally, the metaphor that arises from the term “standpoint” invokes
particular assumptions common to traditional, non-feminist epistemologies, leading again to the
problematic implications of relativism and inaccessibility. These challenges are mitigated
somewhat by letting go of another belief in the network of beliefs at work in non-feminist
epistemologies: the separation of subject and object, “a spectatorial conception of knowing, a
contrast with the unity and identity of the knower and a static and perhaps mostly retrospective
understanding of epistemic normativity.” 122
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Because of the inseparability of the epistemic and the political, Harding argues that
standpoint approaches bring into focus the “inseparability of commitments to male supremacy
and conventional regulative ideals of scientific research” as is has heretofore been conducted. 123
Research that uses a FSE logic is motivated to acquiring information about bodies, environment,
economic, governmental and legal institutions that will help marginalized groups to survive and
flourish. 124 This points to a charge of relativism on several fronts. In the first place, the term
“standpoint” is a technical term that refers to an achievement, rather than a perspective or point
of view. Achieving a standpoint necessitates empirical work to study what is labelled “natural”
because, as it will be shown in chapter four, what is considered natural changes. Secondly,
standpoint epistemological projects are not relativist because FSE theorists strive to “redefine
epistemic standards for more accurate, comprehensive, objective (in Harding’s sense) and
rational production of knowledge,” 125 and consequently, look to the successful practices rather
than the truth of representations of nature that are offered.

FSE’s Naturalistic Epistemology
In this final section, I determine FSE’s status as a naturalistic epistemology. I examine
Potter’s claim that FSE is the least naturalistic and normative of critical feminist responses. I
employ Nelson’s three criteria for naturalized epistemology to make my assessment. A
naturalized epistemology must reflect the history and practice of science, be subject to the same
criteria as the sciences, and use consistent principles by which to explain consensus and dissent,
and progressive and less progressive episodes in science. 126 I take up the first two criteria,
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deferring my discussion of the last criterion to the fourth and final chapter that will cover
naturalism, and FSE’s approach to its definition and application. The purpose of applying these
criteria to FSE is to offer the following theses as FSE’s resources for epistemology, and to bring
forth and question entrenched concepts and spur epistemic progress that includes: the recognition
of difference; critical self-reflection on all aspects of inquiry; including epistemic subjects and
the objects of inquiry; recognition of the significance of acknowledging values and interests in
our criteria for objectivity rather than value-neutrality, and the impact of social, cultural and
political structures and institutions on epistemic inquiry.
As I outline in chapters two and three, feminist epistemologies and feminist standpoint
theories take as starting points the history and practice of science with the aim of identifying the
features of the ideology of the practitioners, including the cultural values and arrangements that
have shaped said history and practice. They also outline their own ideological stance that stems
from this program of criticism of the beliefs, attitudes, and desires of the subjects who practice
science. In this respect, Harding’s FSE does not distinguish itself from other feminist critiques.
FSE does distinguish itself, however, in its account of what the work of feminist critiques does
for the history and practice of science overall. The processes at work in scientific inquiry, made
murky by the rational reconstructions of non-feminist philosophers of science, were clarified by
the critical work of feminist empiricists from their respective disciplines. Their empirical work
and critical analyses coalesce into an achieved standpoint. Exposing androcentric biases in the
actual practices of non-feminist scientists and philosophers of science is the descriptive part of
Harding’s project. In this sense, Harding’s FSE straightforwardly meets the first condition set by
Nelson.
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The second condition requires that the theory be subject to the same criteria as the
sciences. The critical feminist responses discussed in chapter two point to how feminist
naturalized and contextual empiricisms align in important ways with the non-feminist practice of
science. The critiques of feminist scientists and philosophers of science were intent on showing
where scientific inquiry had gone awry, and calling for more rigor in the production of less
distorted knowledge. These scholars located themselves within the historical lineage of science
as it had been practiced because they continued to strive for empirical evidence, garnered from a
narrow conception of experience and observation, just as non-feminist scientists would. In this
context, Harding’s FSE seems not to meet the second condition. From Harding’s point of view,
these critiques challenge the incomplete practice of the scientific method, not the norms of
science themselves, which Harding takes to be an important element of the reconstructive project
of her standpoint epistemology. The limitation in the critical feminist empiricist response is that
it cannot aid in Harding’s over-arching emancipatory goal, which would make a space in which
marginalized others, from an achieved epistemological standpoint, can contribute to scientific
progress and the accumulation of knowledge.
Harding’s FSE, when understood as a type of critical theory, deliberately distinguishes
itself from both non-feminist science and philosophies of science and feminist critiques of these.
It eschews an allegiance to the norms and practices of any science whose underlying
commitments to static definitions, concepts, and kinds make it improbable that feminist insights
could be a resource and a motivation for changes in the way science is practiced. This
conclusion notwithstanding, I want to claim that another implication of categorizing Harding’s
FSE as a critical theory is that FSE and scientific inquiry should be subject to the same critical
self-reflection of all parts of the process of inquiry, including a review of assumptions,
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definitions, and methods entailed in hypotheses, theoretical/conceptual models, and research
programs.
The critical self-reflection of Harding’s FSE has important consequences for Nelson’s
third condition for naturalized epistemology: the use of consistent principles by which to explain
consensus and dissent, and progressive and less progressive episodes in science. As I have
attempted to show in previous sections of this chapter, Harding’s contention is that her definition
of strong objectivity will result in more accurate explanations both of consensus and dissent, and
of how these explanations account for progressive and less progressive episodes in science.
Strong Objectivity flies in the face of non-feminist science aims for objectivity achieved through
a commitment to value-neutrality, the de-politicization of inquiry, and a singular account of
“reality.” Strong objectivity goes beyond acknowledging social interests and values, and beyond
the influence and explanatory power of these non-cognitive values closely aligned to gender,
race, ethnicity, and cultural biases to show no one method can achieve this. Strong objectivity is
a goal that requires different strategies staked out by the objectives of the inquirers. These
strategies must be reviewed. Harding’s aim, already implied in the discussion of the second
standard for naturalized epistemologies, is to submit science—comprising its practices and
theoretical assumptions—to critical assessments that include historical and self-reflective
analyses. Critical accounts of past scientific successes would serve as evidence in support of
recommendations for future scientific practices informed by how success is or has been defined
and their effects on marginalized peoples. In the final chapter, I focus on several issues. One of
these is naturalism and other beliefs embedded in it, along with a formulation of Harding’s
critique of naturalism. Harding’s critique provides several points on which to give an account of
strategic naturalism and its effect on how science focuses its efforts to understand and know.
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practice, and how this could serve as a resource for epistemology.

133

CHAPTER 4:
Naturalisms
Introduction
One of the motivating questions of this dissertation is whether Sandra Harding’s Feminist
Standpoint Epistemology (FSE) is a more efficacious naturalism than naturalisms of the past.
These naturalisms will be discussed in this chapter. Given their underlying assumption of the
continuity of scientific practice and epistemology, the point of the discussion is to propose FSE
as a more truly naturalistic methodology that is applicable to science as well as epistemology.
Ultimately, the naturalism of FSE is more fruitful for epistemology than the naturalism proposed
by Quine. Is FSE’s naturalism better? An attempt to answer the question has required some
discussion of the main concepts under review: epistemology and feminist epistemologies,
standpoint epistemologies, and naturalism. In answering this question in the affirmative, I want
to further claim that the kind of naturalism Harding is arguing for could be a resource for
epistemology, not a replacement or successor project. Harding’s work began and remains in the
disciplines of philosophy and sociology of science, and the critical approach she advocates is
pluralistic and interdisciplinary. These pluralistic standpoint insights have been used
productively in many disciplines in the natural and social sciences, but epistemology. My
contention, based on my reading of Harding’s work, is that the resistance stems in large part
from a constellation of beliefs associated with the Archimedean point of view described
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previously. As I recount in previous chapters, Harding interprets the rise of modern science and
modern epistemology as two projects that overlap and support each other in a way that is more
complex than the fact that they are both concerned with knowledge. Their close, historical ties
point to shared commitments to specific views about humans both as natural objects of study and
inquirers into nature.
The discussion here concerns naturalism as well as other commitments the variants of
naturalism entail. After laying out the classifications of naturalism, I provide a critique of
naturalism that I believe is supported by Harding’s work in philosophy of science. I will then
hone in on the kind of naturalism Harding is pursuing, given her feminist and epistemological
commitments. I have named Harding’s position “strategic naturalism.” I offer two humble
reasons for the use of this term and one caveat. One reason for applying this label to Harding’s
version of naturalism is bolstered by her own use of a related expression. In a 1999 response to
an article that charges feminists with being too wary or too critical of realism to make good use
of it, Harding uses the term “strategic realism” to argue for a more nuanced reading of the
feminist response to critical realism. 127 Importantly, Harding’s main contention concerns her
interlocutor’s (Lawson) view about the structure of reality. He acknowledges the important and
influence of social structure. Additionally, Lawson assumes scientific knowledge is fallible and
partial, and that scientific theory is subject to revision. Nevertheless, he concludes that there is
but one basic structure of reality and one theory of nature that precedes all the partial views and
that this is so despite the fallibility and partiality of scientific knowledge. What Harding finds
equally problematic is the implication that this basic structure can and should be represented in a
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culture-free way. 128 Another reason for using “strategic naturalism” has to do with her
commitment to the overarching emancipatory goal shared by both critical theories and feminist
standpoint theories. This aligns with the use of the term “strategic” as referring to long-term or
superordinate aims and interests and the means for achieving them. The very broadness of
“strategy” suggests my caveat regarding Harding’s FSE and her general stance on scientific
inquiry and epistemological concepts. I do not propose that by using “strategic” I mean that
Harding’s FSE is an attempt to establish a monolithic method to establish and pursue static
objectives. Strategic naturalism must be viewed as necessitating a multiplicity of approaches
shaped by the changing goals and objectives of the inquirers and those who would benefit and/or
harm. What qualifies as emancipatory must be determined by considerations of historical,
cultural, and social contexts, and the goal and outcomes projected by such inquiries.
The term also suitably describes how the descriptive and prescriptive elements of
Harding’s theoretical approach are in service to FSE’s emancipatory goal. As demonstrated in
my chapter on feminist epistemologies, many feminist scholars initially responded positively to
the naturalism Quine espoused since these scholars – conceiving of naturalism differently – were
at the forefront of investigating and describing actual scientific practices and questioning
foundational concepts and definitions. Similarly, in the standpoint epistemology chapter, the
various standpoint epistemologies expressed the naturalistic move to be an “emancipatory
promise” that served the political aims of feminist standpoint theory. That is to say, feminist
standpoint theorists, including Sandra Harding, make it clear that all standpoint theories have a
common emancipatory aim: to empower marginalized and/or oppressed groups. 129 Bronner’s
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discussion is again useful given his reference to “counter-hegemonic” strategies that empower
those in society who are exploited.130 This parallels Harding’s position: the practical work of
early feminist scholars accomplish objectives that contribute to the empowerment of oppressed
peoples , utilizing in a critical, dialectical method such as FSE. Harding’s emphasis on the
historical analyses of every element of scientific process provides a theory that is descriptive,
and prescriptive rather than proscriptive. 131 The first phase of FSE’s strategy is to describe actual
scientific practices, and identify the distortions in the knowledge produced by these practices.
The responses to Quine discussed in chapter two were the consequence of misgivings feminist
epistemologists and philosophers of science had with aspects of scientific inquiry. I highlighted
three: the entrenched and outdated goals and methods of science, the distorted accounts of reality
these produce, and what most feminists would characterize as the limited and problematic
application of the term “natural” to objects of scientific study.
I revisit these topics to frame what I take to be Harding’s response to naturalism and its
commitments as they are commonly understood. Much like her critical stance toward objectivity,
any absolutist claim about naturalism must be questioned. Naturalism must be acknowledged as
a continually revisable term, and naturalizing in scientific inquiry and epistemology must be
responsive to the situatedness of human subjects and communities, as well as to the goals and
projects of their inquiries. The holism Quine advocated is still on display in Harding’s FSE. An
implication of this holism is that methodology and ontology are implicated in each other; and
consequently, critically reflecting on aspects of one implies reflecting on the other. Naturalism is
one belief among others and if we are willing to see the usefulness of revising categories,
entities, and concepts – like gender, race and ethnicity, for example – at work in theories and
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explanatory models in science, it seems inevitable that this would also apply to the
epistemological concepts rooted in those theories and models. In the next section, I define
naturalism and explain the different perspectives as clearly as is possible for such an imprecise
term. I lay out ontological and methodological positions and highlight aspects of each that will
help me make room for the kind of naturalism Harding is after. I lay out Harding’s critique of
these naturalist positions with a brief review of the important features of FSE’s epistemological
commitments, including some important points from previous chapters. This will include the
position Harding takes in the “Strategic Realism” (1999) article, and other Harding writings that
outline Harding’s epistemological commitments and provide support for my claim concerning
Harding’s strategic naturalism and its applicability to epistemology.

Naturalism in a Broad Context
It seems unproblematic to say that there is some significant consensus in the literature
about the term naturalism, particularly as it pertains to epistemology. Jacobs (2017), Kornblith
(1984), Friedman (1996), Wagner and Warner (1993), and Kitcher (1992), begin their respective
discussions with straightforward characterizations of naturalism as an approach to philosophical
problems that rejects a priori theorizing and a special and autonomous status for philosophy,
while placing the methods and results of the empirical sciences at the center of philosophical
work. For some scholars, this means “[aspiring] to reductionism and physicalism.” 132 For
Papineau (2009), Rysiew (2017), Stroud (2009a), Stroud (1999b), however, naturalism is a
broader term that has no precise definition in its use in contemporary philosophy. The term
refers to different approaches, commitments, and assumptions. Papineau (2009) does
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acknowledge that naturalism is a positive term, as few contemporary philosophers would want to
claim to be non-naturalists. Stroud refers to it as a “trendy” term and asserts that the term
‘naturalistic’ "has been applied more widely, at more different times and places, and for more
different purposes, than probably any other notion in the whole history of human thought.” 133
De Caro and Macarthur (2004) similarly claim that it is “philosophically commonplace that
Naturalism means many different things to different people.” 134 Nevertheless, in a broader
context, there is a core conception of naturalism that “motivates a great deal of current
philosophical thought.” 135 One of the goals of this section will be to discuss this “substantial
core” and then provide an overview of naturalism as it is used in epistemology and philosophy of
science.
Naturalism falls into two broad categories: ontological naturalism and methodological
naturalism. Both Papineau (2009), and De Caro and Macarthur (2004) discuss these categories
even as they explain that the naturalism of each category continues to be imprecise. Per Papineau
(2009), contemporary philosophers are still not clear on nor can they satisfactorily explain how
mental events can have causal force. “The driving motivation for ontological naturalism is the
need to explain how different kinds of things can make a causal difference to the spatiotemporal
world.” 136 Those who fall within this category thus want to place “strong restrictions” on the
kinds of things that can have “strong effects.” 137 And yet, Papineau notes, this “places no
immediate constraints on categories that lack any such effects … [namely] mathematical and
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modal realms and perhaps the normative realm.” 138 Naturalism in this sense can be understood
as anti-supernaturalism. Papineau’s tactic is to discuss the ways in which the ontological thesis
as causal influence plays out in modern science. In early 17th century mechanistic models of the
physical world, there were a very narrow range of causes. Physical effects were caused by the
impact between material particles. 139 This view points to the strong anti-supernaturalism that
motivated these models. Early Newtonian physics with its recognition of action at a distance is
more liberal in its limits on causes. Papineau remarks that “early Newtonians posited distinct
mental and vital forces alongside magnetic, chemical-cohesive, gravitational and impact forces.
Accordingly, they took sui generis mental action in the material world to be perfectly consistent
with the principles of physics.” 140
By the mid-19th century, physics and conservation of energy “plus potential energy came
to be accepted as a basic principle of physics.” However, these principles implied that “special
forces must be governed by strict deterministic laws” which would restrict how much potential
energy could be produced. 141 This thus limited the range of possible causes again. The tide turns
again in the 20th century, as
scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects,
and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and
predictable kind. Detailed physiological research, especially into nerve cells, gave no
indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained in terms of basic physical
forces that also occur outside living bodies. By the middle of the 20th century, belief in
sui generis mental or vital forces had become a minority view. This led to the widespread
acceptance of ‘causal closure’ or ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm, according
to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical causes,” including
fundamental forces. 142
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For Papineau, the acceptance of causal closure leads to even stronger ontologically naturalist
views since the causal closure thesis implies that any mental and biological causes must
themselves be physically constituted “if they have physical effects.” 143 This has the added result
of strengthening ontological naturalism into ontological physicalism. The underlying assumption
is that throughout the shifts in the boundaries of causal closure, this kind of naturalist view
already goes beyond its ontological meaning to shape the methods by which empirical data is
gathered, and the theoretical models that help explain the data. Papineau’s historical account of
the naturalist ontological commitment provides an example of a term that remains stable while
its meaning and reference change in response to variations in theoretical physical models
describing natural phenomena and the behavior of objects in nature.
De Caro and Macarthur (2004) straightforwardly describe the ontological thesis as a
scientific conception of nature. This theme says “modern natural science provides a true picture
of nature, but more contentiously, that it is the only true picture.” 144 They attribute this to the
“Great Success of Modern Science Argument (GSMS)”: the GSMS argues that “given the great
success of modern natural science in predicting, controlling, and explaining natural phenomena,”
the claim that the conception of nature in the sciences “is very likely to be true and moreover,
that this is our only bona fide or unproblematic conception of nature. It is the latter claim that
earns scientific naturalism the label of ‘scientism.’” 145 The widespread acceptance of the
scientific conception of nature is, according to De Caro and Macarthur, the main reason for the
multiple naturalizing projects that have been part of the dominant currents in contemporary
philosophy. In the first part of the 20th century, these projects were conceived as semantic
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projects in which “non-natural” discourses were to be “reduced or reconstructed in scientific
terms” in order to treat them as either “useful fictions” or take them to play a “nonfactual
linguistic role,” or sometimes, altogether to dismiss them as “pre-scientific” thinking. 146 I note
here, somewhat unsurprisingly, that this take on the dominant currents in contemporary
philosophy does not include feminist critiques in their many forms.
The second thesis is Methodological Naturalism. This thesis is an expression of the
continuity of philosophy and science. Epistemology and philosophies of science are to be
aligned with science, using similar methods and pursuing similar goals. The primary goal is to
establish knowledge about the natural world by comparing theories with empirical and/or
physical data. Papineau’s discussion focuses on methodological naturalism in terms of its effect
on philosophical practice. As previously mentioned, there is a broad range of attitudes toward
and motivations for philosophical methods that align with scientific methods. Methodological
naturalists see philosophy and science as engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing
similar ends and using similar methods. Papineau cautions that if one understands
methodological naturalism as the assertion that “philosophy and science have just the same aims
and methods,” it further implies a shared goal “to establish synthetic knowledge about the natural
world, in particular, knowledge of laws and causal mechanisms.” This is achieved by
“comparing synthetic theories with the empirical data.” 147 There are some methodological
naturalists who would say there are differences between philosophy and science, although they
could be described as relatively superficial differences. These differences are not in aims or
methods, but a matter of philosophy and science focusing on different questions. This kind of
naturalism holds that whereas scientists think about specific phenomena, philosophical questions
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are often distinguished by their great generality. Papineau states that categories, both those
specific to science, e.g., electrons, stars, and those specific to philosophy, e.g., universals and
identity, “structure all our thinking about the natural world.” 148 Philosophers can and do gather
empirical data, but not in the same manner as scientists. Papineau suggests that this is because a
single experiment would not suffice to modify a going theory, nor would it be the basis for
alternative theories at this level. “Even so, the naturalist will insist, such theories are still
synthetic theories about the natural world, answerable in the last instance to the tribunal of
empirical data.” 149
Regardless of whether philosophical questions are general or specific, some
methodological naturalists claim the theoretical stance and the generality that characterizes
philosophical method will not always have a need for empirical data. Empirical information can
be used in different ways so specific empirical data is not critical for answering theoretical
questions. The issue is that we might “have all the data we could want, but [we] can’t find a good
way to accommodate them” 150 in a theory. Philosophical theorizing requires “unearthing implicit
assumptions that we didn't realize we had … a search for alternative positions that don't generate
further contradictions” or re-evaluating premises that may be faulty. 151 “Still, methodological
naturalists will urge, this doesn't mean that cogent empirical theories are not the aim of
philosophy. An empirical theory unraveled from a tangle is still an empirical theory, even if no
new data went into its construction.” 152 Along similar lines, David Schatz (1993) puts forth a
proposal in “Skepticism and Naturalized Epistemology,” in which he describes “integrative
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naturalists” as those who hold that empirical inquiry can be used and applied to traditional
epistemological questions. 153 There are alternatives to the replacement thesis that may be implied
by varying commitments to methodological naturalism. Given Papineau’s account of
methodological naturalism, science’s effect on philosophical practice appears to intently rely on
and respond to scientific conceptions of nature—of what there is and what it does or does not do.
This in turn implies some kind of implicit reliance on the ontological variety of naturalism.
De Caro and Macarthur take a somewhat different historical view. To distinguish it from
other or older versions of naturalism, they refer to methodological naturalism as scientific
naturalism – referring to its role since the beginning of the scientific revolution which they
define as the gradual reversal of the roles of philosophy and science. The first decisive step is
made by Hume, “who limited the scope of a priori knowledge to the relation of ideas and
advocates a new ‘science of man’ whose guiding ideal is to regard the human as simply a part of
nature; not set over against it.” 154 De Caro and Macarthur are in agreement with Quine that the
naturalism advocated in QNE is a rejection of the idea that philosophy is prior to science but
further, that with respect to the sciences, philosophy no longer plays the foundational role it once
did. De Caro and Macarthur state that scientific naturalists would defend an even stronger claim:
“Philosophy is continuous with the sciences; philosophy has no autonomy and philosophy IS
science in its general and abstract reaches.” 155 They categorize three types of naturalism from
within the category of scientific naturalism:
i) The ontological scientific naturalist who holds that the entities posited by acceptable
scientific explanations are the only genuine entities that there are. A weaker version holds
that the only unproblematic entities are scientific posits.
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ii) The methodological scientific naturalist holds that it is only by following the methods
of the natural sciences or at the minimum, the empirical methods of a posteriori inquiry—
that one arrives at genuine knowledge. A weaker version holds that the methods of the
natural sciences are the only unproblematic (or non-mysterious) kind of knowledge that
there is, thus provisionally allowing for nonscientific knowledge in some loose or
practical sense.
iii) The semantic scientific naturalist holds that the concepts employed by the natural
sciences are the only genuine concepts we have and that other concepts can only be
retained if we can find an interpretation of them in terms of scientifically respectable
concepts. A weaker version holds that such concepts are the only unproblematic concepts
we have. 156

De Caro and Macarthur position scientific naturalism as a strong claim, “a global doctrine,”
committed to these theses that are based on the ambition of science to give a complete
explanation for all phenomena. 157 This becomes an important consideration in light of the
powerful influence of modern scientific practice on philosophical methods. De Caro and
Macarthur summarize the connection between scientific naturalism and the analytic tradition by
acknowledging the decisive influence of 19th century positivists like Comte, Mill, and Mach,
who were a part of “the first fully fledged scientific naturalist movement." 158 This movement
was then confronted by thinkers who became the founders of analytic philosophy-- Frege,
Russell, and Wittgenstein – who rejected positivists’ psychologism and were critical of scientific
naturalism. This rejection was fueled by the idea that philosophy and science were distinct, each
with its own domains. Quine later undermined this distinction by disassembling the logical
analysis of concepts that was central to the linguistic turn in philosophy. De Caro and Macarthur
claim that Quine’s naturalized epistemology, in strongly endorsing the continuity of philosophy
and science, was a significant contribution to establishing the orthodoxy of scientific naturalism
within Anglo-American philosophy. In describing the differences between the various types of
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naturalism, De Caro and Macarthur give priority to the ontological theme. Per De Caro and
Macarthur’s account, ontological naturalism is generally the result of the formation and success
of modern, post-seventeenth century science and methodological (or scientific) naturalism
followed, as a response to its “foundational relation to the enterprise of scientific inquiry.” 159

Harding’s Critical View of Naturalism
The scientific conceptions of nature of which feminists are generally critical have
overshadowed conceptions of what it means to naturalize epistemology. To naturalize
epistemology as Quine had proposed illustrates problematic commitments described by the three
types of scientific naturalism outlined by De Caro and Macarthur: to scientism, to the totalizing
and objectifying stance of science, and acceptance of the view that scientific methodology and
concepts are the best available means for making and justifying knowledge claims. I frame
Harding’s critical view in terms of her overarching emancipatory goal and how this goal informs
the holistic elements of her strategic naturalism. These holistic elements are those first described
in my chapter on Quine. They will serve as starting points for discussions of how Harding has
advanced that holistic view, how this contributed to changes in philosophies of science and
scientific practices, and finally, how these contributions may become a valuable resource for
epistemology. The first holistic commitment is a straightforward one: the continuity of
epistemology and science especially as it pertains to the advance of knowledge claims, both
common-sense and scientific. As Quine argues, these claims are confirmed or disconfirmed by
reference to several parts of the current network of beliefs. In Harding’s work, as I hope I have
made clear, the naturalism she finds problematic is one that is directed toward the achievement

159

Ibid., p. 6.

146

of the closest approximation of the God’s-eye view. This presents a singular reality, comprised
of static entities and relations. The standard story of the development of science is that by
adhering to a scientific method, political interests and values could be kept out of our inquiries
and explanations of the natural order. Naturalism has had a wide range of meanings that
changed from the strict rejection of supernaturalist explanations to expressions of the prevailing
metaphysical beliefs of the inquirers, and reduction of phenomena to scientific descriptions.
Strategic naturalism would take this as an account of what actually happens when knowing
subjects attempt to naturalize elements of inquiry, putting naturalism in an historically situated
context. Furthermore, it positions naturalism as but one belief that makes up a system or network
of beliefs and therefore, makes it a proper candidate for revision. For FSE, the continuity of
epistemology and science maintains a holistic and attenuated view of the fact/value distinction
taken for granted in the discussion of naturalism. While it is possible and valuable at times to
distinguish claims with explicit normative content from those with explicit descriptive content,
this distinction obscures the influence of other non-epistemic, and non-scientific norms on
justifications of knowledge claims or the nature of knowledge. As I discuss in chapter three,
Harding’s position is that an empiricism that refers to everyday experience is a worthwhile
notion with which to begin. To naturalize would require not merely looking at everyday
experiences but analyzing the ideologies that undergird our descriptions and interpretations of
everyday experience.
The second holistic commitment of Harding’s version of naturalism is the rejection of the
distinction between knowing subjects and the objects of study. Strategic naturalism is not a static
concept that is applied by knowing subjects or communities onto passive objects of study.
Rather, it is a position that must be understood historically, previous definitions and applications,
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determined by actual practice, and must be reflected upon. The ambiguity of naturalism, and
Papineau’s historical account of the shifting meanings and references of the term both point to
the necessity of acknowledging these shifts as a part of a naturalistic approach. Harding’s
strategic naturalism, in accord with critical feminist responses, recognizes the actual scientific
practices and theoretical models being used, and values the social/cultural values and forces that
have shaped scientific practices and the objects of study. Rejecting the separation between
knowing subject and objects of inquiry implies that subjects and objects should be studied such
that naturalism is not something that a knowing subject or community applies to passive objects
of study. This approach is pluralistic in its orientation, and given its emancipatory goals, is
motivated to measure epistemic progress in terms of how accessible it is to marginalized
standpoints as well as to how the knowledge produced might improve the lives of marginalized
peoples. Naturalistic science would be responsive to marginalized groups and aim to alleviate the
problems of marginalized peoples in its projects and research. Beyond the fact that epistemic
labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding recognizes that
epistemic labor is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs,
and practices. This approach has several implications. From a scientific standpoint, the
underdetermination thesis looms large. Evidence can be explained by any number of seemingly
conflicting theories or models. As pointed out by FSE and other feminists, scientists cannot
produce culture-free representations and, Harding notes, “intellectuals-- economics or science
theorists, ontologists and epistemologists-- occupy social structure positions as intensely as
anyone else. We are not floating around outside them.” 160 Therefore, analyses of analytic
categories like gender, as well as the social, cultural, and political values and interests at play in
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these theories and models would be essential to methodologies and explanatory models. The
knowledge produced would offer a candid account of the sphere of inquiry, the condition of the
relationship between inquirers and the objects of inquiry, and hopefully, a realistic view of the
consequences and outcomes of inquiry. This supports Harding’s arguments for strong objectivity
and her claim that we should aim not for theories that are true, but for theories that are less false,
and less distorted. Quine does grant that there are ideological commitments that are expressed in
science—in the broadest way Quine meant it—and in our language. However, he places these
commitments outside the purview and investigation of science. The situated self-reflection that
characterizes FSE’s general approach and application suggest that Harding’s strategic naturalism
would find Quine’s approach lacking.
The third holistic commitment is to the communal character of knowledge. Chapter two
describes Quine’s critical anti-individualism regarding knowledge claims: individualistic
accounts of knowledge that start from the internal mental processes and ideas of individual,
knowing subjects are not naturalized. FSE accepts the characterization of knowledge as located
in community; however, FSE does not draw restrictions on which elements of that community
are to be included in naturalizing the way Quine does. Quine’s unwillingness to consider the
influence of social and cultural values and interests makes QNE as problematic and
unprogressive as non-naturalized epistemologies. By reflecting critically on those social and
cultural values, and recognizing their influence on these practices, the relevant characteristics
and forces of a knowledge community are vested with explanatory power. Another important
implication is that determining who is included in the communities of knowledge would also be
revisable. The ideologies that shape communities of knowledge must be recognized and gauged
because hypotheses are informed by what these communities want to know and what they want
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to do. Science practiced in previous eras reflected aims to “provide solutions to a culturally
distinctive set of social projects,” 161 and going forward, scientific and epistemic practices would
be no different. What would be different would be that given the acknowledgment of culturally
distinctive elements of both subjects and objects of inquiry, the knowledge produced and the
decisions made based on that knowledge would be less distorted and inclusive. The input of
marginalized standpoints would be proportional to the consequences borne by those standpoints;
research proposals and decisions about how to use the knowledge produced would reflect that.
In this context, the third of Nelson’s criteria for evaluating an epistemology as naturalized
is relevant: a naturalized epistemology would use consistent principles by which to explain
consensus and dissent, and progressive and less progressive episodes in science. FSE’s
characterization as a critical theory would mean that consensus and dissent, and progressive and
less progressive episodes should be determined by noting to what extent marginalized others,
from achieved epistemological standpoints, may contribute to scientific progress and the
accumulation of knowledge. Harding’s aim is to submit the practices, and conceptual and
theoretical assumptions of science to critical assessments that include historical and selfreflective analyses. Critical accounts of past scientific successes would serve as evidence to
support recommendations for future research, methods, techniques, and practices that are
produced by how scientific success is or has been defined, and the effects of these successes on
marginalized peoples.
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Standpoint as a Resource for Epistemology
My aim has been to look to Harding’s FSE and the strategic naturalism it entails in search
of guiding principles that might be applied to epistemology to make it more naturalistic, which is
to say that it is an epistemology that acknowledges how and what we actually know, and how we
use that knowledge to augment further inquiry. Any guiding principle would be offered up for
revision based on the result of empirical and historical research from natural and social sciences,
analyses of the ideologies concerning gender, social and cultural assumptions described by
Schiebinger and Harding, and the evaluation of norms relevant to the inquiry undertaken. The
normativity would be focused not merely on beliefs or justifications of beliefs but also on the
structure and process of the inquiry itself. The holism at work in FSE requires evaluation of
every aspect of epistemological inquiry. This holistic and pluralistic approach would have an
impact on the methods and goals of epistemology and the critical evaluation of relevant
concepts, categories and kinds at work in inquiry, including the recognition of difference, the
recognition and benefit of acknowledging the role values and interests play in inquiry and
knowledge, the impact of social, cultural and political structures and institutions on
epistemological inquiry. As Harding acknowledges in Is Science Multicultural? (1999),
standpoint strategies locate resources for knowledge production originating in marginalized
contexts rather than contexts of dominant frameworks. Determination of these contexts result
from examining and questioning conceptual practices at work in modern science, philosophy of
science, and epistemology. Beginning epistemic inquiry in this way helps explain the larger
context of political and social relations. Standpoints are not meant to essentialize or universalize,
nor to determine the judgment or outlook of a learning community based on its political and
social location. Rather, they call for a multiplicity of factors to be considered. Analyses done in
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a variety of disciplines becomes a source for one and perhaps the only guiding principle
currently available from this perspective: empirical data. This empirical data, however, can and
should be used in a myriad of ways. As Harding points out, we should see FSE as “an
epistemology, a philosophy of science, a sociology of knowledge, and method of research.” 162
Because the assumptions of each of these projects is indicated in the others, the upshot is that
adopting a standpoint methodology will aid in the detection of broad cultural and conceptual
frameworks that “limit knowledge-seeking projects.” 163 The standpoint approach could be one
way to open up the variety of approaches that have defined epistemology: conceptual analyses
that move beyond linguistic conceptions, intuitions, issues of epistemic trust, justification, and
agency. It would also provide a space for epistemic progress. Epistemological progress, because
it is difficult to define, cannot be predicted or guaranteed. The attempt to find a definitive set of
epistemic principles would seem to be a misplaced objective. Any distinguishing marks,
epistemological achievements, new epistemic standards or determination of the criteria by which
to assess idea as constituting epistemological progress can be broached in broad strokes.
Charges of cognitive relativism that often are attributed to pluralistic epistemologies such
as Harding’s are mitigated in several ways. Firstly, Harding makes a crucial distinction between
Judgmental (or epistemological) Relativism and Sociological Relativism. Judgmental relativism
holds that there can be no way to evaluate the truth or falsity of knowledge claims unless there is
prioritizing of epistemic privilege. If there are no objective truth or criteria by which to make
evaluations, then there is no way to make judgments. Strong objectivity is Harding’s attempt to
move away from the fruitless choice between objectivity traditionally defined in terms of
neutrality, and judgmental (epistemic) relativism. FSE is not advocating this kind of relativism.
162
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Sociological relativism holds that people of different cultures and eras will have different beliefs
and different sets of criteria by which to evaluate knowledge claims. FSE calls for the
recognition that beliefs--including scientific and epistemological—are socially situated and
require critical evaluation and analysis already discussed. Another way to respond to the
charges is by looking at the history of science familiar to us. We can see both the successes and
failures of scientific practices at work have been conducted successfully without conclusive
concepts and definitions. A third way to respond is to remember, as Harding notes, that
knowledge production always occurs in “disunified and unstable environments,” 164 so
acknowledgement of different frameworks and communication of said frameworks becomes an
important element of epistemological progress. Disunified and unstable environments have value
in the sense that they allow for tensions, which serve as opening spaces for synthesis and
novelty. Harding’s acknowledgment of tensions is a familiar idea in philosophy of science. In
“The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research” (1977), Thomas Kuhn
describes the tension between the desire for innovation and conservative resistance to change
that exists in scientific practice. He asserts that the successful scientist begins work by taking up
a set of “intellectual and manipulative commitments” and, at some point, must be able to
abandon those commitments in order to take up commitments of “[one’s] own invention.” 165
Ultimately, Kuhn claims that new traditions could only result from “investigations firmly rooted
in scientific tradition,” and this is why he, like Harding finds this tension “essential.” 166
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In the critical feminist responses discussed earlier, one of the underlying assumptions is
that epistemology should rely on the empirical evidence provided by the physical sciences.
However, feminists also strongly advocate the use of sources, models and analyses that originate
in the social sciences. Depending on the goals and objectives of the inquiry, there is always a
range of commitment to familiar epistemological concepts, including justification, methodology,
and objectivity that have been reconceived to be pluralistic, provisional, and open-ended in order
to successfully change and respond to our shifting environments, projects, goals, and
understandings. A naturalistic epistemological practice would acknowledge the diverse ways
humanity responds, and has responded to environments, to adjustments to the environment, and
how the environment responds to human knowers. It would be a holistic position because of the
continuity between science and epistemology, which have overlapping goals pertaining to the
pursuit of knowledge. Naturalized epistemologies should be receptive to not only empirical data
of all the sciences, but to the “organic roots of behavior and of consciousness.” 167 Data from
analyses of concepts or kinds at work in knowledge claims such as gender, race, and ethnicity,
for example, but also analysis of broader, institutional social and cultural structures would also
be included. Harding acknowledges the value of the responses and critiques of the traditional
narrative of modern science. Similarly, the value of the responses and critiques of traditional
epistemological theories and concepts feminist epistemologies bring to the table does not mean
that epistemological practices are completely rejected. What would it mean to include methods
and questions garnered from critical analyses and explanations by of epistemological work
feminist scholars? Standpoint epistemologies, epistemologies of ignorance
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(Sullivan and Tuana 2007), and epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) have all taken definitive step
toward epistemological progress by questioning and analyzing entrenched epistemological
concepts. These could contribute positively to our epistemological goals by expanding our
critical understanding of ourselves and the world we live in. As I have argued, FSE’s pluralistic
and critical approach could motivate epistemological progress by shaking up, once again,
epistemology’s central normative task, its general approach, and the knowledge it has produced.
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